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THE OPENING OF THE GULF OF AQABA

JOHN J. MCINTYRE

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THE OPENING OF THE GULF OF AQABA

by

John J. McIntyre

//

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: _____

Dean of the College

Date: _____

Date: _____

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of recorded history, the Middle East has been the stage on which unfolded an almost continuous drama of ascent and decline, of arsis and thesis, as civilization, cultures and peoples met in the great courtyard of the world and established patterns which had impact wherever there were men. Unlike many areas of the world, spawning grounds of less enduring civilizations, the Middle East retained its vital significance in an unbroken continuum of relevancy to the world as ages passed, each new act in the drama reinforcing or characterizing what had gone before rather than obliterating it.

One explanation for the permanence and endurance of the significance of the Middle East lies in the nature of the civilizations and cultures which have played the various roles. The Hittites, the Persians, the Medes and the Parthians, the Sassanians and the Byzantines, the Arabs and the Monguls, the Seljuks and the Ottomans met in the Middle East in an almost continuous superimposition which, perhaps by chronological accident, insured that at virtually no instant in history was the Middle East an area of only incidental importance.

But chronological accident is a foolish explanation for the motivated actions of the peoples of forty centuries. While

it has become almost axiomatic that modern political history is the history of power politics, it is no less true that the power configurations erected in the Middle East generated a dynamic which explains, in large manner, the primary relevance of the area for so long a period of time. Power relationships are certainly nothing new. The history of the Middle East, far older than the story of many subsequently overshadowed empires, is the story of the ebb and flow of political, military and economic power as it was born, matured and expanded through the accessible world.

Power, however, unlike energy, must be exercised. It must have a rationale, a focus. And power, continuously exercised in the Middle East since 3000 B. C. had its focus in the geography of the area. It requires a very scanty knowledge of the sweep of history to appreciate the fact that the area we now call the Middle East occupies the position of a link, in both geographical and historical terms, between the three great land masses of the eastern hemisphere. Sometimes a bridge, sometimes a barrier, occasionally a baffle selectively passing processed elements and retaining traces of the same elements in the pores of its culture, this has been the Middle East, and the era of modern history has had an "Eastern Question" since it began.

In modern times, the Middle East has been the scene of an almost continuous exercise of diplomacy and the geographical

It has become almost axiomatic that power politics is the history of power politics, it is to be said that the power configurations created in the world have generated a dynamic which explains, in large measure, the primary relevance of the area for so long a period of time. Power relationships are certainly working now. The history of the Middle East, for all that the story of any continuously overbalanced region, is the story of one and then of two, of the ally and enemy power as it was seen, when it was expanded through the Middle East.

Power, however, unlike energy, must be expended. It must have a resultant, a force. And power, continuously expended in the Middle East since 1900 A. D. has its focus in the geography of the area. It requires a very ready knowledge of the course of history to appreciate the fact that the area we now call the Middle East occupies the position of a link in both geographical and historical series, between the three great river basins of the eastern hemisphere. Sometimes a bridge, sometimes a barrier, occasionally a battle site, the passing processes of change and political power of the area are made in the course of the century, this has been the Middle East, and the area of modern history and its "Middle East" almost is begun.

In modern times, the Middle East has been the scene of an almost continuous series of historical and geographical

importance of the Muslim world continues to bear on the national interests of the members of the international community. A facet of this continuum of interest has been the drive of nations outside the Middle East to dominate or influence events within the area, even if this dominance had occasionally to manifest itself in enforcing irrelevance, never wholly successfully. In the inter-war period, for example, Great Britain and France frequently seemed guided in their Eastern policies by a desire to blanket the smouldering coals of Arab national consciousness in an attempt to maintain an international status quo unaffected by events in the area.

A second, and currently far more vital facet of the modern political Middle East has been the overwhelming force at work within the area. At a time in history preoccupied with the revolutions of nationalism in the underdeveloped world, events in the Middle East assume a gigantic relevancy in contemporary international relations as a second generation nationalism plays out its role. It would be of primary importance, in itself, this second generation revolution, were it concentrated in virtually any area on the face of the earth. Occurring as it does in an area of unparalleled strategic importance, the spectacle of modern Middle Eastern politics bears crucial significance for the entire world community.

Relatively weak in themselves, the Middle Eastern countries today can neither help nor control the impact their

importance of the Jewish world community to bear on the national interests of the members of the international community. 1

Least of this position of interest has been the effect of nations outside the Middle East to influence or influence events within the area, even if this influence has occasionally been exerted in religious or religious matters, never wholly un-essentially. In the inter-war period, for example, Great Britain and France frequently seemed guided in their Eastern policies by a desire to placate the swelling coils of Arab nationalism. Consequently in an attempt to maintain an international status and unaffected by events in the area.

A second, and currently far more vital facet of the Jewish political Middle East has been the overwhelming force as well within the area. At a time in history preoccupied with the revolution of capitalism in the underdeveloped world, events in the Middle East assume a significant relevancy in contemporary international relations as a national generation nation-ally plays out its role. It would be of primary importance, in itself, this second generation revolution, were it however, to be essentially any more on the face of the world. Hence, that as it does in an area of unexplained strategic importance, the spectacle of Jewish Middle Eastern politics takes on a significance for the entire world community.

Definitely seen in themselves, the Jewish people themselves may not realize they are bearing the largest share

relationships among themselves have on the rest of the world. With the exception of Egypt, each of these states were carved out of the territory wrested from a defeated Ottoman Empire at the Armistice of Mudros and were artificially erected by foreign powers unable to fulfill three mutually exclusive sets of promises made during the First World War.

It will be remembered that when the Conference of San Remo met in 1920 to formalize some settlement in the Middle East after the defeat of the Central Powers, the British had promised Sharif Husayn most of the entire area for the erection of an Arab state virtually coterminous with the central core of the Middle East.¹ Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had attempted to formalize an entirely different arrangement with France, dividing up the same territory promised to the Arabs between the French and the British. At odds with both agreements was the Balfour Declaration that "His Majesty's government would look with favor on the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Faced with the problems of making an artificially erected, externally imposed nation-state system work in this difficult context, the force known as Arab nationalism was caught off

¹ Indispensable for an understanding of the politics of the period is George Antonius', The Arab Awakening (London: H. Hamilton and Co., 1938).

balance at the precise moment that it was attaining an organized momentum and it fragmented. Arab nationalists in, say Iraq, still clung to the idea of an Arab nation but by 1945 the idea of an Arab nation not structured on Hashemite dynastic lines was an uncomfortable concept for the Iraqis. In Syria and Lebanon, Arab nationalism also claimed ardent followers but to the politically more sophisticated Levantines, schooled for a generation in republicanism, an entirely different concept of such a "nation" was held.

Various plans were circulated in the late thirties and during the Second World War which had as their objective the destruction of the artificial San Remo borders in favor of a final effort to give substance to the dream of Sharif Husayn, and in 1944 Egypt craftily consented to act as the broker for a marriage between the semi-independent, semi-articulate political entities of the Middle East. Conferring in Egypt in 1944, representatives of the Arab states were able to produce the famous Alexandria Protocol signed on October 7, 1944, which set forth the idea of a League of Arab States. This strongly popular document was an idealistic statement of a desire for a strong Arab League, but a compromise measure at best. A quarter century of effort in building political stability within the nation-state framework had destroyed much of the consensus there once was for a single, monolithic Arab state and what remained was hammered and moulded into the Protocol.

Balance of the forces which led to the abolition of slavery
was not as it appeared. The abolitionists in 1833
still clung to the idea of an ideal nation but by 1848 the idea
of an ideal nation was subordinate to economic, political and
social considerations. In 1833 the
abolitionists also viewed slavery as a moral evil
to the politically more sophisticated Americans, abolitionists
a generation in revolution, an entirely different concept of
such a "nation" was held.

Various plans were discussed in the 1840s for the
during the 1840s the idea of an ideal nation was
abolition of the ideal nation was subordinate to
final effort to give substance to the idea of ideal nation,
and in 1848 the ideal nation was subordinate to the ideal nation
a struggle between the anti-slavery, anti-slavery poli-
tical entities of the 1840s. Confronted in 1848 in
1848, representatives of the 1848 ideal nation also in 1848
the 1848 ideal nation fought on October 7, 1848, which
set forth the idea of a league of free states. This struggle
political movement was an idealistic movement of a nation
a strong ideal league, but a compromise measure at best.
fourth century of effort to realize political idealism with
in the 1840s the 1848 ideal nation was subordinate to the 1848
abolitionists were for a single, unified free state and
which remained an idealistic and political ideal.

Individualism in the Middle East vitiated even the Alexandria Protocol, however, and when the Pact of the League of Arab States was signed at Zafaran Palace in Cairo on March 22, 1945, it was a far weaker document than had been planned the previous autumn. In the absence of any rationale of commonality, blocs had developed within Arabdom jealous of national power and the League emerged as an instrument of Egyptian-Saudi conservatism constructed to obstruct Iraq and Trans-Jordan in any moves calculated to unite the northern tier into a Greater Syria.²

The strength of the Arab League was not its insides. Just as the human body, no matter how ill and infirm it may be at a given moment, is able to rally strength for defense against infection, so it was with the Arab League. For the strength of the Arab League was never its friendship, but its antipathy. The Arab League lived on its desire to be rid of England and France and to "once and for all" destroy the growing menace to Arabism posed by the Zionist movement into Palestine.

² On the Arab League and its problems, see M. Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement," American Journal of International Law, October, 1946, pp. 756-777; "The Arab League, Development and Difficulties," The World Today, May, 1957, pp. 187-197; "Cross Currents Within the Arab League," ibid., January, 1948, pp. 12-25; A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective," The Middle East Journal, April, 1947, pp. 125-136 and particularly T. R. Little, "The Arab League--A Reassessment," ibid., Spring, 1956, pp. 138-150.

For the text of the Pact, see Basic Documents of the League of Arab States, Collection Number 1, April, 1955 (New York: The Arab Information Center, 1955), pp. 9-16.

Administered for all practical purposes by the Jewish Agency, the British Mandate in Palestine had been erected in 1924 in fulfillment of the promise made in the Balfour Declaration. Little by little, the Agency planned to acquire land in the mandate to accommodate the rising tide of Jewish immigrants and as political consciousness matured within Palestine, it was evident as early as 1938 that full independence as a national state was the objective of the movement. When the Second World War ended, the nationalism of the Arabs had to contend not only with the parochialism generated by its division into separate nationalisms but with the horror of an alien people and an alien nationalism mushrooming within the very territory considered as the location of its own homeland.

Following the Second World War, events in the Middle East continued to occupy the attention of the world but for almost the first time in centuries, the activity began to take on an element of immanence. Centuries ago Aristotle had defined life as "spontaneous and immanent motion"; after World War II, a case could be made for the thesis that the Middle East was coming to life. No less preoccupied than with the Eastern Question of the previous century, observers found themselves watching the unfolding of a new dynamic which now had its origins not in the foreign ministries of the great capitals of Europe but in the palaces and souks within the Middle East. The focus had shifted from the things which were being done

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to the Middle East to the things which were being done in the Middle East by persons and forces which were indigenous to the area.

The same national interests still obtained in Whitehall and on the Quai d'Orsay, to be sure, given added edge now by the fact that the area had been lately proven to contain upwards of half the world's petroleum supply, but at a time when Western civilization was almost literally fighting for its life, it was difficult to relate the same degree of encompassing importance to the area which had previously motivated such total involvement with the Eastern Question. In this same context, a somewhat curious aspect of developments in the Middle East stemmed from the fact that the unsettled conditions in the central core had only a tangential relevance to the Cold War being waged everywhere else. In a sense, the Middle East had its own problems after 1946.

After the Arab-Israeli "War" of 1948-49, a certain balance of power arose in the Middle East which lasted for seven troubled years. It was a balance in the sense that a certain perilous equilibrium existed as each "side" in the conflict refrained from any major attempts at alteration of the status quo.

Noted analysts were pessimistic about the survival chances of the newly proclaimed State of Israel. A new form of Arab nationalism was born in Egypt which seemed to rekindle the dying spark of Arab Unity and the prestige of the Western powers declined annually as their policies

to the Middle East in the Middle East which were being done in
the Middle East by persons and forces which were indigenous
to the area.

The same persons, however, will be asked to
Whitehall and to the UN Security Council, given added
edges now by the fact that the UN has lately moved to
become a center of world's political activity, but at
a time when Western civilization was almost totally disintegrating

for its life, it was difficult to imagine the same degree of
cooperation, especially to the area which had previously
received much great involvement with the Eastern Question.
In this new context, a somewhat different aspect of develop-
ment in the Middle East appeared from the fact that the un-
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After the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49, a certain
balance of power arose in the Middle East which lasted for
seven troubled years. It was a balance in the sense that a
certain political equilibrium existed at that time in the
conflict between the two major powers as a reflection of
the status quo.

Recent analysis was presented about the survival
chances of the newly established State of Israel. A new
form of Arab nationalism was born in Egypt which seemed to
challenge the dying spirit of Arab unity and the prestige of
the Western power system, especially in their policies.

foundered in the complexities of an ambivalent Arab posture in world affairs which they either could not or would not understand. A premium was put on answers and analogies and the west refused to conceive of a situation where analogies produced no answers and there were simply too few analogies. Agitation was a premium similarly within the area as the troubled Arab nations sought to retain their self-respect and atone not only for their military embarrassment of 1949 but for the fact of the establishment of the new Israel.

When the seven years of "peace" was crumpled by the events of October, 1956, the anachronism of all out war by a minor power held a fatal fascination for the world. Conditioned to a world in which war had meant total annihilation, the fact of a war which bore no risk of annihilation but instead had as its aims the traditional utility of the institution of war was indeed an oddity. Viewed from the capitals of the nuclear powers, the Sinai War was a contextual curiosity. But to the Middle East, it was a somewhat necessary event which had very definite causes and which should have had very definite results. As an anachronism itself, it is a fascinating study.

But more germane to contemporary world politics, an even more worthwhile study is the historical fact of the Sinai War overlaid on the patterns of international organizational efforts to achieve peace in the middle decade of the twentieth century.

together in the realization of an ambitious and positive
to world affairs which they might not or would not
understand. A similar was put in evidence and analyzed and
the most serious consequence of a situation which was
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from the seven years of "peace" but disrupted by the
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a minor power held a total position for the world. Con-
ditioned by a world in which war had meant total annihilation,
the fact of a war which was no war of annihilation but in-
stead had as its aim the strategic victory of the Israeli
twice of war was limited in scope. Viewed from the position
of the nuclear power, the United States was a continental entity,
but to the Middle East, it was a somewhat necessary event which
had very definite consequences and which should have had very

definite results. As an international itself, it is a
fascinating study.

Two more questions of contemporary world politics, an
even more worldwide study in the historical fact of the
which was avoided in the past and international organiza-
tional efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East at the
twenty-first century.

The old met the new in the wastes of the Sinai desert, on the Gaza frontier and at Sharm el-Sheikh, as traditional diplomacy extended itself by traditionally "other" means. The old met the new in the great hall of the United Nations as force was restrained by consensus and somehow in the process, something really new emerged. For the first time in history, the forces of the "new" were able to field an army of sufficient size and prestige to separate the combatants and return the situation back to its precarious balance. Many feel that the entire Suez-Sinai Crisis was therefore a colossal waste for all concerned. Egypt retained the autonomy she claimed over the Canal, adding the new revenue she had hoped for in nationalization. Britain and France lost valuable prestige where there was precious little prestige to go around. Israel was badly and vocally disappointed in the outcome of her efforts.

There was, however, at least one victory. This was a war that somebody "won" in the traditional sense of the word.

In October 1956, one nation--Egypt--had access to both the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In April, 1957, the same could be said of her hated rival, Israel.

It was a victory in the sense that a political "situation" had operated through the Egyptian boycott to prevent Israel from using anything but her Mediterranean port facilities to traffic in commodities. The same political "situation" had thwarted her attempts to enjoy what

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she felt were her rights under international law in the face of armed forces preventing that enjoyment. The same political "situation" had forced other world powers, neutral in her controversy, to honor claims of her enemies in violation of the same legal standards which they themselves were anxious to proclaim to the rest of the world. The same political "situation" had prevented the development of a substantial portion of her geography.

The victory came when the "situation" was eliminated.

The opening of the Gulf of Aqaba as a result of the Suez Crisis reversed these political situations. In the classic sense, a state had gone to war to extend diplomacy by other means and while it failed to create a new power structure, it was able to obtain by force of arms in the field what it had been unable to obtain at the conference table.

In a deeper sense however, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a defeat for the international community in the same measure as it was a victory for Israel. Substantive issues notwithstanding, the fact of a political advantage being wrested anywhere on the face of the earth by clash of arms can be viewed in light of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations as a defeat.

The inter-relationship between the forgotten victory and the ignored defeat is the main theme of this study, although it is never mentioned or described in just those terms. Vic-

tory and defeat are relative, to be sure, depending on aspect and interests. In the question of the Gulf of Aqaba in international relations from 1946 to 1957, the elements of both are so continually present as to form a counterpoint well worth listening to.

The main problem of this study is to determine how and why the defeat and the victory occurred.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

As a bridge or "baffle" between Europe, Asia and Africa, the Middle East owes much of its history to its limited accessibility, protected by natural barriers from indiscriminate use as a thoroughfare for general traffic. The mountain ranges of the north effectively isolate the Fertile Crescent from Eurasia except at the traditional passes of antiquity and to the south, the Arabian peninsula is isolated from the rest of the world by seas of great strategic significance. To the east, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman wash the oil rich Hasa Coast of Kuwait, Qatar and the Omans while the Arabian Sea has been traditionally the most important means of access to the Hadhramut.

South and west of the peninsula, the Red Sea slashes the topography with the narrow Bab el-Mendeab separating Yemen and Aden on the eastern shore from the Eritrean-Somali coast of Africa on the west. It washes a thousand miles of some of the most forbidding territory on earth and at its northern extremity, it splits into two well defined fingers which thrust further north toward the Mediterranean Sea.

The westernmost finger, the Gulf of Suez, is entered through the Strait of Jubal and the southern terminus of the

Suez Canal at the port of Suez is the northern anchor of the Gulf. The topography of its coasts, spawning grounds for freakish winds, makes it a difficult waterway to navigate and the current, while well charted, is frequently unpredictable. While this current is partly due to the spill from the Canal, the wind in the Gulf made it a one way waterway during the centuries between the last oared galleys of the Romans and the age of steam.

Less well known and somewhat more treacherous is the eastern finger which extends from the Red Sea in a north-by-northeast direction forming a vee with the Gulf of Suez. This is the Gulf of Aqaba, an entirely different geographical and topographical personality from its sister.¹ Almost one hundred miles long, the Gulf of Aqaba averages only fifteen miles in width and is entered through a narrow valve-like throat between the island of Tiran and the mainland of the Sinai Peninsula known as the Strait of Tiran.² Two channels

¹ Ancient geographers considered that the peninsula jutted into a single body of water and named this body the Bay of Reeds (Sinus Aelaniticus) corresponding to the two modern Gulfs. See the excellent charts of the area in Luc H. Grollenberg, Atlas of the Bible (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1956).

² There is no agreement as to whether this throat should be called the Strait or the Straits of Tiran. The island obviously divides the water area in two although only the westernmost separation is usable.

Great Canal at the foot of Great is the northern limit of the Gulf. The topography of the basin, sloping towards the west, makes it a difficult matter to navigate and the current, while well defined, is frequently unsteady. While this current is fairly good in the Gulf from the Canal, the wind in the Gulf adds in a way whereby current the connection between the last canal passage of the Panama and the sea of Mexico.

Less well known and somewhat more important is the eastern limit which extends from the sea in a northerly-northeast direction forming a bay with the Gulf of Mexico. This is the Gulf of Mexico, an entirely different geographical and topographical formation from the latter. Almost one hundred miles long, the Gulf of Mexico averages only fifteen miles in width and is entered through a narrow five-mile strait between the island of Yucatan and the mainland of the Isthmus of Panama known as the Straits of Yucatan. Two channels

¹ Indeed, early writers considered that the peninsula joined into a single body of water and named this body the Bay of Mexico. (Humboldt, 1805) corresponding to the two modern gulfs. The earliest charts of this area in fact show the Gulf of Mexico (Humboldt, 1805) and some, 1805).

² There is no agreement as to whether this body should be called the Gulf of the Straits of Yucatan. The island obviously divides the water into two although only the westernmost portion is navigable.

have been marked out through this narrow strait and the western one, known as the Enterprise Channel on current hydrographic charts, is the one in use today by normal shipping.³ Entering the Gulf, the mariner finds himself in an area of many reefs and tiny islands, the water enclosed by faulted, steep slopes which rise to an elevation of at least two thousand feet in the narrows north of Dahab.⁴ Just behind these slopes, mountains can be seen to the east and west giving the impression that the ship has entered a chute funnelling into the face of a constant north wind which accentuates the apparent speed of the vessel. While the slopes are occasionally broken by a few rugged wadis, there is no continuous foreland until very near the end of the passage northward. There are no trails following the coast to the west and the ancient one following the coast from Aqaba to Haqal on the east had to be hewn out of solid rock centuries ago.

As the northern end of the Gulf is neared, the mountains on either side seem to dip toward the center to accommodate the divide formed by the Wadi Araba which stretches another hundred miles north to the Dead Sea continuing the impression of a funnel. The northern coast of the Gulf of Aqaba is only sixty miles south of the northern-

³United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, H.O. 157, Sailing Instructions For the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 171-174.

⁴These slopes have considerable bearing on the military operations described infra, Chapter IV.

have been reached and through this narrow strait and the western end, whence as the hydrographic channel on current hydrographic course, it is now in use today for naval shipping. Entering the Gulf, the western limit itself in an area of many reefs and shipwrecks, the water enclosed by Lampedusa, being also, which rise to an elevation of at least two thousand feet in the narrow north of Dohat. Last being some ships, mountains can be seen to the east and west giving the impression that the ship has entered a chute funneling into the face of a constant north wind which concentrates the apparent wind of the vessel. While the ships are occasionally broken by a few rugged walls, there is no continuous landward until very near the end of the passage westward. There are no trails following the coast to the west and the nearest one following the coast from Akaba to Jeddah on the west had to be made out of solid rock centuries ago.

As the northern end of the Gulf is reached, the mountains of Akaba rise to dip toward the center to accommodate the first channel by the west which separates another rugged ridge north to the head sea containing the impression of a funnel. The northern coast of the Gulf of Akaba is only a few miles north of the northern-

¹United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, H.O. 117, General Instructions for the Use and the Gulf of Akaba (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900, pp. 17-18).

²These ships have considerable bearing on the oiling operations described there, Chapter IV.

most point on the Gulf of Suez but whereas the Suez traveller enters the Bay of Suez and the metropolitan area of the city of Suez, no such visual hospitality greets the northern bound traveller on the Gulf of Aqaba.

The northern coast is almost artificially square. At either "corner" roughly six miles apart, two settlements have been made and between them is what appears to be a wasteland slashed by the usually dry bed of the Wadi Araba stretching north into the distance as far as the eye can see.⁵ The territory between the two settlements is a political wasteland, as will be shown, and the topography seems to emphasize this fact. To the right, facing north, is the Jordanian town of Aqaba with the only decent wells in the area and thus the best date gardens. Greenery from the tops of the date palms is visible above the tops of the squat buildings and the appurtenances of a light cargo port facility stretch down to the water's edge.

To the left is the Israeli port of Eilat⁶ roughly the same size as its opposite number five miles away, but

⁵The valley of the Araba, the Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley are part of the "Great Depression" which extends from Syria southward through the Red Sea into the heart of East Africa. See Grollenberg, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶Eilat is the preferred spelling although Elath is frequently seen. The word comes from the same root structure as the name of the ancient Sinus Aelaniticus which gives it its name. Premier Ben Gurion refuses to refer to the body of water as the Gulf of Aqaba, calling it instead the Gulf of Eilat.

most point on the Gulf of Gura and whence the river
 travels to the sea. The bay of Gura and the surrounding
 area of the city of Gura, on which stands the
 ruins of the northern tower, is situated on the Gulf of Gura.
 The northern coast is almost entirely barren.
 At other "corners" roughly six miles apart, the coastline
 has four bays and between them is what appears to be a
 straight line. The coastline is roughly the same as the
 straight line. The distance between the two points is a
 political distance, as will be shown, and the coastline
 seems to emphasize this fact. To the right, facing north,
 is the Jordanian town of Gura with the only stone wall
 in the area and from the sea side. The distance from
 the bays at the same point is visible above the tops of the
 great buildings and the appearance of a light curve over
 locally straight line to the water's edge.
 To the left is the Israeli port of Gura, roughly
 the same size as the opposite number five miles away, but

The valley of the Jordan, the Dead Sea and the Jordan
 valley are part of the "Great Depression" which extends from
 Syria through Jordan to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Gura.
 Africa. See Gura, pp. 10, 11.

Gura is the greatest of the Jordanian cities. It is
 frequently mentioned. The word comes from the same root as
 Gura, the name of the Jordanian city. Gura is the name of
 the city of Gura. Gura is the name of the city of Gura.
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 the city of Gura. Gura is the name of the city of Gura.

its personality is almost immediately distinguishable from Aqaba. Eilat is more colorful to look at. Its buildings are all new and have been engineered with an eye to providing just the sort of contrast with Aqaba as is mentioned here. The dockside facilities are somewhat more elaborate and the squat petroleum jetty with its yellow and green pumping heads provides a splash of color against the drabness of the brown earth. Officially designated a "port" on June 25, 1952, Eilat is further distinguished from Aqaba by the round cylindrical oil storage tank farm off to the west of the docks and if appearances are to be taken as the sole judge, the casual observer would rate both towns about equal in cargo handling capacity. Laid out as a modern "city", with a grade A hotel as a major inducement to an expanding tourist clientele, Eilat's 5000 inhabitants are occupying an area which was completely barren save for a police station in 1948.⁷

⁷The first private houses were built in 1958 by a group of South African investors and the air conditioned hotel was opened in January of that same year. Most of the development is done by the Eilat Building and Development Company, Ltd., formed by South African, Canadian and Israeli investors. See the Israeli Government, Israel Yearbook (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1958), p. 165. Ben Gurion has a deep personal interest in Eilat over and above the political and economic interests of the government which will be discussed in this chapter. During his retirement between terms as premier, he lived in a kibbutz in the Negev and has frequently expressed what he calls the great dream of making Eilat "the Los Angeles of Israel." See Gertrude Samuels, Report on Israel (New York: Herzl Press, 1960), pp. 40-41 and particularly the center fold of current photographs of the development.

its personality is almost completely lost. The
 again. This is very evident in the fact that the
 are all now and this is a very serious situation
 which has led to the fact that the country is now
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The first project was built in 1955 by a
 group of young African students and the air conditioned
 hotel was built in January of that year. The
 development is now in the state of a state of
 Company, Ltd., owned by the state of a state of
 Israeli Government. The Israeli Government, Israeli
 book (Jerusalem). The Government of Israel, 1955, p. 105.
 Gordon has a long personal interest in the country and
 the political and economic interests of the government which
 will be discussed in this chapter. During his visit
 between the two countries, he lived in a house in the
 and has frequently expressed his interest in the
 of which this is the subject of this book. The
 Gordon, Israel (New York, World Press, 1955).
 pp. 10-11 and particularly see page 101 at various points
 of the development.

The natural endowment of the region is scanty at best. The best area for comparison is probably southern Egypt where the rainfall is approximately the same⁸ but no rivers or wadis, other than the Wadi Araba pock the tableland to indicate a holding capacity for the 3.5 inches of annual rainfall. Inland on the slopes, rainfall reaches 8 inches annually but is mostly wasted on the rocky and rugged faces of the cliffs. Wells are few and far between and the yearly heat makes grazing a very limited endeavor. The annual temperature span averages from about 78 degrees in January to well over the hundred degree mark in the summer months, a factor which underscores Israeli determination to settle Eilat when it is considered that the entire drinking water supply of the town must be distilled.

Close together are the two air facilities serving the towns, complete with two sets of air navigational aids.⁹ The Eilat airport is an attempt at sophistication in the desert and is serviced regularly as is the Aqaba facility which is somewhat more primitive. The Eilat personnel

⁸ William W. Jeffries (ed.) Geography and National Power (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1958), p. 80.

⁹ Royal Air Force, Supplementary Flight Information Document (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, monthly through 1962), pp. 42 and 44. See also United States Air Force, World Aeronautical Chart Number 447 and Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Facts About Israel, 1961 (Ramat Gan: Peli PEC Printing Works, Ltd., 1962), p. 107.

maintain a radio beacon, the terminal fix on the Eilat-Beersheba corridor and the Jordanian Air Ministry maintains Eureka direction finding services from the Aqaba tower four miles to the east.

North from Eilat, the new Israeli highway stretches 213 miles into the heart of Beersheba paralleling the pipeline and the new railroad which together make up the "dry land Suez Canal" described so glowingly by the Israeli Ministry of Information. Completed in February, 1958, the well engineered asphalt highway is one of the most important factors in the developmental scheme for Eilat. Prior to this decade, the passage to the Mediterranean from the Gulf of Aqaba was infinitely more difficult than the relatively easy passage through the Suez Canal and even prior to the opening of the Canal a century ago, the advantages of the Egyptian route were largely unquestioned. Despite the difficulty of this passage prior to the miracle of modern black-top and diesel, however, governments established in the north have frequently attempted to occupy the region to develop trade with the east and imperial interest in the headland of the Gulf can be traced in the patterns of political geography back to Biblical times.

Early Patterns

The first attempt to trade through the Gulf of Aqaba is probably reported in the Book of Kings dating around the year 1000 B.C.:

maintain a wide beach, the terminal 125 on the left-
 hand side of the beach and the terminal 125 on the right-
 hand side of the beach. The beach is 125 feet wide.

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Early History

The first history of the beach is found in the early part of the 19th century.

It is generally reported that the beach was first settled in the early part of the 19th century.

Year 1800 A.D.

King Solomon made a navy of ships in Ezion-geber, which is beside Eloth . . . in the land of Edom. And Hiram sent in the navy his servants, shipmen that had a knowledge of the sea, with the servants of Solomon. And they came to Ophir and fetched from thence gold, four hundred and twenty talents, and brought it to King Solomon.¹⁰

Archaeological evidence developed in the late thirties located the ancient foundry town of Ezion-geber about four miles west of the modern site of Aqaba about five hundred yards inland and the rate of sedimentation in the Gulf has been variously interpreted to place the town on the water. There may have been two settlements, one a foundry ingeniously designed to catch the blast of north wind for forced draft and the other a maritime settlement temporarily used during Solomon's sea ventures.¹¹ The introduction of the camel into western Asia at about this time resulted in a busy traffic of camel caravans through the area and in time the difficult passage by sea down the Gulf and through the straits was probably abandoned for the more economical and characteristic land routes.¹²

¹⁰3 Kings, 9:26. See also Deuteronomy 2:8 which mentions Eloth (Eilat) as a stopping place on the Exodus and Numbers, 33:35.

¹¹Leonard Cottrell (ed.), The Concise Encyclopaedia of Archaeology (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1960), p. 74.

¹²Hermann von Wissmann, "On the Role of Nature and Man in Changing the Face of the Dry Belt in Asia," in Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, William L. Thomas, Jr., ed. (Chicago: World Books, 1956), p. 296.

The following table shows a summary of the results of the survey conducted in the various districts of the Province of Ontario, during the year 1900. The results are given in the following table, which is divided into two parts, the first showing the results of the survey conducted in the various districts, and the second showing the results of the survey conducted in the Province as a whole.

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The Romans arrived on the scene during the first century before Christ and administered the Holy Land for several centuries. The first real road was constructed to the Gulf during this period but there seems to have been little trade by sea, if any, through the Gulf. The Romans did use the Nile for transportation from the east and since they were in possession of both Gulfs, it seems logical that they favored the route overland across the isthmus of Suez and through the Red Sea rather than the more forbidding Aqaba route. Additionally, Roman oared galleys were well suited to sailing in the Gulf of Suez and this was probably another factor which favored Suez over Aqaba.¹³

The Nabataens of Petra were in actual control of the area during the early Christian era and again, no record of trade through the Gulf has been found for this period.¹⁴ The Nabataens were a farming community and they built their wealth on cereal cultivation supplanted to some extent by trade with the peoples of the Arabian desert.

¹³Theodor F. Meysels, Eilat, Old and New (Eilat: Israel Government Tourist Corporation and the Local Council: undated), pp. 15-24. This vest pocket guide for the tourist in Eilat is a surprisingly complete history of the early period.

¹⁴The rise of the Nabataean kingdom owed some of its importance to its position as a halting place for caravans carrying oriental trade overland via Aqaba. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

The first really detailed history of the area concerns the Crusades and considerable interest was shown in the Aqaba area by King Baldwin of Jerusalem.¹⁵ In 1115 Baldwin rode south from Jerusalem with a force of two hundred men to occupy the present site of the town of Aqaba. A permanent installation was made there with a fort and a bishopric established which became part of the seigneurie of Montreal which corresponded roughly with the pre-1948 area of Trans-Jordan. To control the Gulf, the Crusaders found it necessary to establish themselves on the tiny island of Gezira Firun which lies twelve miles south-west of Eilat which they named Isle de Graye. To this day, this island is the only place near the head of the Gulf which affords protection from the sudden gales of winter but the protection is far from being a significant factor to modern ships.¹⁶ Moslems captured the island in 1170 and almost immediately, the Crusaders abandoned their mainland holdings. When their attempt to recapture it in 1182 failed, the Crusaders seem to have abandoned all plans to hold Aqaba

¹⁵ See particularly Alexander Melamid, "The Political Geography of the Gulf of Aqaba," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, September, 1957, p. 232, which summarizes Volume II of Runciman's History of the Crusades.

¹⁶

United States Navy, op. cit., p. 175.

in an interesting commentary on what must have been a maritime orientation in their original plan. Very little trade ever developed through the Gulf during Crusader control and for lack of an eastern outlet for trade, the southern kingdom remained rather poor. The northern kingdoms, with better outlets eastward, survived far longer than their neighbors to the south who succumbed to the Arabs in 1189. It is not too difficult to imagine that had the Crusaders developed any trade in addition to the sea-shell business which delighted twelfth-century Europe, their tenure might have been affected.

When the Crusaders left the headland of the Gulf, the Arabs showed little interest in the area and it disappeared from history for almost seven centuries. In 1836, an enterprising French explorer, Jean de Laborde made a journey through Arabia Petra to Mount Sinai and recalling the French origins of the kingdom of Jerusalem, attempted to establish a claim on the previous French occupation but the lack of importance of the Gulf during the nineteenth century during the period of active French imperialism in the Middle East prevented his claim from being taken seriously.¹⁷

Modern History

At the beginning of the 19th century, Egypt was a

¹⁷ Melamid, loc. cit.

as an international community we must have been a
 positive contribution to the world scene. Very little
 has been done through the half-century since 1945
 and the fact of an almost total lack of progress
 southern regions remains a sad fact. The southern high-
 lands, with their rich natural resources, have been
 given their rightful place in the world and recognized as the
 basis of life. It is not too difficult to believe that
 had the Government recognized the truth in relation to the
 sea-shore resources, the development of the country might
 have been different.

When the Government left the island of the Gulf,
 the people were left to fend for themselves in the area and it took
 nearly two years for the island to be re-established. In 1950, an
 expeditionary force was sent, and the island was a fairly
 thriving little town to have been left and realizing the truth
 of the people of the island, it was decided to establish
 a state in the region of the island for the sake of
 progress at the time of the Government's return during
 the period of the island's independence in the island area
 government the main line being taken seriously.

Notes on the

in the history of the island, 1945-1950, 1950-1955

province of the Ottoman Empire. Because of the weakness of the central government, the Governor of Egypt enjoyed the position of almost complete de facto independence from the Sublime Porte.¹⁸ Expanding his rule over additional Ottoman territories in the early century, Muhammad Ali Pasha threatened to disrupt the traditional balance in the Middle East which had become so much a part of the foreign policies of the Great Powers in the "Eastern Question," and a concerted effort was made in 1840 to contain him. By the Convention of London in 1840, he was offered in addition to the governorship of Egypt, the Pashalik of Acre (Southern Syria) for life, providing he withdrew from other Ottoman holdings. When he refused to withdraw, an Anglo-Austrian military expedition enforced the Convention but his grandson, Ibrahim Pasha had occupied Aqaba in the beginning of that year. Ibrahim had built a road across Sinai to Aqaba to facilitate pilgrim movements from the Nile to Mecca and although the provisions of the Convention were never completely carried out, the demarcation of Southern Syria or the Pashalik of Acre annexed to the Convention establish for the first time in modern history a clearly established border related to the Gulf of Aqaba. Administration of this area of Southern Syria was entrusted to the Governor of Egypt but the subse-

¹⁸ George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (Sixth ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 81.

quent Firmans of Investiture of each subsequent Governor contained no explicit reference to the Pashalik or to the Sinai region. Ibrahim exercised some measure of control over the Suez-Aqaba pilgrim route but for all practical purposes, there was no Egyptian administration in that area.¹⁹

Until Great Britain established herself in Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula was of no practical importance either to the Ottoman Empire or to the Egyptians. Sinai acquired a new value, however, after 1876 as an important aim of British foreign policy involved shifting the boundary of Egypt as far away from the Canal as possible.²⁰ Turkey, on the other hand, took a more active interest in the area as the possibilities of a Hejaz railway materialized and the conflict between England and Turkey came into the open in 1892 when the British did not permit the promulgation of the investiture Firman granted to the new Governor which contained a more specific definition of the boundaries of

19

L. M. Bloomfield has covered this material with exhaustive documentation of his Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba (Toronto: Carswell, Ltd., 1957), particularly pp. 109-113. This book is the only full length treatment of the material on which this study is based, but Bloomfield's book is written so hap-hazardly and so obviously with the intention of bolstering the Israeli case that it is virtually worthless as an independent source. His thesis, for example, in the section cited, is that Egypt has no legal claim to any sovereignty in the Sinai peninsula.

²⁰Ibid., p. 112.

great measure of investigation of each individual country
contained no specific reference to the balance of the
final report. It is to be noted that some of the
over the long-range effects of the war and its
progress, there was no specific reference to the
area.

Great deal of material was included in the
the Great Britain was of no practical importance either
to the German Empire or to the British. Great Britain
a new value, however, of the war as an important one of
British foreign policy during the war and the necessity of
to be in the way of the Great Britain. The war, on
the other hand, was a more active interest in the war as
the possibility of a large military establishment and the
conflict between England and Norway was also the open in
1942 when the British did not have the opportunity of
the investment of the war in the new system which
contained a new specific reference of the possibility of

17
I. A. Macmillan has covered this material with
extensive discussion of the British, French and the
of the (British) Council, 1944, 1945, particularly pp.
102-111. This book is the only one which is
the material on which this work is based, but Macmillan's
book is written in a way which is not only with the
intention of presenting the material in a way which is
fully written as an historical source. The book, for
example, in the section cited, is that there is no legal
claim to any sovereignty of the Great Britain.

Egypt than was contained in the document investing his predecessor. There followed a long and unnecessarily involved series of telegrams which pertained to the Egyptian boundary. In reading these documents the modern student cannot help being impressed by the British attitude that the Ottoman Emperor had gone back on his word, although no intention to incorporate Southern Syria permanently into Egypt is indicated in the 1840 document. The Emperor was claiming that the Egyptian boundary should by rights be drawn from El Arish, near Gaza, to Suez; only after considerable British pressure did the Grand Vizier send an explanatory telegram acknowledging what might be termed a prescriptive claim by Egypt with a border drawn from El Arish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Turkish troops installed themselves in Aqaba and the matter was considered settled after Lord Cromer, the British Consul General and virtual ruler in Egypt, declared British agreement in a telegram to Tigranne Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on April 13, 1892:

Under these circumstances, I am instructed to declare that Her Britannic Majesty's Government consent to the definition of boundaries contained in the present Firman, as supplemented, amended and explained by the telegram of the 8th inst. from His Highness, the Grand Vizier...²¹

²¹ Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 115, quoted without indication of source.

Never adequately demarcated (until 1946), the border continued to give trouble, and in 1906 an incident took place near Aqaba between an Egyptian Army party under the command of a British officer and the Turkish troop at Aqaba. After exhaustive negotiations and four separate counterproposals on strict delimitation of the boundary determining what was and what was not part of the Sinai peninsula, Turkey obtained Aqaba and the lands at the head of the Gulf east of the Wadi Araba in return for the cession of an area north and east of El Arish which had been vaguely a portion of the prior Turkish claim. Except for modifications around Gaza and the El Auja pocket, this boundary persists as the Armistice line between modern Israel and Egypt.

Turkey planned to develop the port of Aqaba in the first decade of the present century and when the Hejaz railway was first conceived, it was planned to construct a spur line to develop the port as a trading terminus with the east. When the British occupied the town in 1917, however, only a telephone line attested to the ambition of the Ottomans and there was not even a fishing boat in the Gulf.²²

Following World War I and the dissolution of the Empire, the Turkish portion of the Gulf littoral became part of the Kingdom of Hejaz under Hussein. As closely as the

²²Melamid, op. cit., p. 235.

These specimens, however, are not the same as the ones
 described in the literature, and in fact are entirely new.
 They are very different in appearance, and are very
 different in size. They are also very different in
 color. They are also very different in shape. They are
 also very different in texture. They are also very
 different in taste. They are also very different in
 smell. They are also very different in weight. They are
 also very different in value. They are also very
 different in use. They are also very different in
 history. They are also very different in legend.

These specimens are very different from the ones in the
 literature. They are also very different from the ones in
 the museum. They are also very different from the ones in
 the market. They are also very different from the ones in
 the laboratory. They are also very different from the ones in
 the field. They are also very different from the ones in
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Following these are the specimens of the
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 of the species of the species. The number of the species of the species.

Hashemites were aligned to England in the twenties, there was little doubt of the influence of Great Britain in the area. Meanwhile, Ibn Saud, Sultan of the Nejd, was being supported as a counterbalance to the northern kingdoms of Faisal and Abdullah and when Saud conquered the Hejaz, England insisted that a small strip of the headland of the Gulf be ceded to the Mandate of Palestine and Trans-jordan. The Treaty of Jidda in 1927 did not define such a border but a de facto effective Trans-jordanian control was recognized which, while never demarcated, exists to this day as the Saudi-Jordanian frontier on the Gulf. Saud is dissatisfied with the arrangement, to be sure, and no traffic is allowed between Aqaba and the rest of the Arabian peninsula. The line itself runs inland from a point two miles south of the "corner" of the Gulf and all flat land suitable for port facilities lies in Jordanian territory. This is the only Jordanian outlet to the sea.²³

While no definite boundaries existed between Palestine and Trans-jordan during the mandatory period, Abdullah never claimed more than the four or five miles around Aqaba nor did he ever have access to more. During the Palestine disorders in the late thirties, a road was constructed from Maan to Aqaba. The road was originally intended to serve the British

²³ See, for example, S. N. Fisher, The Middle East (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 531.

Rebels were more likely to appear in the Jordan, there was little more to be expected of them. In the Jordan, however, the army, which of the 1911, was being organized as a counterforce to the army, to which it was expected to be added to the Jordan and the Jordan.

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garrisons in Trans-jordan should the normal supply lines through Haifa be cut by disturbances in Palestine and it is interesting to note that this road serves the present day Jordanian economy in just such a situation as pertains today. In addition, a railroad was begun in 1941 which would have linked Maan and Aqaba in the face of possible German control of the Mediterranean and Egypt. If supply through Egypt were cut, the railroad was designed to supply the allied armies in the Levant through the Gulf of Aqaba, but by the time it had reached Ras el Nebk about twenty five miles south of Maan, victory at el Alemain was assured and the railroad halted there. Interestingly enough, this line also forms a major prop to the Jordanian economy today.²⁴

Today's armistice boundaries between Jordan and Israel generally follow the line of least elevation in the wadis south of the Dead Sea and are correspondingly vague. North of the Gulf, the Wadi el Araba extends as a reasonably definite boundary until it becomes almost impossible to follow north of the airstrip at Ghirandal about forty miles to the north. Here it follows the Wadi el-Jelb, something of a geographic fiction in summer, north to the Dead Sea.

Jordan, of course, no longer uses Haifa and, since cargo moved through Beirut south across Syrian highways into Amman is very expensive, she began using Aqaba on a

²⁴ Melamid, op. cit., p. 237.

gentleness in these places shows the narrow supply lines through which he can get his necessities. It is interesting to note that this road serves the present day Jordanian economy in two ways: a link to the Persian Gulf. In addition, a railway was begun in 1921 which would have linked the road to the rest of Jordanian territory and to the Mediterranean Sea. It is a pity that the road was not built at the same time as the railway.

By the time the road was built, the railway was already in use. The road is now a link to the Persian Gulf, and the railway is a link to the Mediterranean Sea. The road is now a link to the Persian Gulf, and the railway is a link to the Mediterranean Sea. The road is now a link to the Persian Gulf, and the railway is a link to the Mediterranean Sea.

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continuous basis in 1952 and improving its facilities.

Transit sheds have been built all along the waterfront and a storage farm with a thousand ton capacity for diesel and gasoline fuels has been built. An interesting sidelight on the political problems of the area is afforded by the stevedore population of Jordanian Aqaba, most of them Arab refugees from Jaffa and Haifa. With the eight automotive cranes which were installed in 1953, the port now has a daily cargo handling capacity of 1,700 long tons. The north side of the waterfront is now given over to shallow berths. A dozen class F lighter berths accommodate the waterborne off-loading of the largest vessels afloat which can be anchored in the harbor. To the south, new deep wharves are being finished this summer with the assistance of United Nations Technical Assistance personnel. These wharves will permit the bulk handling of phosphates and will include a new quarantine station for pilgrims on the relatively short voyage down the Gulf out into the Red Sea to Jiddah for the Hadj. Pilgrim traffic continues to be a large factor in Aqaba's economic life and the annual rate exceeded 10,000 each year since 1955. Fishing has been developed as an industry and a processing plant in Aqaba produces about 300 tons of preserved fish annually. The main imports through Aqaba to Jordan are foodstuffs, steel, machinery, textiles and petroleum products and the port is equipped to handle and store almost as much as the traffic will bear.

There is unlimited open storage, 43,000 square feet of warehouse space and limited cold storage facilities by the lighter wharfs.²⁵ In years when the harvests have been scanty, as in the 1959-1961 seasons, wheat and flour imports under United States Public Law 480 are processed through Aqaba. Phosphate rock with a 74 percent phosphate of lime is quarried at Roseifa north of Amman and trucked to Aqaba to be exported in bags.

Several British steamship lines connect Aqaba with British and Belgian ports and a monthly German service reaches ports of the Hamburg-Le Harve range. Cargo moves by truck from the Nebk rail terminal and while extension of the railroad south to Aqaba was once considered out of the question because of the steep descent of over 5,000 feet, planning is now actively underway and some track has actually been laid south of Nebk.

Costs of transportation from Aqaba to the northern population center averages \$30 a ton compared to \$39 for the same ton from Beirut. Political activity in Syria and the ever changing complexion of Arab politics make the Aqaba way the preferred one, and it has the additional advantage of saving foreign exchange. Should transportation through Haifa

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United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, World Port Index, H. O. 950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957, with annual corrections); Sir Archibald Hurd, Ports of the World (London: The Shipping World Ltd., 1961), and Melamid, op. cit., p. 239.

ever become possible, Aqaba's importance would decline because transit through Haifa, on the same scale as quoted above, costs less than \$10 a ton to Amman.²⁶

In March 1949, during the last stage of the Arab-Israeli war, Israeli troops penetrated to the Gulf. Israel occupied about nine miles of shoreline opposite Jordanian Aqaba and established Eilat on the site of the Umm Rashrash police station; but by 1956, fewer than ten ships had visited it.²⁷ The Egyptian blockade of the Gulf was enforced by an armed station at the entrance to the Gulf along the strip or cheek of land known as Sharm el-Sheikh, by gun positions slightly north at Ras Nasrani overlooking the Enterprise Passage, and by Egyptian outposts on the island of Tiran. The other island in the straits, the island of Sanafir, is east of Tiran and hence not much use in blockading the channel.

Although most charts show these waterless and uninhabited islands as part of Saudi Arabia, Egypt has claimed sovereignty over them since 1907. The ownership of these islands has been vague ever since the Sixth century and reference to them in any recent history is impossible to find outside the context of the Aqaba question itself. Ben

²⁶Melamid, op. cit., p. 240.

²⁷Malcolm W. Cagle, "The Gulf of Aqaba, Trigger for Conflict," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1959, p. 77.

Gurion referred to them in a speech in the Knesset on November 9, 1956, and it would appear that Jewish independence on the island of Tiran, known in Hebrew as Votvat, was maintained at least until the time of Procopius who wrote in the sixth century (527-565 A.D.). Some time during the ensuing century, the colony disappeared.²⁸

The Sharm el-Sheikh ("Sharm" means cove or creek) is a strip of territory on the Sinai mainland which commands the entrance to the Gulf and permanent installations--wharf and airstrip--serviced the personnel on blockade duty. The heavy emplacements at Ras Nasrani were finished in 1953 although temporary mobile batteries on Tiran operated as early as July, 1951. The complex was also an important signalling station during the blockade and, today, the United Nations Emergency Force occupies the position.²⁹ In more recent times (Spring, 1962), the coast east of the islands has been the scene of clashes between Egyptian fishing skiffs and Saudi patrol launches now that the political climate between the two nations is considerably more frigid than it was a decade ago.³⁰

Other than the military buildup in southern Sinai,

²⁸New York Times, November 8, 1956. See also Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 5., where he quotes extensively from E. A. Salpeter, "A Visit to Sharm el-Sheikh," The Canadian Jewish Chronicle, February 1, 1957, p. 11.

²⁹See *infra*, Chapter IV.

³⁰New York Times, April 4, 1962.

little activity has ever taken place on the Egyptian side of the Gulf. Considering the nature of the Sinai desert and the relative difficulty of defense and communication in the further reaches of this area, this is not surprising. An all weather road once connected Suez to Taba, a police post just south of the Palestine-Egyptian line on the Gulf. There are two anchorages on the Gulf other than Eilat and Aqaba, one at Dahab on the Egyptian side and one at Maqneh in Arabia. Neither have any considerable traffic and traffic from Dahab to Suez is a rough track which passes St. Catherine's monastery, the highest point on the peninsula, and oil prospecting in western Sinai has been undertaken in recent years using this route as a jumping off point for some deep-well work in the desert.³¹

On the other side of the Gulf, the prohibition of land traffic across the Saudi-Jordan border effectively seals off the eastern bank of the Gulf from traffic. As late as 1957, occasional cargoes were moved up to Manqueh by war surplus LST and LCI craft which would take on a load of consumer cargo at Jiddah and beach it in the wadis on the shores of the Gulf. Goods would then be delivered to some of the oases inland by truck but the cost of an operation such as this is prohibitive of any real economic

³¹ Melamid, *op. cit.*, p. 237. The topography of this area figures in the Sinai War and the Ninth Israeli Brigade was supplied during its drive southward by landing craft which used these spots to unload.

little activity has ever taken place on the Egyptian side of the Gulf. Considering the nature of the final desert and the relative difficulty of defense and communication in the further reaches of this area, this is not surprising. An all weather road once connected Suez to Tena, a police post just south of the Palestine-Egyptian line on the Gulf. There are two anchorages on the Gulf coast - Suez and Tena, one at Tena on the Egyptian side and one at Suez in Arabia. Neither have any considerable activity and traffic from Suez to Tena is a rough track over the desert. Suez's importance, the highest point on the peninsula, has all disappearing in western Sinai has been under- taken in recent years using this route as a jumping off point for any day-will work in the desert. On the other side of the Gulf, the prohibition of land traffic across the Sinai desert border effectively seals off the western end of the Gulf from traffic. As late as 1917, commercial cargoes were moved up to Hamed by way of the Red Sea and the Gulf which would take on a load of commercial cargoes at Tena and back in in the water on the shores of the Gulf. Goods would then be delivered to some of the same inland of Suez but the cost of an operation such as this is prohibitive of any real economic

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The map of the Gulf, the Sinai Peninsula and the Red Sea is shown in the margin of this page. The map is a reproduction of the map of the Gulf, the Sinai Peninsula and the Red Sea which was published by the United States Government in 1917.

significance. Rehabilitation of the old Hejaz railway south of Maan through the Saudi-Jordan border town of Mudawwara considerably inland from the Gulf and the new highway paralleling this rail bed considerably diminished this glamorous traffic.

Few geopolitical generalizations are possible about the Gulf of Aqaba and until the creation of Israel, little attention had ever been focused on it. There are, however, some geopolitical trends and patterns which are applicable to the area generally.

Control of the region around the Gulf by a state established in the north could effectively block communications by land between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. A severance of this nature suited the Crusaders as well as it suited the Israelis in 1949. Whether this is a significant consideration in recent years is difficult to assess, in view of the decreased dependence on land communications generally and the decreasing dependence on the traditional geographical basis for military strategy in desert areas.

If strategic considerations are only indirectly significant, the politico-economic question of "trade with the East" is an entirely different matter. Almost every move made on the Gulf since the days of Solomon has been motivated by this desire and as has been shown above, the half-hearted efforts made in this regard were never carried to complete success because a "backdoor to the Levant" was

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never needed badly enough by any Levantine state prior to 1948. With Israel established on the Mediterranean, the blockade of her access to the east was as natural from the Arab viewpoint as her interest in the Negeb as a gateway to the east was to the Israelis. Denied Suez at a time when the new state was aggressively embarking on a plan to build a major, industrial economy from nothing, the importance of the Gulf of Aqaba as a backdoor to the Levant became acute.

Trade with the East, as a policy, evokes images of spice-laden caravans plodding across the desert wastes to the mysterious centers of Cathay. In modern language, this policy is translated into more prosaic images of tanker movements from the Persian Gulf. It became almost immediately apparent to the Israeli economic planners that without trade with the East, a modern industrial economy based on machinery and power would be hard put to survive, much less grow in step with a mushrooming population. It became obvious to the Arab League at about the same time that the best way to kill a weed was to starve it out. Thus, following the Arab-Israeli War, the blockade of Israel, begun as early as 1946, was a major policy item.

[illegible]

CHAPTER III

THE BLOCKADE

Probably the most abiding element in Middle East politics from the Rhodes Armistice in the Spring of 1949 until the later days of 1956 was the continuation of the Arab-Israeli War by other means. The guns were officially silent but casualties on both sides were well into the hundreds¹ as each side engaged in border forays whenever the precarious balance tipped one way or the other. Diplomatic warfare was perfected to an astonishingly acute art as the Arab Blockade became institutionalized throughout the Middle East. The loss of face suffered by the Arab forces reinforced the already violent emotional antipathy toward Israel rendering normal inter-state relations impossible during the years which followed. Aimed at the political, economic and moral isolation of the new state, the foreign policies of the Arab League nations rarely reached the high accord all shared in their common stand against the enemy, Israel.

In Tel Aviv, on the other hand, almost insurmountable difficulties faced the infant government which would have

¹In a speech before the United Nations on November 1, 1956, the Israeli Permanent Representative Abba Eban quoted the figure 400 dead and wounded. The latest "official" figure, quoted in Facts About Israel, 1961, p. 19 (cited supra), is 1376 dead and wounded for the same period. Arab figures are not available.

terrified more experienced statesmen accustomed to operating from traditional foundations of national power. An expanding, heterogeneous population made up of diverse and contradictory cultures was attempting the creation of a modern economy in the face of total and complete poverty, isolation and internal disagreement over even the basic aims and values of the new state.²

During this period of blockade and development, the Gulf of Aqaba took on a new significance for both sides. When the State of Israel had been proclaimed following the termination of the British Mandate in May, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel had not extended its "sovereignty" to the Beersheeba sub-district of the Negeb owing (as one Israeli publication puts it with delightful ingenuousness) to the "forceful opposition by the Arabs and the subsequent military occupation of the area by the armed forces of Egypt and Trans-jordan."³ In more blunt terms, there was a war on.

²See particularly Fisher, op. cit., Chapter 40; Halford Hoskins, The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1958), Chapter 6; and George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), Chapter 9, for impartial discussions of the problems of the new state. For an inside view, cf. Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1958), particularly the first three chapters.

³Shabtai Rosenne, The Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1957), p. 20. This pamphlet is a scholarly apologia for the Israeli position liberally quoted, usually without acknowledgment, by Bloomfield (op. cit.).

permitted more experimental attitudes known as "freeing
from traditional restraints of conventional power. An example
was, nevertheless, provided out of all things and
consequently, power was exercising the exercise of a
modern economy in the form of social and economic power,
industrial and financial institutions, over the state and
and values of the new state.

During this period of transition and development, the
Gulf of Aqaba came on a new significance for both sides.
When the state of Israel had been proclaimed following the
termination of the British Mandate in May, 1948, the pro-
visional government of Israel had not extended the "rever-
sibility" to the boundaries and-divide of the state being
(as one Israeli politician put it with delight) indepen-
dence) to the (Israeli) population of the Arabs and the
subsequent military occupation of the area by the state.
forces of Egypt and Jordan. In more than one
there was a war on.

The Palestinian Arab, pp. 216, Chapter 20;
Baker, *Arabism, The Middle East, From the Arab to the Gulf*
New York, 1958, Chapter 2, and Chapter
Introduction, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (London, 1958)
University Press, 1958, Chapter 2, for a detailed discussion
of the position of the new state. For an inside view, cf.
Said, *Arabism, The Middle East, From the Arab to the Gulf*
Shower, 1958, Introduction, the first three chapters.

Chapter 20, *The Arab and the Gulf*
of Arab (London, The Government Printer, 1957), p. 20.
This chapter is a scholarly study of the Israeli Arab
and, especially, the Arab, with a bibliography, by
Said (pp. 216-217).

The Arab-Israeli War was a complicated phenomenon to analyze at the time and it remains so today, but the perhaps over-simplified objective of the Zionist armies was to secure as much of the mandated area under their control as possible. The armies of the Arab states, on the other hand, acted to prevent this. Because of a host of factors eloquently analyzed by both sides ever since, the new year 1949 began with Israeli forces poised to deliver the death blow to the Egyptians in the south. On the evening of December 27, 1948, Israeli forces had actually penetrated beyond the mandated frontier slightly south and east of El Auja and were preparing an invasion into the Sinai peninsula under the code name Operation Ayin.⁴

Partly because of the British military commitment to Egypt and partly because the mandated frontier had been crossed, political pressure was put on the Israeli command by the threat of direct British military intervention. Withdrawing on the 2nd of January, 1949, there was little doubt that the Egyptian army had been broken in the field. Meanwhile, on December 28th, the Egyptian Prime Minister had been assassinated and when the replacement government took office the following week, it responded to public disappointment over the progress of the war and asked for an armistice

⁴The following paragraphs are based on the New York Times and the London Times reports for the period 25 December 1948 to 16 January 1949 and on Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1956), Ch. 10.

The Arab-Israeli war was a complicated phenomenon to analyze at the time and it remains so today, but the passage over-simplified analysis of the Israeli system was the accurate as much of the movement after World War II as possible. The system of the Arab states, on the other hand, seemed to have been based on a form of feudalism. It was usually analyzed by both sides even since the war year 1947 began with Israeli forces being in control of the area close to the Egyptian border. On the evening of December 29, 1947, Israeli forces had actually penetrated beyond the Egyptian border, Israeli forces and some of the Arab units were operating in the area and the Arab units were the only ones operating in the area.

During the war of the British military campaign in Egypt and partly because the mandated front in the area, political movements were put on the Israeli side by the onset of the British military intervention. With the onset of the end of January, 1948, there was little doubt that the Egyptian army had been broken in the field. Even while, on December 29th, the Egyptian forces had been associated and even the Egyptian government took office the following week, it responded to public opinion over the progress of the war and asked for an armistice.

¹The following passage is based on the New York Times and the London Times reports for the period 25 January 1948 to 10 January 1949 and on the New York Times, 10 January 1948 (London: News and Times, 1948), p. 10.

which began on January 7th and which brought the armed phase of the war to an end. Under cover of the armistice, the Israelis began the move southward into the Negeb which lay open and unprotected.

King Abdullah of Trans-jordan immediately realized the implications of this move and invoked his own treaty with the British and on January 8, 1949, it was announced that British forces would occupy Jordanian Aqaba. This move has been frequently misunderstood.

Denied the future use of Haifa as a port, Trans-jordan faced the possibility of becoming completely landlocked if the narrow Jordanian toehold at Aqaba were to fall. While there was no suggestion or assurance given or asked that British troops assist Glubb's Legion in the event of further fighting between Jordan and Israel, the government in Amman did need protection of her border on the Gulf and protection for what was her only port.⁵

It was not until March, however, that the Israelis were able to complete the occupation of the Negeb. The advance southward was called Operation Fact and caused considerable tension at a time when the Armistice negotiations were in heated progress at Rhodes. Additionally, as the column advanced southward, the British became increasingly tense about the possibility of an armed clash between

⁵See Fisher, op. cit., p. 588.

which began on January 2nd and which opened the first phase of the war to the east. (The first phase of the war, the Israeli invasion of the West Bank, began on January 2nd, 1967, and was announced by the Israeli government on January 2nd, 1967.)

The Israeli government of Yasser Arafat immediately visited the implications of this war and showed his own views. When the British and on January 2, 1967, it was announced that British troops would occupy Jerusalem again. This move has been frequently criticized.

The British and American governments of Britain and the United States have the possibility of becoming seriously involved.

Indeed, if the British government should be forced to take

While there was no discussion of any other type of action that British troops might take in the event of a further Israeli invasion of the West Bank, the government in London had been informed of the situation on the Golan Heights and had been informed of the situation on the Golan Heights.

protection for which was not only for the

It was not until March, however, that the British

were able to complete the occupation of the Golan Heights.

British troops were called upon to take action and control

consequently, the situation at a time when the situation was

There were no other progress at present. Additionally, as

the situation worsened, the British became involved.

It is clear that the possibility of an armed clash between

their troops and the Israelis.⁶ On March 10, the column passed the position called Bir Qattar and occupied the abandoned police station at Umm Rashrash on the Gulf of Aqaba, having kept to their own side of the Jordanian boundary up the Wadi Araba and the tension simmered down.⁷

In the meantime, the Egyptian Armistice had been signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949.⁸

Briefly, its conditions were that certain pockets were to be de-militarized and the fighting ceased on the "western front" in the Negeb. This was followed by the Lebanese Treaty signed at Ras el-Naqura⁹ which guaranteed the old Mandate frontier to the north and the Trans-jordanian Treaty of April 3¹⁰ which provided for a de-militarized Jordanian-Israeli border from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea along the line described in the previous chapter. All

⁶The London Times, March 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th, 1949.

⁷See Meysels, op. cit., for an eye witness report at pages 28-29.

⁸42 United Nations Treaty Series 252.

⁹Fisher, loc. cit. The settlement with Syria would have been completed almost immediately thereafter but was delayed by the coup d'etat of Husni el-Zaim. It was finally signed in July, 1949. The Lebanese Treaty is in Shabtai Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (Tel Aviv: Bloomsteins, 1951), Appendix I. Rosenne was the Israeli negotiator.

¹⁰Fisher, loc. cit. After December, 1948, when the west bank of the Jordan no longer became the Israeli-Trans-jordan boundary, Trans-jordan had been proclaimed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Treaty was signed under this authority.

their troops and the Israelis. On March 10, the same
 passed the position called El-Hadid and occupied the
 abandoned police station at El-Hadid on the day of
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In the meantime, the Egyptian army was not
 allowed to enter on February 24, 1969.

During the month, the Jordanians were not really
 were not so well organized and the fighting moved on the
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the Armistice agreements were to be effected by July 17, 1949, and by that time the "borders" of the State of Israel as they are now known were established.

One of the first complaints to the Mixed Armistice Commission following the Egyptian Armistice was lodged on the basis of the Israeli advance to the Gulf and her occupation of Bir Qattar "in violation of the General Armistice Agreement."¹¹ Taken before the United Nations, the dispute was finally compromised in 1950 when the Security Council was able to take note of the fact that Israeli forces had evacuated the Bir Qattar position. Bir Qattar is really nothing more than a ridge on which an emplacement had been erected and it is almost incredible to realize that the controversy as lodged by Egypt concerned the immensely more germane question of Israeli access to the Aqaba littoral but was settled without boundary modifications of any kind on the basis of a simple withdrawal from an otherwise worthless position.¹²

¹¹Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 21.

¹²Document S/1907 in Security Council Official Records, 5th year, Supplement for December, 1949, through December, 1950, p. 124. The settlement was virtually the only one ever concluded between these two antagonists on entirely legal grounds. The Egyptian Armistice Agreement, Treaty 654, had not extended the "western front" further south than El Auja and on that basis, the MAC was able to effect a settlement. Bloomfield's statement extending the Armistice border to Umm Rashrash (op. cit., p. 4) is simply not true.

Israel lost no time in setting up a camp around the Umm Rashrash police station and this spot became the site of the modern town of Eilat, four miles from Aqaba and five miles from the point where the Egyptian border met the coast of Taba. Israel had her toe-hold on the Gulf and her economic potential was immeasurably brighter, as the intense public interest in Operation Fact had served to demonstrate. As a result of her potential for capitalizing on a position hitherto monopolized by Egypt, the extension of the war by other means was now undertaken in earnest to neutralize whatever advantage this position might be able to bring.

The Blockade and the Economic War

Once situated in command of her own "back door," the Israelis made no secret of their plans to construct a major port under the noses of the enemy. Eilat became an El Dorado for Israeli public opinion during 1950 and a blueprint for a modern harbor and a naval base was prepared.¹³ To the Egyptians, the most vocal leaders of the Arab coalition when every state fancied itself as a leader, it was fairly obvious that any proposed Israeli link between the two seas would be competitive with the Canal and politically undesirable. Furthermore, if the Israeli plans for a modern highway across the Negeb linking Eilat and Beersheba, a rail-

¹³By M. Callet, the Chief Engineer of the Port of Le Harve, Israel Yearbook, 1958, loc. cit.

road into the heart of the northern industrial "complex" and a workable pipeline ever materialized, passage fees through Suez, transmission profits and the political initiative would be seriously endangered. All this of course would be added salt in the open and griping Arab wounds left after the actual Armistice had been proclaimed at Rhodes.

Informal economic warfare against the Jewish Agency was nothing new in the Middle East after 1945 but the formal blockade dates from the declaration of Israeli Independence in May, 1948. Egypt spearheaded the economic drive, joined almost immediately by the other members of the Arab League, and an effective primary and secondary economic boycott became a coordinated joint project. The closure of the Suez Canal was an important weapon in this project, applied to cargoes of "contraband" consigned to Israel. A Prize Court had been established, a Decree on Formalities of Inspection of Vessels and Aircraft was issued and a formal institutionalized program, unaffected by the Armistice Agreement, remained in force during the troubled seven years between armed clashes.¹⁴

To demonstrate the seriousness of the economic diffi-

¹⁴Military Proclamation Number 38, established the Prize Court on July 9, 1948. The Decree on Formalities was published in the Egyptian Journal Official of April 3, 1950, and Law Number 50 of the year 1949 ("On the Ending of the State of Seige," May 1, 1950), The Decree on Oil Transports of July 14, 1950, and the Law on the Seizure of Contraband of April 4, 1951, are the Egyptian statutory basis for the blockade. See Bloomfield, op. cit., Chapter 2; the more accurate Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 22; and Fisher, op. cit., p. 593.

rest into the heart of the western industrial countries and a worldwide pipeline was established, because there through Israel, communication exists and the political situation would be relatively unimportant. All this to achieve would be added also in the year and during the 1950s and 1960s. The natural language was then repeated in Israel.

Israeli economic warfare against the Jewish Agency was nothing new in the Middle East since 1947 and the Israeli blockade had been the foundation of Israeli independence in May, 1948. This represented the economic crisis, which almost immediately by the order of the Arab League, and an effective primary and secondary economic boycott.

became a coordinated joint project. The object of the plan was an important weapon in this project, applied to the concept of "unilateral" blockade in Israel. A first year had been established, a second in 1950, and a third in 1951. Of Israel and America was second and a third in 1951. Economic progress, motivated by the political situation, remained in Israel during the period 1950-1951.

armed classes. It

To demonstrate the effectiveness of the economic effort.

1951-1952, 1953-1954, 1955-1956, 1957-1958, 1959-1960, 1961-1962, 1963-1964, 1965-1966, 1967-1968, 1969-1970, 1971-1972, 1973-1974, 1975-1976, 1977-1978, 1979-1980, 1981-1982, 1983-1984, 1985-1986, 1987-1988, 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, 2021-2022, 2023-2024, 2025-2026, 2027-2028, 2029-2030, 2031-2032, 2033-2034, 2035-2036, 2037-2038, 2039-2040, 2041-2042, 2043-2044, 2045-2046, 2047-2048, 2049-2050, 2051-2052, 2053-2054, 2055-2056, 2057-2058, 2059-2060, 2061-2062, 2063-2064, 2065-2066, 2067-2068, 2069-2070, 2071-2072, 2073-2074, 2075-2076, 2077-2078, 2079-2080, 2081-2082, 2083-2084, 2085-2086, 2087-2088, 2089-2090, 2091-2092, 2093-2094, 2095-2096, 2097-2098, 2099-2100, 2101-2102, 2103-2104, 2105-2106, 2107-2108, 2109-2110, 2111-2112, 2113-2114, 2115-2116, 2117-2118, 2119-2120, 2121-2122, 2123-2124, 2125-2126, 2127-2128, 2129-2130, 2131-2132, 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2497-2498, 2499-2500, 2501-2502, 2503-2504, 2505-2506, 2507-2508, 2509-2510, 2511-2512, 2513-2514, 2515-2516, 2517-2518, 2519-2520, 2521-2522, 2523-2524, 2525-2526, 2527-2528, 2529-2530, 2531-2532, 2533-2534, 2535-2536, 2537-2538, 2539-2540, 2541-2542, 2543-2544, 2545-2546, 2547-2548, 2549-2550, 2551-2552, 2553-2554, 2555-2556, 2557-2558, 2559-2560, 2561-2562, 2563-2564, 2565-2566, 2567-2568, 2569-2570, 2571-2572, 2573-2574, 2575-2576, 2577-2578, 2579-2580, 2581-2582, 2583-2584, 2585-2586, 2587-2588, 2589-2590, 2591-2592, 2593-2594, 2595-2596, 2597-2598, 2599-2600, 2601-2602, 2603-2604, 2605-2606, 2607-2608, 2609-2610, 2611-2612, 2613-2614, 2615-2616, 2617-2618, 2619-2620, 2621-2622, 2623-2624, 2625-2626, 2627-2628, 2629-2630, 2631-2632, 2633-2634, 2635-2636, 2637-2638, 2639-2640, 2641-2642, 2643-2644, 2645-2646, 2647-2648, 2649-2650, 2651-2652, 2653-2654, 2655-2656, 2657-2658, 2659-2660, 2661-2662, 2663-2664, 2665-2666, 2667-2668, 2669-2670, 2671-2672, 2673-2674, 2675-2676, 2677-2678, 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3407-3408, 3409-3410, 3411-3412, 3413-3414, 3415-3416, 3417-3418, 3419-3420, 3421-3422, 3423-3424, 3425-3426, 3427-3428, 3429-3430, 3431-3432, 3433-3434, 3435-3436, 3437-3438, 3439-3440, 3441-3442, 3443-3444, 3445-3446, 3447-3448, 3449-3450, 3451-3452, 3453-3454, 3455-3456, 3457-3458, 3459-3460, 3461-3462, 3463-3464, 3465-3466, 3467-3468, 3469-3470, 3471-3472, 3473-3474, 3475-3476, 3477-3478, 3479-3480, 3481-3482, 3483-3484, 3485-3486, 3487-3488, 3489-3490, 3491-3492, 3493-3494, 3495-3496, 3497-3498, 3499-3500, 3501-3502, 3503-3504, 3505-3506, 3507-3508, 3509-3510, 3511-3512, 3513-3514, 3515-3516, 3517-3518, 3519-3520, 3521-3522, 3523-3524, 3525-3526, 3527-3528, 3529-3530, 3531-3532, 3533-3534, 3535-3536, 3537-3538, 3539-3540, 3541-3542, 3543-3544, 3545-3546, 3547-3548, 3549-3550, 3551-3552, 3553-3554, 3555-3556, 3557-3558, 3559-3560, 3561-3562, 3563-3564, 3565-3566, 3567-3568, 3569-3570, 3571-3572, 3573-3574, 3575-3576, 3577-3578, 3579-3580, 3581-3582, 3583-3584, 3585-3586, 3587-3588, 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3953-3954, 3955-3956, 3957-3958, 3959-3960, 3961-3962, 3963-3964, 3965-3966, 3967-3968, 3969-3970, 3971-3972, 3973-3974, 3975-3976, 3977-3978, 3979-3980, 3981-3982, 3983-3984, 3985-3986, 3987-3988, 3989-3990, 3991-3992, 3993-3994, 3995-3996, 3997-3998, 3999-4000, 4001-4002, 4003-4004, 4005-4006, 4007-4008, 4009-4010, 4011-4012, 4013-4014, 4015-4016, 4017-4018, 4019-4020, 4021-4022, 4023-4024, 4025-4026, 4027-4028, 4029-4030, 4031-4032, 4033-4034, 4035-4036, 4037-4038, 4039-4040, 4041-4042, 4043-4044, 4045-4046, 4047-4048, 4049-4050, 4051-4052, 4053-4054, 4055-4056, 4057-4058, 4059-4060, 4061-4062, 4063-4064, 4065-4066, 4067-4068, 4069-4070, 4071-4072, 4073-4074, 4075-4076, 4077-4078, 4079-4080, 4081-4082, 4083-4084, 4085-4086, 4087-4088, 4089-4090, 4091-4092, 4093-4094, 4095-4096, 4097-4098, 4099-4100, 4101-4102, 4103-4104, 4105-4106, 4107-4108, 4109-4110, 4111-4112, 411

culties of the new state, the experience of the Consolidated Refinery Corporation provides a typical example and serves as an excellent case in point.

In May, 1948, Consolidated Refineries, a British owned firm, closed down the only operating refinery in Israel at Haifa when riots between Jewish and Arab workmen made it impossible to continue operations on a normal or even vaguely economical basis. The refinery was the terminus of the main pipeline from the Kirkuk Field in Iraq and had a through-put crude capacity which was capable of providing most of the needs of the new state. Almost immediately after the closing of the refinery, the government seized the installation and after confiscating the considerable quantity of crude in storage at the plant, refined this confiscated crude for its wartime needs. After perfunctory negotiations collapsed in April, 1949, the government repudiated the agreement by which the Company had operated during the Mandate and delivered an ultimatum to Consolidated, threatening nationalization unless full production was restored. In the meantime, Iraq had closed the Kirkuk supply to Israel in accordance with the blockade, and the Company was placed in the impossible position of being forced to refine petroleum that it could not obtain with workers whom it could not hire at a price it could not bear. It was impossible to move crude from the other terminus of the Kirkuk line at Tripoli; no crude could be brought from the

either of the one side, the experience of the Councils
 delivery Corporation involves a typical example and course
 as an individual case in itself.

In fact, the Corporation's delivery, a British
 owner like, which has been the subject of interest in
 fact at home when there has been a change in the
 made it impossible to maintain operations on a normal scale
 even when the Corporation failed. The railway was the centre
 of the main business from the fact that it had been
 through the years of the Corporation and the results of the
 most of the work of the Corporation, which immediately
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Persian Gulf via the Canal and after the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE) was completed to Sidon in 1950, Saud placed a portal to portal restriction on the crude which moved through it forbidding it to be marketed in Israel. Soon it was found to be impossible for third or even fourth parties to purchase Arab oil if the ultimate user was known or even suspected to be the Haifa refinery. In order to operate, Consolidated was forced to purchase Venezulean crude and ship it in tankers to Haifa, a voyage of over 5,000 miles.¹⁵

Situations of this nature were repeated with respect to almost every category of raw material locally procurable and would have been difficult enough for a mature economy to bear. Building materials, power generation and transmission equipment, books, foodstuffs--the list of "contraband" grew annually, forcing Israel into European markets where the sympathy she gained probably compensated for the economic damage done by the Arabs.¹⁶

The Blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba

The question of applying the provisions of the economic campaign in the Gulf of Aqaba arose almost immediately after the March, 1949, penetration to the Gulf and their occupation of Umm Rashrash.¹⁷ During the summer,

¹⁵See Hoskins, op. cit., p. 108.

¹⁶This was not a widespread opinion. Professor Hoskins, writing in 1954, is quite pessimistic about the viability of Israel (Chapters 6 and 7).

¹⁷Supra, p. 41.

little shipping or economic activity of any kind was feasible because of the presence of armed forces and the transition from wartime to peacetime operation occupied the attention of the protagonists until the weather cooled. By the Fall of 1949, however, a concrete program seems to have been established with reference to the Gulf.

With the concurrence of Saudi Arabia, which still claimed a vague and dubious sovereignty over Tiran and Sanafir, Egypt occupied the two islands "in order to protect them from possible damage or violation."¹⁸ The full text of the agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the occupation has never been made public, and by the end of 1949, Egyptian construction began on the Ras Nasrani signalling station and from the installation of a observation post there, the elaborate fortifications needed to enforce the blockade grew.

In February, 1950, the question of the blockade of the Gulf was discussed in diplomatic correspondence between the major seafaring nations and concern was expressed over the apparent disregard of the principle of free and innocent passage through the Gulf. In the course of these discussions, the United States was requested to obtain confirmation of a statement attributed to the Egyptian government to the effect that the occupation of Tiran and Sanafir would not be used

¹⁸Verbatim Record, 659th meeting, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Nr. 659, February 15, 1954, p. 19.

Established with reference to the Gulf.

There, the statement of the witness is that the witness was not present at the time of the shooting and that the witness was not present at the time of the shooting.

that the collection of time and space would be made
statement referred to the British Government to the effect
the United States was requested to obtain confirmation of a
passage through the Gulf. In the event of such a situation,
the apparent distance of the principal of time and space
the latter existing between the points was considered over
the Gulf are discussed in diplomatic correspondence between
in February, 1914, the position of the islands of

for the purpose of interfering with ships entering or leaving the Gulf. Accordingly, diplomatic contact was maintained between the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Offices through the unofficial offices of the American Embassy in Cairo. On January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued an aide memoire to the Cairo diplomatic community which was ultimately transmitted through the community to Israel. The aide memcire contained two paragraphs which were carefully worded to reassure the major maritime powers of the innocence of the occupation at a time when there was not much activity or interest in the problem of the Gulf. The statements assumed great significance six years later.

In occupying the islands, Egypt has wished simply to confirm its right as well as every possible right of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to them. . . . This occupation is not conceived in a spirit to hinder in any way whatsoever the innocent passage across the maritime space separating these two islands from the Egyptian Coast of Sinai. It goes without saying that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past in conformity with international practice and the recognized principles of international law.¹⁹

A similar respect for "the principles of international law" was written into Article 2 of the 1949 Saudi

¹⁹This paragraph has been frequently quoted on both sides of the issue and was read into the record of the Security Council in the 659th meeting on February 15, 1954. Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Nr. 659, p. 19. Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, gives the French original and a poor translation appears in Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 9. Walter Eytan, op. cit., pp. 102-104, dismisses its importance as a cynical move designed purely for the benefit of the United States and if the statement is taken on its face value, Eytan seems to have a point.

Arabian Decree on territorial waters and into the 1951 Egyptian Law on the same subject in identical words. These laws state:

The territorial waters of the (Kingdom of Egypt) (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) as well as the airspace above and the soil beneath them are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of international law as to the innocent passage of other nations through the coastal sea.²⁰

Several incidents occurred beginning in the summer of 1951 which indicated that maritime nations were taking these declarations seriously and by late 1953, when the fortifications and the signalling installation were complete at Ras Nasrani, a Notice to Mariners warned all vessels approaching the Straits to keep a sharp lookout for signals made at that station.²¹ This was followed, at the end of August, 1955, by a general regulation which made explicit the administrative procedures required of vessels wishing to transit the Straits.²² The 1953 Decree on the "Procedure of Ship and Aircraft Searches and Seizure of Contraband Goods in Connection with the Palestine War" was amended by a clause to the effect that all the commodities on the contraband list, including newly added categories of foodstuffs, were to be regarded as war contraband even when "passing

²⁰United Nations Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, 1957, p. 522.

²¹Notice to Mariners Number 3/54, February 22, 1954.

²²Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, quoting Journal de Commerce et de la Marine, Alexandria, August 29, 1955.

Egypt's territory or territorial waters in transit," an obvious reference to the Strait of Tiran.²³ To make it even more explicit, this decree was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which it is explained that Israel was "showing increasing economic activity and . . . establishing a merchant fleet to handle all its imports from South and East Africa."²⁴ One of the few exceptions to the blockade was the Italian tramp steamer, the "Santa Lucia," which reached Eilat in June, 1950, with its hold full of Yemenite Jews who were being expatriated from their homeland to settle the Promised Land--presumably with the good riddance of the Imman.²⁵

In the air, a prohibited area was established around Sharm el-Sheikh consisting of a circle of 20 nautical mile radius centered on Tiran:

Fire will be opened at or on to the contravening aircraft without any previous warning. The onus of responsibility for any consequential damage to the aircraft shall devote to the pilot in command. Contravening aircraft will be held on their first landing at any Egyptian airport where a thorough investigation will be carried out with the responsible crew.

If the contravening aircraft is being operated by a scheduled airline operator authorized by the Egyptian government, such authorization will be liable to withdrawal. In all other cases, no further permit to fly over Egyptian territory will be issued to any aircraft belonging to the owner of the contravening aircraft.²⁶

²³Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Supplement for January to March, 1954, p. 9.

²⁴Ibid., p. 10.

²⁵New York Times, June 24, 1950. This was a highly emotional issue in the fifties. See E. T. Martin, I Flew Them Home: A Pilot's Story of the Yemenite Aircraft (New York: Herzl Press, 1957).

²⁶Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 10.

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Blackburn was the British agent who, in 1941, was sent to the Soviet Union to investigate the activities of the British intelligence service. Blackburn was the British agent who, in 1941, was sent to the Soviet Union to investigate the activities of the British intelligence service.

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While the prohibited zone so erected effectively blocked direct passage by air up the Gulf, it actually accomplished somewhat more. In asserting Egyptian sovereignty over the mouth of the Gulf to the aircraft of all nations, it established something of a precedent. Through the acquiescence of other states, it substantiated the Egyptian "right" to fortify and defend the straits and the waters of the Gulf. Had Israel attempted to negotiate the passage from the south by air, she would have been blocked. She was denied passage by air over any Arab land areas and this Notice sealed the tiny breach by sea.

The Legal Aspects of the Blockade

The literature concerning the legal aspects of the Blockade in the Suez Canal is enormous, but there is only a small, frequently tendentious body of writings on the far more interesting problem of the Blockade as it applied to the Gulf of Aqaba.²⁷ There is an important difference between the two situations.

The international status of the Suez Canal is difficult to contest. Freedom of passage through the Canal is a

²⁷ Shabtai Rosenne, the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Israeli Foreign Affairs, is the champion of the Israeli position and his influence on the noted jurist, L. M. Bloomfield, has already been cited. Dr. Omar Ghobashy has written for the Egyptian side. The best works are Charles Selzak, "A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba," American Journal of International Law, October, 1958, pp. 660-698, and "The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba," ibid., July, 1959, pp. 564-594.

matter of vital interest to most of the world and although the solid body of treaty law established in the various international arrangements for the use of the Canal is open to interpretation and inference depending on the politics of the inferer, at least some kind of a basis exists for a juridical approach, although the same type controversies which cloud the Aqaba issue also pertain to the Canal.

The application of international law to the blockade of the Gulf is somewhat more indefinite, however, and merits a brief summary at this point. Interestingly enough, there are two mutually exclusive principles of law which apply to the Blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba which the Egyptian and Saudi governments were able to maintain until November, 1956. The first issue concerns the problem of the status of the waters of the Gulf, the waters of the Straits and the air-space above them under the international law of the sea, or, to put it another way, the Laws of Peace. This system of law regulates the normal legal relationships between states in their use of the seas for peaceful intercourse and with the exception of the controversial question of the width of the territorial sea, is a well developed body of international precedent.

The second issue arises out of the Arab thesis of continued belligerency with Israel, which in vitiating any attempt to apply the Laws of Peace to the waters of the Gulf, places the problem in an entirely different legal context

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The second issue arises out of the state of the
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calling for the application of the Laws of War. The Laws of War apply to nations which do not enjoy "normal" peaceful legal relationships and the right of belligerency confers on those who invoke these rights an entirely different set of rights and duties under the law.

Both of these legal issues are superimposed on the politico-legal implications of mutual membership in the United Nations. The problem is one which, like every other problem connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, is primarily political. The fact that the issues are discussed in terms of international law leads many to forget the political basis for the dispute and to imagine that all that would be required to solve it would be a binding decision clarifying the legal issues. Obviously the legal issues are relevant, but if both sides could ever agree to accept any legal settlement as binding the political basis for settlement would no longer be impossible. In any event, to the legalistic, an overriding consideration to the present date is the determination of which body of law to apply--the Law of Peace or the Law of War.

The Law of Peace. The Israeli government, and indeed the governments of most of the western powers and the major seafaring nations of the world, view the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, washing as it does the national

territory of four sovereign states.²⁸ The generally accepted principle with regard to bodies of water of this nature and the use legally enjoyed by other nations in times of normal relationships is expressed succinctly by Judge Lauterpacht:

. . . as a rule, all gulfs . . . enclosed by the land of more than one littoral state, however narrow their entrance might be, are non-territorial. They are parts of the open sea, the marginal belts inside the gulfs and bays excepted. They can never be appropriated; they are, in time of peace and war, open to all vessels of all nations, including men-of-war, and foreign fishing vessels cannot, therefore, be compelled to comply with municipal regulations of the littoral state concerning the mode of fishing.²⁹

Thus a position based on this principle would take cognizance of the fact that since Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia share frontage on the Gulf, the Gulf is an international waterway and a part of the high seas. Regardless of the existence of Israel, the Gulf therefore is open to free and innocent passage by ships of all flags and blockade of the Gulf, for any reason in time of peace, is in violation of international law.

In regard to the question of the limits of the territorial sea in the Gulf and the interminable controversies attempting to fix the breadth of this territorial sea, the

²⁸Selzak, op. cit., pp. 667-676.

²⁹L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I: Peace (London: 1948), pp. 460-461 (7th edition, edited by Sir H. Lauterpacht).

Gulf is so formed that at many points the waters of national territorial seas would "overlap" regardless of whether a three, six or twelve mile limit were claimed. The usual procedure in international law where a situation such as this has occurred is determined on the basis of the national or international character of the body of water so involved.³⁰ The Israeli position rests therefore on the same foundations as does Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone:

There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas.
 . . .³¹

Another legal position that has been advanced by the champions of the Israeli cause, although never formally espoused by a more realistic government, is the involved claim that Egypt is occupying Sinai in violation of international law. What realistic political implications follow from this are somewhat difficult to imagine.³²

The Law of War. The Arab position, as might be expected, is not only diametrically opposed to the point of

³⁰For example, the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits, the Danish Straits and the Gulf of Fonseca are each useful in varying degrees in establishing precedents. See Selzak, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³¹"Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," *American Journal of International Law*, October, 1958, p. 838.

³²Bloomfield is the leading champion of this position.

view expressed above but is based on an entirely different set of legal issues. According to the Arab viewpoint, the entire question of the application of the traditional maritime rules is based on a faulty premise--that the Arabs and Israel are at peace. The juridical nature of the Rhodes Armistice is the key question to be argued. Thus, while their opponents maintain that a right of innocent passage exists for all international shipping through the Gulf, the Arabs agree but refuse to classify shipping bound for Eilat as innocent. The Arab states, furthermore, regard the Israeli possession of the five-mile strip of Aqaba coastline as a military possession without de jure sovereignty in view of the manner in which it was acquired³³ and in further consequence of the fact that no Arab state recognizes Israel; that no Treaty of Peace has ever terminated the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and that Israel, in occupying the territory she now holds, in violating the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, deserves no such recognition until she does.

While the Jordanian Armistice makes a strong legal case for the Israeli right to occupy the section around Eilat, the legal nature of this possession is admittedly unclear. If, as the Arabs maintain, the 1948 "war" is still going on, there can obviously be no question of innocent passage through the Gulf or any portion of it which can be

³³Supra, pp. 40-41.

successfully "defended" by the Arabs until the war is terminated. While the obvious issue of de facto and de jure termination of hostilities remains almost completely political and emotional, there really has never been an adequate legal agreement on the semantics of the case. Armistices and truces are agreements between belligerent forces for the temporary cessation of hostilities. Judge Lauterpacht can be quoted on this side of the argument as well as on the Israeli side, as noted above:

A general armistice is a cessation of hostilities which, in contradistinction to a suspension of arms with its momentary and local military purposes, is agreed upon by the belligerents for the whole of their forces for the whole region of the war. . . . Everybody agrees that belligerents during an armistice may, outside the line where the forces face each other, do everything and anything they like regarding defence and preparation of defence.³⁴

While it has been usual for an Armistice to precede a Treaty of Peace, it may be stated as a strong position that an armistice agreement does not in itself or of itself terminate a war.³⁵

When the matter came before the United Nations on

³⁴Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. II: Disputes, War and Neutrality, p. 551.

³⁵See Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 1945 edition, p. 1783, quoted in Selzak, op. cit., p. 690, and also "The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement," American Journal of International Law, October, 1956, pp. 880-906. Article 37 of the "Hague Regulations" annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on the Law and Customs of War on Land is alluded to in both places.

September 1, 1951, the Security Council passed a strong resolution calling on the Arabs to lift the blockade based on the desire of the Council to remove a dangerous situation rather than on any attempt to change the long-standing legal relationships between armistices and war.³⁶

An additional problem is raised by the fact that as members of the United Nations, the Arabs have no right to maintain a state of war with anyone. To this, the Arab rejoinder has almost ritualistically been that the action taken in 1948 was taken in the name of the United Nations Partition Plan, a position which might conceivably be difficult to substantiate historically. The claim of belligerent rights, therefore, places Egypt in a somewhat inconsistent position from one aspect. When she announced military intervention in Palestine several months after the fighting had been in progress (November, 1948), the Egyptian delegate was careful to exclude any idea that war was being declared or that a legal state of war was in fact in existence. The text of the Egyptian message to the Security Council states that her forces had "entered Palestine to establish security and order in place of the chaos and disorder which prevailed."³⁷ Then again, on August 1, 1949, when the Palestine Conciliation Commission suggested that steps be

³⁶See infra, p. 72.

³⁷United Nations Document S/743, 1948.

In addition, the problem is stated by the fact that the
 members of the United Nations, the media have an interest in
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delivered by such a local agent of our own in that it would
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The text of the document is as follows:
 It is stated that the document is a copy of a letter from the
 Secretary of the State to the President, dated 1945, in which
 the Secretary advised the President of the results of the
 investigation conducted by the Special Committee on the
 activities of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in
 connection with the war effort. The letter stated that the
 AFSC had been found to be in violation of the Espionage Laws
 of the United States. The letter also stated that the AFSC
 had been found to be in violation of the War Relocation
 Administration's regulations regarding the activities of
 Japanese-Americans. The letter concluded by stating that the
 AFSC had been found to be in violation of the laws and
 regulations of the United States.

taken which would lead to a negotiated Peace Treaty, the Arab representative replied on the floor before the Security Council that "as there has never been a formal state of war with Israel, no formal treaty with Israel can be signed."³⁸

How can the Arabs on the one hand insist that there is no war but at the same time claim belligerent rights?

Frequently alluded to by the Israelis as a glaring inconsistency, the apparent contradiction is actually not as contradictory in its own context as it might seem. The Arab position, simply stated, is that Israel does not and has never existed. There is a political unit occupying Arab territory in Palestine (but what legal status "Arab territory" has is still another thorny problem); this unit may call itself a state but by its very existence international law is being violated. Hence, while there is no state of war--a relationship between two states--there is ample grounds for the exercise of belligerent rights. Since Israel does not exist, the matter of a Treaty of Peace with her is out of the question.³⁹

In addition to this main argument of impossibility of innocent passage by an enemy, two other Arab positions are

³⁸United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 292nd meeting, p. 10.

³⁹A careful reading of the Rhodes Armistice, Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 5, paragraph 2, indicates that the position described in this paragraph has a curious and cogent legal validity.

advanced from time to time which have been formulated with an eye for home consumption rather than for any serious legal negotiations.

The first of these positions relegates the Gulf of Aqaba to the status of a historical bay, a technical expression which would confer on it a peculiar status in international law under which the traditional occupants of its littoral would have joint control of the use of its waters.⁴⁰ The second position, somewhat similar and more emotionally charged, attributes to the Gulf a singular legal status based on its historical use as a vital waterway for pilgrimages to Mecca from all Islamic states to the north.⁴¹ While neither position of itself is entirely convincing, these positions support and bolster the Arab legal artillery.

While no solution can ever be reached independent of a more penetrating political solution of the other differences which divide the two camps,⁴² one of the first steps in any legal framework will have to establish the parameters of the law that will be applied, provided a legal basis for

⁴⁰Selzak devotes much space to this position in the article cited with commendable impartiality, concluding that the issue is for a court to decide.

⁴¹This and the previous point are strong features of the Saudi position. See Leo Gross, *op. cit.*; for the Egyptian interpretation, see Omar Ghobashy, "The Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, Status in International Law," Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March, 1957, p. 27 ff.

⁴²The Arab Refugees, for example, and the Jordanian Water disputes.

settlement is still relevant. In the meantime, if a judgment is appropriate in the context of the present study, the weight of evidence seems to point to the fact that the Gulf is an international waterway but a true legal controversy may well exist as to the extent of and foundation for the right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Israel and of the status of the four littoral states vis a vis each other.

Incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba, 1951-1956

During the years following the Rhodes Armistice, the Egyptian government intended to deny the use of the strait and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel but until Israel could afford an improvement over the primitive land communications between Eilat and the rest of the country, it was premature for her to contest the blockade in the straits with anything more than continued diplomatic pressure exerted through the Great Powers. There was really little at Eilat to fight for save hopes and expectations of a major seaport. As a focus for Arab-Israeli tension, the Gulf remained relatively quiet during the early fifties and between the designation of Eilat as a port in 1952 and the opening shots of the Sinai War, no Israeli shipping passed Tiran in either direction. The Israeli economy was in too precarious a position, living as it did on dreams and UJA bonds, to devote much resource to the vast needs of the barren area. But little by little, civilization came to Eilat.

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Incidents in the Gulf of Aden, 1951-1952

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Despite the relative quiet of the period, a series of incidents occurred in the Gulf illustrating on the one hand the extreme Arab sensitivity with regard to the blockade and on the other hand the reluctance (indeed, the de jure refusal, to coin an expression) of other nations to accept the blockade or to recognize any legal validity of its measures.

The first incident occurred when the British freighter "SS Empire Roach" was fired upon by the temporary Tiran batteries. The "Roach" was loaded with arms consigned for Jordan and on the evening of July 1, 1951, in excellent visibility several hours before dark, she was stopped in the approaches to the Enterprise passage by an Egyptian corvette and detained for twenty-four hours. During the detention, an Egyptian armed guard was placed aboard the vessel and the crew was restricted to below-deck spaces until the following morning. During this period, the British charged that the Egyptians looted the ship's store, wrecked the radio and generally harrassed the British without giving any reason except that they had been ordered to do so by their government. An outraged debate ensued in Commons over the matter and a stiff note of protest went off to Cairo on July 11th, calling the act "a flagrant violation of international law."⁴³

⁴³Bloomfield's treatment, op. cit., pp. 12-16, is basically correct and is verifiable in British and Foreign State Papers: Great Britain Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. 490, Col. 641 ff, July 16, 1951.

The Egyptian reply of July 23, 1951, is written in terms so dogmatic and final that Lord Cromer must have whirled in his grave. In effect, the Egyptians coolly and civilly pointed out that the ship had been west of a forbidden line established by their blockade regulations and that their personnel were responsibly taking the steps that they felt necessary under the circumstances. The "acts of spoilation" were contested and the general philosophy of the blockade reaffirmed.⁴⁴

Agreement over the matter was never reached but a modus vivendi was arrived at whereby Egyptian customs officials were to satisfy themselves of the "innocence" of the cargo carried on British ships bound up the Gulf, while the ships were at Suez or Adabia. These officials were then to inform the Tiran station "so as to preclude the later to make [sic] a further visit or search of the vessel." In return, all British shipping was pledged to comply with "normal practice" when passing through Egyptian territorial waters.⁴⁵

The exchange between the Egyptians and the British over the "Roach" was significant for two reasons. The ship was not bound for Eilat but for Aqaba. Britain's prestige

⁴⁴Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 13, in French.

⁴⁵This somewhat ominous phrase was to cause trouble later on. The executive agreement was signed by Ralph S. Stevenson on July 29, 1951, and is quoted in Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 14.

in the Middle East was at a low ebb that summer following the Iranian crisis in May. The Wafd government in Cairo was becoming more and more intransigent in its attitude toward the Suez occupation by Great Britain and there seems to have been a political overtone in the "Roach" incident quite apart from either the blockade or the alleged administrative misbehavior of the British.⁴⁶

The second element of significance was that the "Roach" was carrying arms for Jordan. In the summer of 1951, Abdullah at sixty-nine was perhaps the only rival for the hegemony in the Middle East that Egypt was conscientiously building through the Arab League. It is not impossible that the "Roach" incident was intended as a "feeler" to assess the popularity of the old Emir in the context of general Arab politics. He was assassinated less than three weeks after the incident.⁴⁷

On January 23-24, 1953, a Danish freighter, the "Andreas Boye," en route from Mombassa to Eilat was detained for twenty-four hours but eventually allowed to pass.⁴⁸

⁴⁶John Campbell's Defense of the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1960), carries a succinct recapitulation of the context in which the incident occurred. See especially pp. 40-43.

⁴⁷See Lenczowski, op. cit., for the details of the assassination.

⁴⁸Bloomfield, copying verbatim from Rosenne, op. cit., p. 25, without acknowledgment, mentions a similar incident with the same vessel on March 10, 1953, which Rosenne places in March, 1955. See op. cit., p. 11.

The following September, a 3,000 ton Greek freighter, the "Parnon," was apparently singled out as a test case. Carrying a load of asphalt for the Eilat-Beersheba highway and with a deck cargo of several vehicles, the ship was detained at Port Said for twelve days. The fact that she was Greek and carrying no military freight was given by the Egyptians as the reason for allowing her to pass and eighteen months later, this precedent was applied to the "Konitsa," a second Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement (this time from Haifa to Eilat) which was also allowed to pass.⁴⁹ The Italian government immediately protested the passing of the "Parnon" in September, 1953, because on a previous journey of the same ship Egyptian Customs personnel had ordered the confiscation of two Italian owned fishing vessels which had been consigned as deck cargo on the "Parnon" to Italy via Haifa overland. The Italian consul in Port Said had vigorously protested the action at the time and the matter was eventually discussed before the Security Council and a settlement reached.⁵⁰

The first American ship to be directly involved in the conflict was the "SS Albion" bound, on December 3, 1953, for Jordanian Aqaba with a shipment of UNRWA wheat. When it

⁴⁹Cagle, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

⁵⁰Security Council Official Records, 8th year, Supplement for July-September, 1953, p. 73, Document S/3993; New York Times, September 3 and 14, 1953.

entered the Enterprise channel, the Tiran batteries suddenly opened fire on it. Captain James Hassell, a resourceful Philadelphian, was forced to back down and while maneuvering to get clear of the narrow passage, he replaced his small steaming ensign with a large American flag and tried unsuccessfully to raise Ras Nasrani by blinker. Eight shells were fired on the "Albion" from astern as it proceeded outbound but none, fortunately, hit their mark. Hassell immediately hove to in the Red Sea and radioed for instructions from the American Consul in Cairo. This time the Egyptian apology was frankly lame in excusing the action on the grounds that the batteries had made an error in assuming that the destination was Eilat rather than Aqaba. It was a sobering warning to American shipping however.⁵¹

The British had cause to enter a protest in the Spring of 1955. Earlier, following the "Albion" incident and a similar incident involving the Italian "Maria Antonia" bound for Eilat with a badly needed shipment of Eritrean meat,⁵² the shipping nations of the world began to take the blockade somewhat more seriously and shipping through the Gulf declined to zero for almost fifteen months. On April 10, 1955, the British tramp "Agrobec" was stopped in her track by shots across her bow. There is reason to believe

⁵¹Cagle, op. cit., p. 78; New York Times, December 5, 1953.

⁵²Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 11.

entered the laboratory obediently, the three patients obediently
 opened their eyes. "Gladly," said Russell, a representative
 Philadelphia, was known as being very and while answering
 subject class of the various patients, he replaced his small
 apparatus with a large American line and this was
 undoubtedly as much as Russell by himself. Right before
 were lined on the left hand side of the patient as he proceeded
 outward for some, particularly, his first name, Russell,
 immediately after he is in the line and was noticed for instance
 from the various types in class. This time the
 Egyptian subject was nearly dead in extreme the action on
 the ground that the instrument had made an error in reading
 that the instrument was still under some action. It was a
 subject coming to himself, subject, subject, subject.
 The subject had been in a great deal of
 action at 10:15. Again, following the various incidents
 and a similar incident involving the three times involving
 found for him with a small number of subjects of fifteen
 more, the subject nature of the world began to take the
 subject nature of the world began to take the
 will decided to take the subject nature of the world. On this
 10, 1922, the subject nature of the world began to take the
 break in which nature was 10:15. There is reason to believe

21. Op. cit., p. 11. New York Times, December

1, 1913.

22. Op. cit., p. 11.

that the "Agrobec" incident would have been soon forgotten without formal action had not a far more serious incident occurred soon after. While the British were deciding what course to take over the "Agrobec," relations between Whitehall and Cairo reached a new low over the Baghdad Pact and its implications.⁵³

On July 4, 1955, the 6,224 ton merchantman "Anshun" flying the British flag entered the straits and was struck broadside by a shot from the new heavy emplacement at Ras Nasrani. The shell struck amidships near the waterline and, while there were no casualties, there was considerable damage to the vessel. The irony of the situation was emphasized by the fact that the vessel had been previously cleared and was on its way to Aqaba to pick up a group of Moslem pilgrims on their way to Mecca.⁵⁴

The "Agrobec" and "Anshun" incidents were debated in Parliament on July 13 and they served to bring the Gulf of Aqaba into the circle of increasing Middle East tensions during the summer of 1955.⁵⁵ A sharp diplomatic note from

⁵³While there are numerous accounts of the political climate in the Middle East in the standard texts referring to this period, a real appreciation can be grasped from Editorial Comment, Egyptian Economic and Political Review, March, April, May and June-July, 1955, and from the London Times, April 15 to May 3, 1955, passim.

⁵⁴Cagle, loc. cit.

⁵⁵British and Foreign State Papers, Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 543, Col. 1917, July 13, 1955; London Times, July 14, 1955.

that the Government would have been...
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On July 4, 1957, the...
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Great Britain was answered by Egypt to the effect that the "Anshun" had failed to state her destination.⁵⁶ The British rejected the Egyptian note and the Foreign Office issued a statement of policy on the Gulf declaring that it was an international waterway open to all ships. Somewhat sternly, the statement pointed out that insofar as the straits lay inside territorial waters, Egyptian authorities had the right to enforce only such measures "as customs regulations and public health rules." The ambiguity of the term "customs regulations" was never pointed out, however, as the Egyptian position linked customs and blockade into the same category. The Egyptian answer to the British protests was a general regulation issued on August 29, 1955, to the effect that 72 hours advance notice was now required for any passage through the Gulf, and a statement by Colonel Nasser in his October 5 press conference that Egypt had "a legal right to control shipping in the Egyptian territorial waters of the Gulf of Aqaba."⁵⁷

This was the same press conference at which the Soviet Arms Deal was announced.⁵⁸

⁵⁶This contradicts both Bloomfield and Rosenne, who claim that the Egyptian answer merely stated that they had not meant to hit the vessel, but Cagle's account, loc. cit., as given here, agrees with press reports of the incident. See London Times, July 11, 1955, et seq.

⁵⁷London Times, October 6, 1955.

⁵⁸Ibid.

Great Britain was answered by saying in the letter that the
 statement was failed to make any distinction.⁵⁵ The British
 rejected the Egyptian view and the Foreign Office issued a
 statement of policy on the Gulf question that it was an
 international matter open to all ships. However, clearly,
 the statement pointed out that neither in the British law
 nor in international law, Egyptian authorities had the
 right to enforce any such measures for customs regulations
 and public health rules. The validity of the two customs
 regulations was never doubted, but, however, as the Egyptian
 position linked customs and public health with the same category.
 The Egyptian answer to the British protests was a general
 regulation issued on August 29, 1952, on the effect that
 it gave customs control and was required for any passage
 through the Gulf, and a statement by Colonel Nasser in his
 October 7 press conference that Egypt had no legal right to
 control shipping in the Egyptian territorial waters of the
 Gulf of Aden.⁵⁷

This was the last time that the two sides met on the

Gulf of Aden and was announced.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ This statement was issued by the Egyptian and British, who
 claim that the Egyptian answer merely stated that they had
 no right to the vessel, but that it was a matter of the
 as given date, which was given in the statement.
 See London Times, July 21, 1952, p. 1.

⁵⁷ London Times, October 8, 1952.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Meanwhile, Premier Ben Gurion made a major speech at Beersheba on July 10th which added to the tension and probably served to crystalize the Egyptian response to the British note. The port Eilat was being completed so that passage to the Indian Ocean could be assured, he declared, "if necessary with the help of the Israeli Navy, Air Force, and Army."⁵⁹ He spoke of his plans to build the Eilat-Beersheba railroad and in another major speech on September 25, he answered the new stiff Egyptian Blockade regulation by prophesizing that "in a year or less," the situation would be resolved although he reiterated a previous stand that he would renew his efforts to discuss the matter with Nasser once the port construction was completed.⁶⁰ Israel had just taken title to two surplus British destroyers, which renamed the "Eilat" and the "Yaffo," were being refitted in British yards. They were ready within the year, 1,710 tons each with four 4.5 inch deck mounts, six 40 mm. anti-aircraft weapons, eight torpedo tubes and a maximum speed of 37 knots.⁶¹

⁵⁹Cagle, op. cit., p. 79.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹These vessels were the real start of the Israeli Navy. Prior to their purchase, the navy had consisted of three ex-Canadian river class frigates of 1,445 tons each, with four 4 inch guns, ten 20 mm machine guns, capable of a maximum speed of 20 knots. The "Eilat" and the "Yaffo", former Z type first line British destroyers, were ready for action in the Sinai war. Egypt acquired two similar ships

While these tensions continued to mount, the Anglo-Egyptian tension suddenly began to relax. On November 30, 1955, Prime Minister Eden announced that an agreement of sorts had been reached with Nasser and the agreement itself is significant to an understanding of how the power structure in the Middle East was beginning to be altered. It also indicates a growing concern in London for the massive implications of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. The English accepted the September, 1955, regulations in the strait on a de facto basis while never accepting the

contention of the Egyptian government that they are entitled to exercise at the present time belligerent rights with regard to shipping going to the Gulf of Aqaba. They [Her Majesty's Government] have, however, accepted these arrangements⁶² on practical grounds pending a wider settlement.

In the United States, the official posture was to irritate as few of the touchy principals as possible. Accordingly, following a normal international practice, the Hydrographic Office issued a warning to all American flag vessels to identify themselves prior to transiting the

at the same time from Britain as well as two Skory class Soviet destroyers. See United States Navy, Recognition and Identification Guide, Ships (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955, with corrections to 1962), looseleaf, and Cagle, loc. cit.

⁶²Quoted from Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Third Series, Vol. 546, Col. 2,297, November 30, 1955, and Vol. 549, Col. 364, February 22, 1956, in Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 26.

straits⁶³ and four weeks later the complete text of the Egyptian revision to the regulations concerning the blockade was promulgated verbatim without comment.⁶⁴

The Blockade Before the United Nations

Under the terms of the Armistice of Rhodes between Egypt and Israel, a Mixed Armistice Commission was established to execute its provisions and decide on procedural and substantive matters concerning the terms of the agreement.⁶⁵ On question of principle, there was a provision for appeal from a decision of the Commission to a special committee composed of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one Israeli and one Egyptian member.⁶⁶

In the late summer of 1950, an appeal was made to this special committee against a decision by the Mixed Armistice Commission which had ruled that the matter of the Suez Canal Blockade was a matter outside the scope of its competence, but while this appeal was still pending, Israel brought the matter before the Security Council on September 16.⁶⁷

⁶³Notice to Mariners, No. 40, October 1, 1955, in U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, NOTAM SUMMARY OCT 1955, 1955 (mimeographed, looseleaf).

⁶⁴ibid. Notice to Mariners, No. 44, October 25, 1955,

⁶⁵Article 10.

⁶⁶Article 10, para. 4.

⁶⁷Security Council Official Records, 5th year, Supplement for September-December, 1950, p. 55, Document S/1794.

and to the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only two countries in the world that have a large number of people who are both white and black. This is because of the large number of people who are both white and black in the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only two countries in the world that have a large number of people who are both white and black. This is because of the large number of people who are both white and black in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Under the terms of the resolution of 1906, the
type and form, a special committee was established
to examine the provisions and to report on the same.
The committee has since the time of its organization,¹ the
question of interest, there was a provision for appeal from
a decision of the Commission to a special committee composed
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.²

the matter before the Security Council on September 26, 1957

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The Council refused to consider the matter until the committee had reported a decision⁶⁸ and by June 12, 1951, by the deciding vote cast by Lieutenant General Riley, the United Nations Chief of Staff, the committee agreed with the Mixed Armistice Commission that it did not have the right to demand a suspension of the Suez blockade from Egypt.⁶⁹ This ruling in effect opened the way for a full dress Security Council consideration of the entire matter of the Suez Blockade and on September 1, 1951, a lengthy Resolution was passed calling upon Egypt "to terminate the restriction on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal . . . and cease all interference with such shipping."⁷⁰

Egypt ignored the resolution.

After the incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba described above indicated that Egypt had every intention of applying the same measures to the Gulf, Israel once again complained against Egypt following the "Albion" and "Maria Antonia" incidents, at a time when she felt she could muster the support needed to vote a resolution through which would

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 124, Document S/1907.

⁶⁹Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Supplement for April-June, 1951, p. 162, Document S/2194.

⁷⁰Security Council Official Records, 6th year, Meeting 558, p. 2, Document S/2322. The sentence quoted is the last sentence of the resolution. The sponsors were the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and the supporters were Brazil, Ecuador, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Netherlands.

specifically apply to the Gulf.⁷¹ This time, she requested action against Egypt by the 1954 Council for non-compliance with the 1951 Resolution adding the additional charge for "interference . . . with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba," and persuaded Sir Leslie Munro, the New Zealand Representative to sponsor it.⁷² She also submitted an explanatory memorandum in which the development of the blockade since 1951 was traced.⁷³ The Resolution was introduced on March 24, 1954, at the 644th meeting of the Security Council calling on Egypt to comply with the prior resolution and which also contained the provision that the Aqaba question would be directed to the Mixed Armistice Commission "in the first instance . . . without prejudice."⁷⁴ Lebanon and the Soviet Union voted against the measure and the door was closed, by the Russian veto, for any further Security Council action on the Blockade question.

⁷¹Supra, pp. 65-66.

⁷²Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 47.

⁷³Security Council Official Records, 9th year, Supplement for January-March, 1954, pp. 1-2, Document S/3168.

⁷⁴This was a procedural move designed to preclude the MAC from deciding that it did not have competence, repeating the 1951 experience. Abba Eban, the Israel representative, took the veto with bitterness. Security Council Official Reports, 9th year, 664th meeting, March 29, 1954, p. 22.

Deterioration of Stability--1955-1956

The complicated politics of the 1955-1956 period form the background setting for the next phase of the Aqaba story, and a brief resume of some of the more important events of that period, as they bear on the main topic of study, is now in order. It will be remembered that in February, 1955, after long and occasionally bitter exchanges between the supporting Hashemite-oriented camp and the opposing Egyptian oriented camp, the Baghdad Pact was signed drawing Iraq into the western alliance system to the consummate disgust of President Nasser. At the same time, Israel began a particularly vicious and savage series of raids across the armistice lines into Gaza and the combination of these two events placed the issue of modern arms well into the forefront of Egyptian policy considerations. The subsequent "commando" raids Egypt launched in retaliation were devices to arouse Egyptian public opinion and to disguise Egyptian weakness⁷⁵ and by November, 1955, Nasser was inventing counter-attacks for this purpose. The fedayeen program was just getting under way on the scale originally planned.⁷⁶

In April, 1955, meanwhile, Nasser had attended the

⁷⁵Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 75.

⁷⁶Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959), p. 126.

Deterioration of Jewish-Arab Relations, 1955-1956

The completed collection of the 1955-1956 period from the background setting for the next phase of the Arab story, and a brief review of some of the more important events of that period, as they bear on the main topic of study, is now in hand. It will be remembered that in February, 1955, after long and occasionally bitter exchanges between the Egyptian Government and the Arab League, the Egyptian position on the Arab League fact was aligned opposite Egyptian position. The Egyptian fact was aligned opposite fact into the Egyptian position system to the commonest degree of Egyptian history. At the same time, Israel began a particularly violent and savage series of raids across the Egyptian border into Gaza and the Sinai. In the midst of these two events, the issue of Jewish-Arab relations will into the forefront of Egyptian policy considerations. The subsequent Egyptian policy followed in relation were devised to show Egyptian public opinion and to the Arab Egyptian position. In November, 1955, Kasser was invited to attend the Arab League for this purpose. The Egyptian program was first tested under way on the Arab League. In April, 1955, Kasser had attended the

⁷⁵ For further, A. J. Aronson, Arab League (New York: Time, 1955), p. 11.
⁷⁶ For further, Arab League (New York: Time, 1955), p. 11.
⁷⁷ For further, Arab League (New York: Time, 1955), p. 11.

Bandung Conference of Asian Powers where he met Chou en-Lai and in the Spring and Summer of 1955, a new line emerged in the troubled Middle East which was typified by the now famous Czechoslovakian Arms Agreement. The prospects of a Moscow-Cairo axis troubled the western powers considerably⁷⁷ to say nothing of the obvious Israeli concern. It was fairly clear that the arms Nasser was obtaining from the Eastern Bloc were designed for ground warfare against Israel and the western concern, quite naturally, was that the supply of petroleum from the Middle East would be cut as soon as any major outbreak of hostilities occurred or even, possibly, as a prelude to such an outbreak.

The Security Council gave renewed consideration to the events in the Middle East during the early part of 1956, particularly to the Israeli attacks against the Gaza Strip. Over the vigorous protests of the Israelis, an encompassing resolution was passed on June 4, 1956,⁷⁸ which took note of the inflammatory actions on both sides but made little reference to the blockade. Secretary General Hammerskjold had been surveying the general situation since April 4 under a previous Security Council Resolution but in a statement on April 16, 1956, he announced that his interpretation of the

⁷⁷John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 119-120.

⁷⁸See New York Times, June 5, 1956, for complete text and comment.

Security Council mandate gave him no authority to deal with the blockade question itself.⁷⁹ He was able to arrange a "cease fire" by conciliation on April 18.⁸⁰

In order to dramatize the blockade at a time when Israel was coming in for censure for her own actions, the "Panagia" incident was manufactured⁸¹ out of Egyptian refusal to allow this Greek ship to transit the Canal on May 25, 1956. It was a Greek vessel loaded with cement bound from Haifa to Eilat, at what was probably the most inauspicious moment in history for a trouble-free voyage, and was detained at Port Said from May 25 to September 8, 1956, while its presence was milked for propaganda by both sides.⁸²

On June 18 the last contingent of British soldiers left the Canal Zone in accordance with the 1954 Treaty;⁸³ Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was entertained in Cairo at a three day celebration⁸⁴ and the orientation of

⁷⁹Rosenne, Gulf of Aqaba, p. 29. See also New York Times, April 18, 1956.

⁸⁰New York Times, April 19 and 20, 1956.

⁸¹This judgment is original in view of the context in which the incident occurred. Obviously, the Israel government needed sympathy in the United Nations and on balance, she probably deserved it even though her own record was not completely clean.

⁸²Rosenne, loc. cit.

⁸³Fisher, op. cit., pp. 621-622, provides an excellent background on the Treaty.

⁸⁴New York Times, June 21, 23, 25, 26, 1956.

Security Council members have no authority to deal with the situation presented here. The only way to handle a vessel under the jurisdiction of the United States is to allow this vessel to proceed to the Canal on May 20, 1956. It was a Greek vessel loaded with goods bound from Haifa to Haifa, at which time was provided the most immediate support in Haifa for a commercial vessel, and was detained at Port Said from May 15 to September 8, 1956, while the presence was taken for protection by both sides.⁶²

The June 11 and June 12, 1956, resolutions of the Security Council have been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty.⁶³ The United States has been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty in its position, and the United States has been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty in its position.⁶⁴

⁶²See, e.g., New York Times, April 18, 1956.

⁶³New York Times, April 19 and 20, 1956.

⁶⁴This document is included in the list of the documents in which the United States has been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty. The United States has been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty in its position, and the United States has been in accordance with the 1956 Treaty in its position.

⁶⁵See, e.g., New York Times, April 18, 1956.

⁶⁶See, e.g., New York Times, April 18, 1956.

⁶⁷New York Times, April 18, 1956.

the "new" Egyptian foreign policy was now causing serious concern in the foreign ministries of the western world.

Pending throughout the summer was the American offer to finance part of the development cost of the Aswan High Dam project. In mid-July, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, returned to Washington from Cairo with instructions to notify Secretary Dulles of Nasser's decision to accept the aid offer, but on July 19, 1956, in possibly one of the most fateful decisions in recent history, Dulles withdrew the offer.⁸⁵

The retraction was a heavy blow to Egyptian hopes, since the American loan had been the prerequisite for World Bank and British participation in the project, offers which were also immediately withdrawn.⁸⁶

The withdrawal of the Aswan offer was the spark which ignited the tinder box.

The blaze began, slowly at first, which would soon engulf the Middle East in one of the most bizarre events of modern times, bringing the last of the old political world into sharp contact with the new.

The status quo was about to be radically altered.

⁸⁵See John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles, 1888-1959 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), pp. 247-259, for the background. For Secretary Dulles' comment on the Beal analysis, see his press conference of April 2, 1957, in the New York Times, April 3, 1957.

⁸⁶New York Times, July 22, 1956.

the new Egyptian foreign policy was now becoming obvious
 however in the foreign relations of the Western world.
 Turning attention to the present and the foreign order
 to financial part of the development cost of the Suez Canal
 has been. In addition, some houses, the Egyptian
 Ambassador in the United States, returned to Washington from
 Cairo with instructions to study Secretary Ewing's
 decision to accept the aid offer, but on July 19, 1955, an
 possibly one of the most important decisions in recent history,
 India withdrew the offer.⁸⁵

The withdrawal was a heavy blow to Egyptian hopes,
 since the American loan had been the prerequisite for World
 Bank and British participation in the project, plans which
 were also immediately abandoned.⁸⁶

The withdrawal of the American offer was the spark which
 ignited the Suez crisis.

The crisis began, slowly at first, which would soon
 engulf the Middle East in one of the most dramatic events of
 modern times, beginning the end of the old political world
 into sharp contrast with the new.
 The process was now set in motion as he rapidly altered.

⁸⁵ See John R. Ball, *Suez Canal Crisis, 1956-1957*
 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), pp. 124-125, for the back-
 ground. For Secretary Ewing's comments on the Canal crisis,
 see his press conference of April 5, 1957, in the *New York*
Times, April 5, 1957.

⁸⁶ *New York Times*, July 20, 1955.

CHAPTER IV

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH

The Suez Crisis was one of the most significant events of the last decade. It has been effectively chronicled, analyzed, regretted, defended and interpreted so many times in the last few years that for the purposes of this study, only the more obscure implications of the events in the southern Sinai peninsula need be explored in any great detail.¹

The Suez Crisis began, if a beginning must be established, with the nationalization of the Suez Canal on the evening of July 26, 1956.² The decision to nationalize had not been a hasty one³ but within the framework of the political context in which it was made, it was taken by Great Britain and France as something not far short of a declaration of war. There were four separable issues which disturbed the West but paramount was the fear engendered by Nasser's

¹A good approach to a thorough understanding of the series of events known popularly as the "Suez Crisis" might be the simultaneous examination of the accounts of the last half of 1956 in Beal, op. cit., pp. 246-308, for the American orientation; in Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), pp. 457-554, for the British orientation; in Merry and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez, trans. by James Cameron (London: Sidgewick and Jackson, Ltd., 1957), for what is purported to be the French orientation. All are more or less mutually contradictory on many points.

²Michael Adams, Suez and After (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), pp. 1-8.

³Partner, op. cit., p. 78.

new ability to close the Canal at some unforeseen time and thus jeopardize the security and economy of whatever nation he chose, ominously underscored by his increasing closeness with the Soviet Bloc. Secondly, there was the matter of doubt as to the ability of the Egyptians to handle the mechanical and administrative details of the operation. There was, thirdly, a great prestige factor to be considered. The events of July began to look more and more each day like a great Egyptian political victory gained with the assistance of neutralist India and the Soviet Bloc. Finally, there were a maze of economic considerations not the least of which was the fact that the Canal itself would add little to the building costs of the Aswan Dam unless major changes were introduced in the economic regime of the Canal and a concern over capital improvement of the Canal itself was deep on all quarters.⁴ By the end of October, 1956, with the United States in the throes of a presidential election and under the impression that the crisis caused by the nationalization was cooling off, the Israeli army had fully mobilized and the French and British combined task force was in a position to act.⁵

⁴ See, for example, Fisher, op. cit., p. 633.

⁵ The newspaper accounts of the last days before the Sinai war are impressive for their lack of indication that anything was afoot. Less and less space was being devoted to the Middle East during the last week of October as the election and Hungary took precedence.

new ability to close the door on any outside influence and thus jeopardize the security and economy of the country. He chose, naturally, to be guided by his own feelings, with the better class. Naturally, there was the matter of doing as to the matter of the country as regards the mechanical and administrative details of the operation. There was, finally, a great general factor to be considered. The system of this system to look over and over and day after day. A great system of this system gained with the resistance of various kinds and the system. Finally, there were a mass of economic considerations and the least of which was the fact that the system would not be able to do this. Building costs of the system had been major changes were introduced in the economic system of the system and a concrete over capital improvement of the system itself was done on all quarters. By the end of October, 1950, with the United States in the midst of a general election and under the impression that the system would be the result of the system was coming off, the system, any day, might be modified and the system and system combined with the system in a question of the.

For example, Fisher, pp. 11, 12, 13.

The newspaper accounts of the last days before the election are impressive for their lack of indication that anything was wrong. Last and first were the last days of the election and the last days of the election and the last days of the election and the last days of the election.

The Israeli Defense Ministry, during the summer of 1956, was faced with a growing concern over the deterioration of the delicate balance of power in the Middle East following the arms deals. During the summer the Arabs had engineered a united military front aimed at the destruction of Israel.⁶ The lid placed on the Middle East arms race by the 1950 Tri-Partite Declaration⁷ had lost all relevance after the arms purchases of September, 1955, and the military alliance of the following summer constituted a major change in the land order of battle against Israel. In troubled Jordan, telling Israeli border attacks against the fedayeen based there were taking their toll of Arab prestige and although Great Britain affirmed its intention of fulfilling her commitments to Jordan if that matter became more serious, the anomalies of the situation were extreme.⁸ (The question during the summer was whether the British, already at swords points with Egypt over Suez, would fight Israel on behalf of Jordan if requested.)

In a clear cut political victory in Jordan in October, the pro-Nasser nationalist Sulayman Nabulsi took office and

⁶ Syria and Saudi Arabia concluded a military pact with Egypt putting their armies under joint command. See Campbell, op. cit., pp. 91-95.

⁷ By Great Britain, France and the United States to monitor the arms purchases of both sides to insure stability. See Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 352. This arrangement was claimed as the "legal" justification of the Anglo-French operation in November.

⁸ See Eden, op. cit., p. 571ff. for the gravity with which the British Prime Minister viewed this possibility.

immediately offered the Jordanian Army to the Arab alliance.

Having lost all faith in the truce keeping machinery of the United Nations and dubious of the actual value of the original armistice agreements in light of their repeated violation (and counter-violation), plans for preventive war had been made in Israel during the summer and finalized shortly after the Nabulsi victory.⁹ The objectives of the Israeli operation were to be three-fold.

One objective was to be the destruction of the fedayeen bases in the Gaza Strip. A second was the occupation of as much of the Sinai peninsula as possible, to hold as a bargaining counter in subsequent dealings with Egypt. The planners realized full well that the Israeli Army lacked the wherewithall to hold Sinai permanently but they were apparently interested in forcing the hand of the United Nations and were willing to settle for demilitarization of Sinai as a victory if the campaign were successful. World interest in the Israeli cause had eroded during the progress of the Cold War and a refocussing of this interest on the complicated new developments was felt to be in order.

Finally, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a burning issue in Israel. In addition to holding Gaza, Rafa and Abu Ageila, the original plan aimed at holding the narrow strip of territory which extended from Eilat down the western shore

⁹See Robert Henriques, 100 Hours to Suez (New York: Viking, 1957), pp. 1-45.

immediately offered the Jordanian King to the Arab alliance.
 Having lost all faith in the Arab League machinery
 of the United Nations and absence of any moral value of the
 original proposed agreement in light of their repeated
 violation (and human-violation), plans for preventive war
 had been made in Israel during the summer and fall of
 shortly after the October 1957. The objective of the
 Israeli operation was to force-1958.

One objection was to be the destruction of the Jordanian
 bases in the Arab world. A second was the cooperation of an
 unit of the United Nations as possible, to hold on a ver-
 gaining control in subsequent dealings with Egypt. The plan
 was revised but still that the Israeli King lacked the
 wherewithal to hold that permanently but they were apparently
 interested in forcing the hand of the United Nations and were
 willing to settle for destruction of Israel as a victory.
 If the campaign were successful, World leaders in the Israeli
 sense had needed during the progress of the Cold War and a re-
 focusing of this interest on the complicated new developments
 was felt to be in order.

Finally, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a driving
 issue in Israel. In addition to securing Israel, Syria and the
 Arab, the original plan aimed at holding the narrow strip
 of territory which connected the Gulf from the western shore

of the Gulf to and including Ras Nasrani, Sharm el-Sheikh and the island of Tiran until the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba could be permanently removed. It is now an open secret that the original objectives were considered overly ambitious by the military and by the civilian political leaders who were privy to the plan.¹⁰

The Israeli Army jumped off on Monday, October 29, exercising her "inherent right of self-defence" under the United Nations Charter.¹¹ The Soviet Union was absorbed with huge troubles in Warsaw and in Budapest. The United States was entering the final throes of an election.¹² The French and British support units were in place according to plan and after the Eden-Mollet ultimatum twenty-four hours later, the operation looked as if it were succeeding brilliantly. All political and military thrusts seemed to dovetail nicely and smoothly.¹³

¹⁰ Edgar O'Ballance, The Sinai Campaign of 1956 (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 79.

¹¹ Statement made by Abba Eban, Israeli Representative to the United Nations, on November 1, 1956. See the New York Times, Nov. 2, 1956.

¹² The New York Times had a field day. Often, during the week instead of all the news that was fit to print, it printed all the news that fitted.

¹³ On the subject of French-British-Israeli collusion, there has been much written. Eden (op. cit., p. 572) states that the possibilities of the Israeli action had been discussed in mid-October but no actual formal collusion had occurred.

The first or northern prong of the Israeli attack entered Gaza and secured the strip by the end of the week.¹⁴ A second central prong moved westward through Sinai toward the Canal and after the British and French paratroop attacks had secured much of the Canal zone the general collapse of the Egyptian Army was immanent.¹⁵

But the most significant and abiding advantage of the entire campaign was being accomplished in southern Sinai by the sweep of the "Eastern Task Force" whose mission it was to open the Gulf of Aqaba. The problem was largely one of

Beal, on the other hand, treats the collusion as a proven fact (op. cit., pp. 277-279) and the collusion angle is the entire thesis of the Bromberger book, cited above. While fascinating in itself, the point has only tangential relevance to the Aqaba issue. But it would seem to be well established that the British, French and Israeli actions were taken as if there had been prior arrangement between them.

¹⁴This, admittedly, is an oversimplification. Each author "numbers" the prongs differently, and there were actually four separate operations rather than three. The numbering here is for simplicity sake and orders the attacks geographically.

¹⁵Interestingly enough, these two campaigns were the only ones to receive press coverage until November 6th, for reasons that will become clear below, and the coverage in both the London and New York Times is quite unsatisfactory. The communiqués issued by the Israeli and Egyptian Army commands during the battles are worthless.

geography rather than strategy. There were no roads to speak of leading from Eilat to the Straits, only a "track" through crags and mountains which paralleled the western shore,¹⁶ and the entire operation had to be conducted in secrecy while the northern and central attacks were receiving great quantities of publicity.¹⁷

The Military Campaign to Open the Gulf of Aqaba

Shortly before dawn on Thursday, November 1, 1956, the Ninth Infantry Brigade¹⁸ departed from Kuntilla and arrived at Ras el-Naqb, the roadhead on the Egyptian-Israeli border five miles north-west of Eilat, that same afternoon.¹⁹ The Ninth Brigade had been mobilized on October 26 and was a reserve group composed of artisans, farmers and a sprinkling

¹⁶

O'Ballance, loc. cit.

¹⁷

Most of its inaccurate.

¹⁸

In the Israeli Army, a "Brigade" is equal to an American regiment.

¹⁹

What follows here is an account which has been synthesized from five principal sources: the communiques of the Israeli Defense Ministry as published in the New York Times, November 1, through 9, 1956; S.L.A. Marshall, Sinai Victory (New York: William Morrow, 1958); O'Ballance, The Sinai Campaign of 1956, cit. supra; Henriques, op. cit.; and the personal recollections of the Assistant Military Attache of the Government of Israel, who unwilling to be quoted by name, had access to information bearing directly on the problem of research and who provided substantiation for many of the judgements made here. See also, Eden, op. cit., pp. 600-626, Brombergers, op. cit., passim and Calvocoressi and Wint, Middle East Crisis (Baltimore, Penguin, 1957), passim.

of white-collar workers from the northern part of the country. The commanding officer, Colonel Avraham Yoffe, was one of the best troop commanders of the Israeli Army. On the day of mobilization, arrangements had been made to haul five LCMs from Haifa to Eilat for use in the operation and after being hauled to Beersheba on flat-cars, these landing craft were placed on phosphate trucks, carted to Eilat, and floated on the afternoon of Monday, October 29, the day the campaign in the north had started. The LCMs were an important element of a plan which envisioned a march down the western side of the Gulf, periodic off-shore replenishment from the "Mike" boats, conquest of the Egyptian installations at the Straits (if possible after a union with the Central Airborne force proceeding southward from Mitla pass) and an amphibious assault on Tiran and Sanafir.

Arriving at Ras el-Baqb²⁰ the force regrouped and rested for the march southward and at 5:00 A.M. Friday, November 2, it commenced the first phase of its advance, a hard hilly run of almost one hundred road miles. The group reached the top of the watershed at 2:00 A.M. the following morning and the oasis of Ein el-Furtuga two hours later. It was now Saturday, November 3.

There is a track from this oasis down to the shore of the Gulf and arrangements had been made for the first

²⁰Not to be confused with Ras el-Nabq (sometimes Nabk, Naqb) in Jordan mentioned supra, Chapter II, p. 29.

replenishments from the LCMs to be made at the point where this track reached the water at a deserted fishing village, Nuweiba. The 220 vehicles were in good shape. Travelling in four groups, none had broken down during the night although considerable hauling and pulling had to be done and in some cases, engineers had been required to carve passages through the crags to manage it.

After replenishing gasoline and water from the boats, the column pushed south toward the next rendezvous planned at Dahab the following afternoon. The going got considerably tougher south of Ein el-Furtuga where the trail ran uphill between large boulders which allowed, in some tight spots, only a few inches clearance between the rocky walls and the vehicles themselves. Each single wheeled vehicle had to be manually pushed and pulled up to the top of the watershed which was reached, after a night of effort, with only eight vehicular breakdowns. From the top of this watershed, the trail led down toward Dahab and at this point Yoffe had to cope with an unexpected logistics problem due to the shortage in his gasoline supply after the exorbitant usage of his vehicles over the rough night travel. He elected to remain at the high point himself, radioing back to Eilat to the LCMs for additional gasoline at the Dehab transfer, and he spent the morning shepherding the rest of the column up over the saddle back.

Meanwhile, the first element of the convoy had come down from the highlands and engaged the first Egyptians which they had seen during the "war." As it pushed down into Dahab at around 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, 3 November, this first element was ambushed by an Egyptian Frontier Force and three Israelis were killed and six wounded before the squad of Egyptians withdrew southward on camels toward Nakeb.²¹

While the skirmish did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the Brigade, it was the first taste of blood and it took the edge of pleasure off the arrival of the LCMs shortly after four. The LCMs were able at this point to off-load two French AMX tanks which now took their place in the column for the drive to Nakeb²² 32 miles south and the force moved out at 7:00 P.M. that evening after a brief rest. South of Dahab, some of the roughest terrain yet encountered took the group through the Ashira Divide

²¹This encounter is difficult to establish definitely as to time and place. Henriques fails to mention it at all. General Marshall describes an encounter at Dahab at about the same time of the same day but his details sound suspiciously like the skirmish O'Ballance places at Nakeb the following afternoon. (See infra.) To add to the confusion, Henriques describes an ambush as described here in place of the Nakeb incident.

²²Sometimes Naqb, Maqb, Naqeb.

Meanwhile, the first element of the company had
come down from the highland and engaged the first Egyptian
which they had seen during the night. As it pulled down
into the valley at about 2:00 P.M. on Saturday, 3 November,
this first element was ambushed by an Egyptian force
of 200 and the Egyptian force killed and took prisoner
the head of the Egyptian column and several others.
March 31

While the attack was seriously delayed the
lighting capability of the Egyptian, it was the first case
of blood and it took the edge of pleasure off the arrival of
the LCM shortly after four. The LCM were out of the
point to all-day and the Egyptian force which was back their
place in the column for the attack on March 31 at 11:00 P.M.
and the force moved out at 1:00 P.M. that evening after a
brief rest. South of the point, some of the Egyptian
yet encountered and the force through the night.

31 This morning is difficult to describe briefly
as to time and place. The Egyptian force is at all
General Marshall described an encounter at 11:00 P.M. at about the
same time of the night but the details were not
like the attack on the Egyptian force at 11:00 P.M. the following
afternoon. The Egyptian force was in the position, however,
described as being in the place of the Egyptian
force.

Excerpts from March, 1941, March, 1941.

which although blocked for at least a mile by boulders, was cleared in the dark by the sapper company working with the infantry troops.

By noon Sunday, November 4, the line approached Nakeb through a small pass cut in the bleak terrain by the Wadi Kaid. Here it was ambushed by another camel patrol, which had managed to blow some boulders across the track down the wadi bed. The patrol harassed the column briefly but no damage was done and no casualties incurred.²³

Nakeb had been a listening and watching post forming part of the Blockade complex and had been apparently evacuated Saturday afternoon. The camel patrol had been left to delay the line of march which, undelayed, now faced a relatively easy run down five miles of flat beach to Ras Nasrani, the linch-pin in the Egyptian installation.

After contacting the LCMs again, the first element hit this road for the run south. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force began working on Ras Nasrani with napalm and as they headed south, the infantry and armor spotted the B-17 and the P-51s which were softening up what was expected to

²³This incident is placed by General Marshall at 2:30 A.M. Sunday morning followed by an incident in a radio conversation between Yoffe and General Moishe Dayan which Henriques places more nearly in the time context mentioned here. Henriques mentions this incident as the first of the actual enemy contacts but consistent with the rate of march and other internal evidence, the account here seems unquestionably correct and follows the account given by O'Ballance. Additionally, the earlier encounter in which casualties did occur as described here is placed by the majority at Dahab.

be the main redoubt in the south, the fortress of Ras Nasrani.

The Egyptian Defense of the Strait

Ras Nasrani is a small headland which, following the Egyptian decision to blockade the Gulf, had been well fortified. The defenses were strong and constructed in accordance with the usual Egyptian desert fortification plan. In addition, concrete breastworks had been laid up and the complex entangled in effective barbed wire defenses. It mounted two 6 inch and four 3 inch coastal guns set in concrete pointing seaward covering the Enterprise passage between the mainland and Tiran, sitting at the other side of the channel two miles to the east. The passage itself, eight hundred yards wide, made an excellent target for the guns and coral reefs and shoals accounted for the remainder of waterspace between the two land masses. Tiran itself was not fortified, nor was Sanifir, although temporary installations on Tiran had been used from time to time during the Blockade.²⁴

Base defense of the installation was provided for by machine gun emplacements laid out in a semi-circular hedge-hog of concrete bunkers and inter-connecting trenches,

²⁴Supra, p. 32.

all with overhead cover and set in a well-designed mine-field.²⁵

The base commander was a senior Egyptian Regular Army Colonel who came directly under the command of the General Headquarters in Cairo. On Friday evening, November 2, word had been received that a "reconnaissance detachment consisting of several tracked vehicles" was moving south and would be at the installation within the next six days. Acting in response to what he and his field commander, Lieutenant Colonel Neguib, determined to be the best strategy based on the information available, he had evacuated this magnificent position over the weekend and when the Ninth Brigade charged up to the fortress ready for an all out attack, incredibly the installation was completely abandoned. Neguib had ordered the position evacuated completely and he had instead, entrenched his force at Sharm el-Sheikh, a few miles to the south, where he decided to make his stand. There he was supplied with 200 cubic meters of fresh water, a purification plant sufficient to sustain his troops with purified sea-water indefinitely and food for several months, including 500 live sheep. He had sent his sick and weak back to Egypt during the previous week and had a total of 1500 men and 43 officers with

²⁵"One batalion, firmly committed to the defense of this position, might have withstood a division attack, so artillery resistant were its works." Marshall, op. cit., p. 221. This from a military expert.

all were upward bound and were in a well-ordered line.
Field.
The new command was a local Egyptian regiment
Army Colonel who was ordered to take the command of the
General Headquarters in Cairo. The Valley was a
it was not long before that a 'Proclamation' was
sent consisting of several hundred copies, and being
covered and would be at the disposition of the
the day. During its progress to the end of the
commander, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, and Captain, as he
part of the army, and the remainder of the
evacuated the Egyptian position over the road and
when the British forces changed to the former road
for an all-out attack, immediately the Egyptian was
completely destroyed. In fact, the Egyptian position
evacuated completely and he had indeed, returned his
force at that time, a few miles to the south, where he
decided to make his stand. There he was supplied with 100
engineers on each side, a full-scale attack with
no machine gun force with machine gun water tank
and food for several months, including 500 live sheep. He
had sent his wife and sons back to Egypt during the
three weeks and had a total of 100 men and 10 officers with

54. On 15th March, 1941, the Egyptian
this position, which was situated at a distance of 10
military position was in fact, 100 miles, 100 miles, 100 miles.
521. This was a military matter.

which to stage his defense.

Much criticism has been heaped on Colonel Naguib (no relation to the more famous Naguib or Neguib of the same name) for deserting such a defense position at Ras Nasrani to make a stand at Sharm el-Sheikh. The criticism is from the Israeli side, generally, and seems usually to be based on an over-emphasis of the hardware at Ras Nasrani. After his capture, for example, Neguib expressed the point that he had made his decision based on the principle of concentration--that he felt it would be better to defend from a single concentrated position than from two widely separated points. While generally belittled as a narrow approach to the problem and while certainly in contrast to the Israeli philosophy of calculated military boldness, such a stand had the additional merit of placing his force where there was both a deep water quai and a usable air strip. No such facilities existed at Ras Nasrani. This would have ruled out supplying or evacuating large numbers by sea or air, or at least by sea assuming a state of real seige.

Before leaving Ras Nasrani, however, Neguib had seen to it that the heavy coastal guns had been spiked.²⁶ It is

²⁶ Israel, of course, claims credit for this. See, for example, Eytan, loc. cit. While they undoubtedly caused it to be done, it was actually accomplished on Saturday evening, November 3rd, by the Egyptian Naval detachment assigned to the installation.

which he wrote his letters.

Such criticism has been based on Colonel Haggin's (as related to the author's former work on Haggin of the same name) for describing such a remote position as Haggin's to make a point of some interest. The criticism is from the Israeli side, generally, and seems usually to be based on an over-emphasis of the hardships of Haggin. After his capture, for example, Haggin expressed the point that he had made his decision based on the principle of concentration—that he felt it would be better to be held from a single concentrated position than from two widely separated points. While Haggin's criticism is a narrow approach to the problem and while certainly in contrast to the Israeli philosophy of maintaining military positions, such a stand has the additional merit of placing his force where there was both a deep water port and a nearby air strip. No other facilities existed at Haggin. This would have been the supplying or evacuating large numbers of men or arms, or at least by sea, according to the needs of the day.

Before leaving the Israeli, however, Haggin had seen to it that the heavy weapons had been packed. It is

²⁰Israel, of course, claims credit for this, too, for example, Haggin, like all the other Israeli command is to be done, is not actually recognized as Israeli even in Haggin's own work. The Haggin's own statement, however, is the foundation.

submitted that any criticism of Neguib from an impartial critic must center around this action more than any other. The guns were the raison d'etre for the defensive installation in the first place and the political implications of the spiking of the guns seems to be the most valid focus of any criticism of Neguib.

The Final Assault

Quickly moving past the defensive fortifications, the Ninth Brigade arrived at the outer defenses of Sharm el-Sheikh at mid-afternoon Sunday, November 4, and proceeded to over-run these perimeter defense posts. The main body concentrated and refueled and while there was spasmodic firing all that afternoon, most of the force got some rest and refreshment. The temperature was 82 degrees and there was a good breeze blowing off the sea. The LCMs arrived in the afternoon, unloaded two more AMX tanks from Eilat and in conjunction with a P-51 strike on Tiran, landed a small party on the island which found it deserted.

Encamped before Sharm el-Sheikh, the Brigade was now the last Israeli unit still in action against Egypt. The operations in the north were over and the Airborne Brigade which had fought through Mitla pass was at that moment hurrying around the western tip of Sinai to join in an expected pincer on Sharm el-Sheikh. The Air Force, relieved of all other commitments, was able to give its full attention to the

undoubtedly that any criticism of Wehrmacht from an impartial
critic will contain serious and valid points. The
The same was the reason given for the defensive inaction
also in the other cases and the political implications of
the splitting of the group seems to be the most valid factor of
any criticism of Wehrmacht.

The Final Assault

Initially moving past the defensive fortifications,
the British Brigade arrived at the outer perimeter of Sharm
el-Sheikh at mid-afternoon Sunday, November 4, and first
needed to overcome three German defense posts. The main
body of German forces was withdrawn and while there was sporadic
firing all that afternoon, none of the force was ever
and withdrawal. The temperature was 72 degrees and there
was a good breeze blowing off the sea. The 10th arrived in
the afternoon, followed two hours later by the 11th and in
conjunction with a 1-21 unit on foot, landed a small
party on the island which was at once secured.
Encamped between Sharm el-Sheikh, the British had now
the last Israeli unit still in action against Egypt. The
operation in the north was over and the British Brigade
which had fought through heavy rain was at once ordered
and moved the German 1st of 10th to 10th in an attempt
to take Sharm el-Sheikh. The 1st of 10th, followed by 1-21
other companies, was then to take the 10th position to the

southern tip of Sinai and all afternoon low passes were being made by aircraft while anti-aircraft fire kept the passes from doing any damage.

The defensive position was a wide one. Yoffe decided that his first task would be to clear the road to build himself a start line for the attack, which he planned to start at daybreak, Monday (Nov. 5). At 3:30 A.M. therefore, one company of infantry was moved down to the position blocking the road but pinned down by small arms fire from the Egyptians, they attempted to retreat back to their lines. In the dark, they made a wrong turn and blundered into the eastern flank of the main defense, only to find it deserted. They quickly hitched the guns there to half-tracks and hauled them back to their own lines.

At dawn a classic infantry charge began, wavered, and had to be discontinued in the face of withering fire from the Egyptians. At 7:00 A.M. Yoffe called for and received a napalm laydown over the trenches from a Mystere jet. The beginning of the end of the physical blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba dates from 7:10 A.M. on the morning of November 5, 1956, when this napalm landed. By 8:30 the wire perimeter was broken and at 9:00 A.M. the Egyptian Commander surrendered.

He had lost 200 men, fought well and lost honestly.

After his capture, Neguib gave three reasons for his defeat. The morale of the force had been shattered by air attacks, to which he had only limited response and no

members of the staff and all afternoon the house was
being made to appear as a comfortable life for the
guests from home and abroad.

The following position was a side one. Little was

aided about his first house which he had the right to
build himself a side line for the house. While he almost
to build it at once, Monday (Nov. 2). At 3:30 A.M. there-
fore, one company of soldiers was moved down to the position
facing the river and ordered them by small fire line
one by one, they attempted to retreat back to their lines.
In the dark, they were a good deal and surrounded them the
eastern side of the river. Only to find it deserted.
They quickly moved out from their to half-point and raised
then back to their own lines.

At 4:00 A.M. a heavy artillery charge began, however,
and had to be discontinued to the loss of military fire
from the Japanese. At 7:00 A.M. Little called for and re-
ceived a message from the Japanese that a Japanese jet.
The landing of the jet of the Japanese side of the
half of Japan about 7:00 A.M. on the morning of November
2, 1935, when they were landed. At 8:00 the wine parlor
was broken and at 9:00 A.M. the Japanese Government announced.

He had left the house, fought well and lost himself.

After his capture, Little was taken to the house for
his safety. The details of the house had been worked up
the house, it was in the half-point position and no

counter-air capability. Secondly, he had no artillery support to speak of, although it would have been difficult to imagine any coming from anywhere other than from within his own lines.

Finally, he complained that his men had been no good.

This comment, when it was all said and done, was unfortunate. Anthony Eden has grasped this remark and has used it to explain the entire Egyptian defense effort but in balance, it would seem rather that he had been outclassed and out imagined by a group of weekend warriors who simply had more to fight for.

Aftermath

As long as the Israeli army held their position in southern Sinai, the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was ended. It became almost immediately apparent however that continued military occupation of the Strait was neither practical nor popular (to say nothing of the legality of it) and the site of the struggle for the Gulf of Aqaba now shifted dramatically to New York where for the first time in history, it became one of the momentous issues of the day.

Israel had won a smashing military victory and did not want to be deprived of the political fruits of that victory. War, the extension of diplomacy by other means, had anachronistically (in the age of total nuclear destruction)

...in fact, it had no effect
...at all, although it would have been difficult
...to imagine any coming from anywhere other than within
...his own mind.

Finally, he emphasized that his own had been so

good.

This comment, when it was all said and done, was
unfortunate. Although it was a good one, it was not
used in the way that the writer had intended. It was
in balance, it would have been better had been enclosed
and one instance of a group of words which were simply
had not to fight for.

Abstract

As long as the human mind has been in
southern France, the Egyptian records of the Gulf of Suez
was noted. It would almost immediately appear however
that continued activity of the Gulf was not only
practical and possible for any number of the results of it
and the age of the records in the Gulf of Suez for which
traditionally to have been there for the first time in history,
it became one of the most important of the day.

There had been a number of other things and his
not want to be involved in the political issues of that
nature. But, the situation of things, by other means, had
been... (in the case of the...)

managed to achieve the purpose for which the institution of international violence had been invented. In possession of Gaza, overextended but triumphantly encamped deep in Egypt and in undisputed command of the Gulf of Aqaba for the first time in her history, Israel could hardly be expected to willingly forego these advantages and return to anything resembling the same position of insecurity from which she had launched the attacks. The Rhodes Armistice had been "torn up" on the night of the 29th in the hopes of replacing it with a negotiated peace when the smoke cleared.

Ben Gurion, "with full moral force and unflinching determination" presented a seven point declaration to the world summarizing his policy:

1. The armistice agreement with Egypt is dead and buried and cannot be restored to life.
2. In consequence, the armistice lines between Israel and Egypt have no more validity.
3. There is no dispute whatever between the people of Israel and the people of Egypt.
4. We do not wish our relations with Egypt to continue in the present anarchic state and we are ready to enter into negotiations for a stable peace, cooperation and good, neighborly relations with Egypt on condition that they are direct negotiations without prior conditions on either side and are not under duress from any quarter whatever.
5. We hope that all peace-loving nations will support our desire for such negotiations with each of the Arab states, but even if they are unprepared for a permanent peace, so long as they observe the armistice agreements, Israel on her part, will do so too.

6. On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how it is called, in her territory or in any of the area occupied by her.
7. Israel will not fight against any Arab country or against Egypt unless it is attacked by them. 27

This was at least, an explicit position, but the realities of international politics in November, 1956, were something else again. Because the United Nations were unable to force the Arabs to talk peace with the Jews, the immediate question emerged as to what kind of a de facto alteration in the power structure might emerge in regard to the withdrawal from Sinai, Gaza and the status of the Gulf itself.

The context was complicated.

On the one hand, in the inter-domestic setting, the difficulties of co-existence between Jew and Arab were all but hopeless during that first week of November and delicate statesmanship would have been required even if that had been the sole problem facing the assembled delegates in New York. Two other situations bore directly on the context however, following the Soviet offer of "volunteer" interven-

27

United States Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, September, 1956-June, 1957, Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957) Publication 6505, pp. 203-204.

in an attempt will be made to the
 situation of a British ship, no matter how
 it is called, is not necessary to it and to the
 crew engaged in her.

7. It is not clear whether the ship is
 or whether it is not in the hands of the
 22

This was at least, an explicit condition, but the
 realization of international politics in November 1955, were
 something like that. Because the United Nations were unable
 to force the Arab to talk with the Jews, the immediate
 question emerges as to what kind of a de facto situation is
 the power structure which emerges in regard to the situation
 from that. Does not the nature of the Gulf itself,
 the content was suggested.

On the one hand, in the inter-ethnic setting,
 the situation of inter-ethnic between the two sides were
 all but hope and during that first week of November and
 delicate arrangements would have been required when it then
 had been the sole power. And the assembled delegates in
 New York. The other arrangement was directly on the contrary
 however, following the latest offer of "voluntary" inter-

23
 British Foreign Office, London, 1955
 Policy in the Middle East, 1955
 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955)
 Publication 1957, pp. 101-102.

tion to clear the Middle East of aggressive armies²⁸ and after the physical blocking of the Suez Canal the previous day brought the entire Canal question into a second, more complicated phase.

At an emergency meeting of the United Nations the previous Saturday afternoon,²⁹ a plan for the establishment of a United Nations Police Force had been approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming vote and with the leverage gained by having a positive suggestion to replace the rapidly degenerating chaotic policies of the separate antagonists, a cease fire was agreed to by all concerned which was based on the realities of the military situation on the afternoon of Monday, November 5.³⁰ The following Sunday, Scandinavian and Canadian members of the first United Nations Emergency Force were reported to be on their way to Egypt.

There had been a suddenness on the part of Ben Gurion to revise the previous truculence of point 6 of his statement

²⁸ New York Times, November 6. See the complete text of the cablegram from Shepilov to the President of the Security Council dated November 5, in Department of State, op. cit., p. 178ff. entered into the record as United Nations Document S/3736.

²⁹ New York Times, November 4, 1956.

³⁰ The Israeli cable read, "Since this morning 5 November all fighting has ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces . . . and full quiet prevails." Full text in Department of State, op. cit., p. 178.

them to clear the White House of aggressive elements and
after the physical clearing of the White House the
day brought the White House back to normal, not
completely, however.

At an emergency meeting of the United Nations the
previous Tuesday afternoon, a plan for the establishment
of a United Nations Police Force had been approved by the
General Assembly by an overwhelming vote and with the leverage
of the Soviet Union a decision was made to replace the rapidly
deteriorating United Nations Police Force with a new force,
a force that was agreed on by all concerned which was based
on the realities of the military situation on the afternoon
of Monday, November 1, 1956. The following Sunday, Scandinavian
and Canadian members of the United Nations Emergency
Force were ordered to be on their way to Egypt.

There was also a statement on the part of Ben Gurion
to reject the Egyptian proposal of point 6 of his statement.

See the complete text
of the statement of the President of the
Security Council dated November 2, in Department of State,
pp. 214, 215. 1956. United Nations, United Nations
Document 1956.

See the text, November 1, 1956.

The President's words were, "I am this morning
Government of Egypt has asked me to send a
force . . . and I am sending it. This is in
accordance with the UN Charter, pp. 214, 215.

quoted above, which he did within twenty-four hours after issuing it.³¹

There seems to be little question that the over-extended forces near Suez were the least of his political concerns and that his primary attention was focussed on the Sharm el-Sheikh and on Gaza. His original reaction might have been based on a mistrust of the effectiveness of the United Nations holding power or again, the allusion to "foreign force" may well have applied in his own mind only to the direct unilateral or bilateral actions of the Soviet Union or the United States. The previous day his own troops had pillaged and all but destroyed the Turce Station in Gaza and harsh protests were all that he had received from that escapade.³² It would be one thing to allow the Egyptians to move back into Sinai; it would be quite another to let them back into Gaza. But in retrospect it would seem that the paramount consideration was for the Sharm el-Sheikh and the ability of whoever occupied it to keep the Strait of Tiran open. He stood much more to gain, therefore, by resisting the United Nations initially and progressively easing his position point by point in return for something than by immediate acquiescence to a force which was not yet in being and which would have been of highly suspect parentage.

³¹Supra, pp. 95-96.

³²New York Times, 8 November, 1956.

1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, 2014-2015, 2016-2017, 2018-2019, 2020-2021, 2022-2023, 2024-2025, 2026-2027, 2028-2029, 2030-2031, 2032-2033, 2034-2035, 2036-2037, 2038-2039, 2040-2041, 2042-2043, 2044-2045, 2046-2047, 2048-2049, 2050-2051, 2052-2053, 2054-2055, 2056-2057, 2058-2059, 2060-2061, 2062-2063, 2064-2065, 2066-2067, 2068-2069, 2070-2071, 2072-2073, 2074-2075, 2076-2077, 2078-2079, 2080-2081, 2082-2083, 2084-2085, 2086-2087, 2088-2089, 2090-2091, 2092-2093, 2094-2095, 2096-2097, 2098-2099, 2100-2101, 2102-2103, 2104-2105, 2106-2107, 2108-2109, 2110-2111, 2112-2113, 2114-2115, 2116-2117, 2118-2119, 2120-2121, 2122-2123, 2124-2125, 2126-2127, 2128-2129, 2130-2131, 2132-2133, 2134-2135, 2136-2137, 2138-2139, 2140-2141, 2142-2143, 2144-2145, 2146-2147, 2148-2149, 2150-2151, 2152-2153, 2154-2155, 2156-2157, 2158-2159, 2160-2161, 2162-2163, 2164-2165, 2166-2167, 2168-2169, 2170-2171, 2172-2173, 2174-2175, 2176-2177, 2178-2179, 2180-2181, 2182-2183, 2184-2185, 2186-2187, 2188-2189, 2190-2191, 2192-2193, 2194-2195, 2196-2197, 2198-2199, 2200-2201, 2202-2203, 2204-2205, 2206-2207, 2208-2209, 2210-2211, 2212-2213, 2214-2215, 2216-2217, 2218-2219, 2220-2221, 2222-2223, 2224-2225, 2226-2227, 2228-2229, 2230-2231, 2232-2233, 2234-2235, 2236-2237, 2238-2239, 2240-2241, 2242-2243, 2244-2245, 2246-2247, 2248-2249, 2250-2251, 2252-2253, 2254-2255, 2256-2257, 2258-2259, 2260-2261, 2262-2263, 2264-2265, 2266-2267, 2268-2269, 2270-2271, 2272-2273, 2274-2275, 2276-2277, 2278-2279, 2280-2281, 2282-2283, 2284-2285, 2286-2287, 2288-2289, 2290-2291, 2292-2293, 2294-2295, 2296-2297, 2298-2299, 2300-2301, 2302-2303, 2304-2305, 2306-2307, 2308-2309, 2310-2311, 2312-2313, 2314-2315, 2316-2317, 2318-2319, 2320-2321, 2322-2323, 2324-2325, 2326-2327, 2328-2329, 2330-2331, 2332-2333, 2334-2335, 2336-2337, 2338-2339, 2340-2341, 2342-2343, 2344-2345, 2346-2347, 2348-2349, 2350-2351, 2352-2353, 2354-2355, 2356-2357, 2358-2359, 2360-2361, 2362-2363, 2364-2365, 2366-2367, 2368-2369, 2370-2371, 2372-2373, 2374-2375, 2376-2377, 2378-2379, 2380-2381, 2382-2383, 2384-2385, 2386-2387, 2388-2389, 2390-2391, 2392-2393, 2394-2395, 2396-2397, 2398-2399, 2400-2401, 2402-2403, 2404-2405, 2406-2407, 2408-2409, 2410-2411, 2412-2413, 2414-2415, 2416-2417, 2418-2419, 2420-2421, 2422-2423, 2424-2425, 2426-2427, 2428-2429, 2430-2431, 2432-2433, 2434-2435, 2436-2437, 2438-2439, 2440-2441, 2442-2443, 2444-2445, 2446-2447, 2448-2449, 2450-2451, 2452-2453, 2454-2455, 2456-2457, 2458-2459, 2460-2461, 2462-2463, 2464-2465, 2466-2467, 2468-2469, 2470-2471, 2472-2473, 2474-2475, 2476-2477, 2478-2479, 2480-2481, 2482-2483, 2484-2485, 2486-2487, 2488-2489, 2490-2491, 2492-2493, 2494-2495, 2496-2497, 2498-2499, 2500-2501, 2502-2503, 2504-2505, 2506-2507, 2508-2509, 2510-2511, 2512-2513, 2514-2515, 2516-2517, 2518-2519, 2520-2521, 2522-2523, 2524-2525, 2526-2527, 2528-2529, 2530-2531, 2532-2533, 2534-2535, 2536-2537, 2538-2539, 2540-2541, 2542-2543, 2544-2545, 2546-2547, 2548-2549, 2550-2551, 2552-2553, 2554-2555, 2556-2557, 2558-2559, 2560-2561, 2562-2563, 2564-2565, 2566-2567, 2568-2569, 2570-2571, 2572-2573, 2574-2575, 2576-2577, 2578-2579, 2580-2581, 2582-2583, 2584-2585, 2586-2587, 2588-2589, 2590-2591, 2592-2593, 2594-2595, 2596-2597, 2598-2599, 2600-2601, 2602-2603, 2604-2605, 2606-2607, 2608-2609, 2610-2611, 2612-2613, 2614-2615, 2616-2617, 2618-2619, 2620-2621, 2622-2623, 2624-2625, 2626-2627, 2628-2629, 2630-2631, 2632-2633, 2634-2635, 2636-2637, 2638-2639, 2640-2641, 2642-2643, 2644-2645, 2646-2647, 2648-2649, 2650-2651, 2652-2653, 2654-2655, 2656-2657, 2658-2659, 2660-2661, 2662-2663, 2664-2665, 2666-2667, 2668-2669, 2670-2671, 2672-2673, 2674-2675, 2676-2677, 2678-2679, 2680-2681, 2682-2683, 2684-2685, 2686-2687, 2688-2689, 2690-2691, 2692-2693, 2694-2695, 2696-2697, 2698-2699, 2700-2701, 2702-2703, 2704-2705, 2706-2707, 2708-2709, 2710-2711, 2712-2713, 2714-2715, 2716-2717, 2718-2719, 2720-2721, 2722-2723, 2724-2725, 2726-2727, 2728-2729, 2730-2731, 2732-2733, 2734-2735, 2736-2737, 27

[illegible]

1944-1945 and 1946-1947 and was not a secret matter.

have been used in a variety of other situations.

United States Postal Service on April 1, 1968, the affidavit is

and allowed us all the assistance for these studies in

Ques and Louis thought this all was a new election too

to get them back into Gael. But in retrospect it would seem

and the ability to answer questions is to keep the trials

[illegible]

...the position being in point in regard to something

When the following information is received, it will be used to determine the appropriate action to be taken.

is being and which would have been its daily subject matter.

There was the psychological consideration, of course, in that the seven points were delivered to a Knesset wildly intoxicated with victory but there can be no doubt that the letter of President Eisenhower dated November 7th was the occasion, if not the cause, for Ben Gurion's change of heart. In this letter, the President "viewed [the reports that Israel did not intend to withdraw from Sinai] with deep concern."³³ Almost immediately, Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, "had the honor . . . to inform" the Secretary General of the United Nations the following day

that the government of Israel will willingly withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the emergency international force.³⁴

In a face saving reply to Eisenhower, therefore, claiming a delay in transmission on "owing to a breakdown in communications between the Department of State and the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv," Ben Gurion himself reiterated this new line after taking care to impress the president with the spontaneity of the change.³⁵

³³White House News Release, November 8, 1956, quoted verbatim in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

³⁴Department of State, op. cit., pp. 212-213, recorded as A/3320.

³⁵The London Daily Telegraph of November 10, 1956 (page 2) carries a report that "evidence is accumulating that Britain, American and possibly France warned Israel that she would have to meet any Soviet threat alone if she refused to

General of the United States the following day
Spitzer, "Was the money . . . to inform the Secretary
Alfred Rosenberg, Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign
and not failed to communicate them to me with deep concern."
In this letter, the President wrote [the report that Israel
cession, it was the same, too long after the change of heart.
issue in President Eisenhower's letter to the State Department
interests were victory and there can be no doubt that the
in that the letter states were delivered to a Russian ally.

There was the psychological consideration, of course,

that the Government of Japan will willingly with-
draw the forces from the Pacific Islands and will
cancel the military agreements with the
United States in connection with the emergency
situation in the Pacific.

expressed with the expediency of the change. 35

2. After these have been released, November 8, 1950, placed in Department of State; no. 113-251.

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1968

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text follows]

25 The London Daily Telegraph of November 10, 1950 (page 1) carried a report that "evidence is accumulating that Britain, America and Russia are working toward a common goal to control the world's oil supply."

It soon developed that the withdrawal was to be somewhat less than whole hearted. On Monday, November 19th, Dag Hammerskjold had requested the status of the withdrawal from the British, French and Israeli representatives in view of the fact that the "arrangements" for the United Nations Force were thoroughly in operation. Both the western powers hedged on the grounds of Egyptian violation of the cease fire and Israel reported that its forces had been withdrawn "for varying distances along the Egyptian front," but that it was awaiting "satisfactory arrangements . . . such as will insure Israel's security against the treat or danger of attack and against acts of belligerency by land or sea."³⁶ By December 22, the Anglo-French withdrawal was complete and only the Israeli forces remained in Egypt, along the Sharm and in Gaza.

The Diplomatic Order of Battle

In effect, the Gulf of Aqaba was opened on the morning of Monday, November 5th but it was not the kind of opening that either faction could be expected to live with. It was certainly distasteful to the United Nations.

withdraw" and quoted a second hand source quoting Ambassador Larson to the effect that Israel was running the risk of forfeiting dollar aid in her intransigence. Such a situation is not unreasonable to assume.

³⁶Report of the Secretary General, November 21, with annexes thereto, in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 232ff.

It was reported that the withdrawal was to be
 completed last week. On Monday, November
 19th, the Government had requested the status of the with-
 drawal from the British, French and Israeli representatives
 in view of the fact that the "arrangements" for the United
 Nations Peace Conference are being in question. Both the
 western powers and the Egyptian Government of Egypt have
 of the case law and Israel reported that the United had
 been withdrawn from various distances from the Egyptian
 front," but that it was awaiting "satisfactory arrangements"
 . . . and as will become Israel's security against the
 threat of danger of attack and against acts of sabotage
 by Israel on sea. By December 22, the Anglo-French with-
 drawal was complete and only the Israeli forces remained
 in Egypt, along the Suez and in Gaza.

The Egyptian Order of Battle

In Egypt, the Gulf of Suez was opened in the
 morning of Sunday, November 25th but it was the kind of
 opening that either Egyptian could be expected to live with.
 It was certainly disastrous to the United Nations.

Withdrawal and opened a second front against Arab forces
 in order to cut off the Israeli forces and turning the risk of
 Israeli withdrawal and to the Israeli Government. Such a situa-
 tion is not necessarily a success.

²Report of the Secretary General, November 21, 1956
 annexed thereto, in Department of State, pp. 412, 413, 414, 415.

It was, moreover, an uneasy military de facto situation, perilous to maintain without diplomatic and political foundation. On the one hand, the United Nations was promising its protection for the freedom of access to the Straits of Tiran provided Israel withdrew the forces she felt vital to the situation she wished to maintain. Israel felt that little by little the gains achieved in November were slipping through her fingers and on the Aqaba question, she decided to make a stand. The United Nations had theoretically also guaranteed her borders during the preceding seven years, and she knew from personal experience how easily these borders had been violated in both directions. Meanwhile, Nasser, through the diplomatic backup he was getting from Russia, was already beginning to emerge as the apparent victor.

On the other hand, a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Suez and a negotiable position in Gaza would leave him with a fight in which his means were more equal to his opposition. Instead of three weak stands in the face of an aroused world opinion, he would be able to concentrate his political and diplomatic strength on the one single stand in the Straits and as 1957 began, Ben Gurion began to act as if this were his main plan. In order to emerge with the single victory of freedom of access to the Gulf, therefore, three things would be necessary.

The first, of course, would be Israeli possession of the headland commanding the Strait of Tiran or, failing that,

It was, however, an unhappy military to Israel when
 then, perhaps to achieve without disturbance and political
 foundation. On the one hand, the United Nations was proclaiming
 its protection for the freedom of access to the territory
 of Israel provided Israel withdrew the forces and left Israel
 to the disposition and status to achieve. Israel felt that
 little by little the idea emerged in Israel was slipping
 through her fingers and on the other question, she decided
 to take a stand. The United Nations had theoretically also
guaranteed her rights during the presenting later years, and
 she now from personal experience had seen these points
 had been violated in both directions. Notwithstanding, however,
 through the diplomatic factor he was gaining from Israel,
 was already looking to emerge as the opponent there.
 On the other hand, a withdrawal of Israeli forces
 from there and a majority position in Gene would leave him
 with a light to which his seems very open to his oppo-
sition. Instead of this was what in the face of an
expressed world opinion, he would be able to concentrate his
political and diplomatic strength on the right side
in the future and in 1957 again, the United Nations seem to be
in this very position again. In order to emerge from this
single aspect of freedom of access to the land, however,
three things would be necessary.
 The first, of course, would be Israeli consent to
 the heavily commanding the status of Israel or, rather, that

demilitarization of the area under a truly effective international administration which would be in a position to sanction its protection with armed force and political strength. It must be remembered that in the period under discussion, the concept of an effective United Nations Emergency Force was wholly new, the only precedent being General Burns' wobbly Truce Supervision Organization of the early fifties which drew little respect from either principal.

The second requirement was a strong, carefully worked out political position based on the unanimous support of the major powers. This position, it is submitted, was necessarily conceived of as being independent of the self-interest of the supporting states narrowly conceived. What Ben Gurion probably had in mind was a support which would be given to the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and not support given to Israel simply out of national interest. The support he wanted would have to be given in the name of international law or some such other universal principle which would be independent of an Arab-Jewish policy. For this, he would have to "work" on the United States since both he and Mrs. Meir were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the Israeli-American honeymoon of the Truman administration and the early, quieter Eisenhower years was all but over in the wake of the 1956 election and the Suez Crisis. There was the increasing shadow of Soviet interest in the Middle East to consider and its effect on an American Middle East

demilitarization of the area under a truly effective international administration which would be in a position to maintain the protection with armed force and political arrangements. It must be remembered that in the period under discussion, the concept of an effective United Nations Emergency Force was wholly new, the only precedent being General Acheson's wholly unsuccessful Organization of the early 1950s which was largely respected from either principle. The second requirement was a strong, carefully worked out political position based on the unanimous support of the major powers. This position, it is submitted, was necessarily concerned of no being independent of the self-interest of the supporting states necessarily concerned. Now Ben Gurion probably had in mind a support which would be given to the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the support given to Israel since the use of national interest. The support he wanted would have to be given in the name of international law or some such universal principle which would be independent of an established policy. For this, he would have to work on the United States since both he and Mrs. Acheson were seeking increasingly more of the free case the Israeli-American cooperation of the Truman administration and the early, unless I am wrong, year was all but over in the wake of the 1950 election and the New Deal. There was not increasing number of Jewish interests in the Middle East to consider and the effect on the Jewish state.

policy was not to be taken lightly. If the United States found itself in a position of support for freedom of access to the Gulf because it was supporting Israel, it would be a weak, unrealistic position which could not possibly hope to correspond to the broader issues at stake. Ben Gurion and Mrs. Meir were apparently realistic enough to realize that the Cold War took precedence over everything else in American foreign policy and a strictly Israeli policy in Washington was out of the question. Dulles' disenchantment with Israel was well known and a more withdrawn policy would make good sense in Washington.³⁷ Indications were that such a policy was coming late in 1956 and that the Eisenhower Doctrine then being formulated would be only one of a series of steps calculated to present a new face to the Arab world on which Israeli friendship would be nothing but a black eye.

Finally, Israeli planners realized that if Eilat itself were ever to fulfill the role required of it, it would necessarily have to be both politically and commercially able to handle Persian Gulf crude. Quite possibly, this problem was the most acute because it threw the situation right back into the inter-domestic political conflict with the Arab League. Politically, the solidarity of the League

³⁷ Drummond and Coblenz, Duel At the Brink (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 178-181.

policy was not to be taken lightly. In the United States
 there is a tradition of support for freedom of movement
 to the Gulf. It was not surprising, it would be a
 week, unrelenting position which would not readily hope to
 correspond to the standard of peace. The United States
 Mrs. White was apparently satisfied enough to realize that
 the Gulf War was proceeding over everything else in the region
 foreign policy and a strictly Israeli policy in Washington
 was one of the questions. Colin's disengagement with Israel
 was well known and a new approach policy would come good
 sense in Washington. ¹⁷ Intelligence were that such a policy
 was coming late in 1956 and that the Eisenhower Doctrine then
 being formulated was in only one of a series of steps
 calculated to present a new face to the Arab world on which
 Israel's friendship would be working out a plan for
 Finally, Israel's plans were revised and it was
 itself were not to fulfill the role required of it, it would
 necessarily have to be more politically and economically
 able to handle the Arab world. Colin's policy, this
 problem was one which would be solved in the situation
 right back into the international political conflict with
 the Arab League. Initially, the solidarity of the League

¹⁷ Intelligence and Diplomacy, 1956-1957, New York: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 150-151.

presented a problem in that it required Israel to look to Iran for any crude it might attempt to move. The solidarity of the League had been amply demonstrated in November when Syrian sabotage had all but cut the throughput flow to the Mediterranean, when Iraq choose her commitment to the Arab Joint Defense Pact over that of the Baghdad Pact (despite the fact that 68% of her economy was in oil she could not move) and when even the sheikhdoms exhibited hostility, sabotage and strikes in sympathy with Nasser.³⁸ Arabian oil was obviously out of the question and with the Canal blocked, the Eilat-Beersheba pipeline was an inflammatory issue in the Arab world. Commercially, the blacklist of vessels and firms doing business with Israel was an important factor to consider. Even if she could arrange it, any ship which carried Iranian oil to Eilat and any company which moved it would face severe economic retaliation unless suitable arrangements could be made to defy the blockade and the black-list profitably and continue the defiance.

The pipeline was begun in January, 1957, its success contingent on three factors:

1. Strong political support from the Great Powers for continued access to the Gulf with or without United Nations Forces, but in any case without Egyptian or Saudi interference.

³⁸ George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 345 ff.

presented a problem in that it required Israel to look to Iran for any action it might attempt to take. The solidarity of the League had been highly demonstrated in November when Syrian associates had all but cut the through-line to the Mediterranean, when Iraq chose not to commit to the Arab Joint Defense Pact over that of the British Pact (despite the fact that 80% of her economy was in oil and she could not move) and when even the Arabians exhibited hostility, sabotage and terrorism in sympathy with Russia. The Arab oil was effectively cut on the question and with the Canal blocked, the Suez-Canal pipeline was an inflammatory issue in the Arab world. Consequently, the blocking of vessels and lines doing business with Israel was an important factor to consider. Even if she could arrange it, any ship which carried Iranian oil to Iraq and any company which moved it would have severe economic retaliation unless suitable arrangements could be made to deny the Americans and the black-list countries and countries the balance.

The pipeline was closed in January, 1957, the American embargo on Soviet Russia.

I. Beyond national support from the Great Powers for resolution action on the Gulf with or without United Nations action, but in any case without Egyptian or Saudi interference.

2. Passage of at least one flag vessel from as many of the major maritime powers as could be arranged, preferably carrying crude, to establish a precedent of unmolested passage.

3. Machinery of some kind on an international scale to procure at least American support for the venture and to engage a ship, cargo and crew which would undertake both the commercial and physical risks of such a voyage in the glare of the publicity which would be an essential element of the operation.

She would be prepared to pay the price of a complete withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh if the plan could be successfully carried off and would acquiesce in assisting the new American Middle East policy by staying out of the American-Soviet context if she could open the Gulf.

Somewhat incredibly, this is precisely what happened.

... of the major military units as could be determined.
... of the major military units as could be determined.
... of the major military units as could be determined.

The Government of the United States is not in a position to make any statement at this time.

It would be proposed to pay the price of a complete withdrawal from these subjects if the plan could be successfully carried out and would accords in realizing the new American public policy of staying out of the European power contest if the could open the Gulf.

...involvement, this is precisely what happened.

CHAPTER V

THE FORGOTTEN VICTORY

With the arrangement of the Cease Fire in Sinai, vast changes had taken place in the power structure in the Middle East and the geopolitics of the new situation were important. The Israeli forces were deep in the heart of Egypt, Gaza was in the hands of the Jews and on the Strait of Tiran, the Ninth Brigade controlled access to the Gulf of Aqaba to insure freedom of passage to any and all ships.¹

The United States and the Soviet Union, occupied with other problems and acting in far less concert than is usually remembered, had succeeded in interjecting sufficient pressure from outside the immediate crisis area to separate the antagonists. The key question of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal was at least temporarily overshadowed by the presence in the Canal of scuttled ships and barges which had to be removed immediately. All sides had promised to withdraw after some preliminary diplomatic skirmishing² which had involved the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India who formulated a strong communique on

¹Would Israeli forces have prevented the passage of an Egyptian merchant ship through the Gulf carrying arms for Jordan? An interesting question which was never brought up.

²Chapter IV, supra, pp. 97-100.

CHAPTER V

THE LIVERPOOL VICTORY

With the agreement of the Canal Zone in 1914, the Canal Zone was placed in the power structure in the Atlantic base and the geographical of the new situation were important. The Liverpool Islands were deep in the heart of Egypt, base was in the hands of the Jews and on the Straits of Tiran, the British Empire controlled access to the Gulf of Aden to insure freedom of passage to any and all ships. The United States and the Soviet Union, occupied with other problems and unable in far less concert than is usually remembered, had succeeded in interjecting sufficient pressure from outside the immediate crisis area to separate the antagonists. The key question of freedom of passage through the Canal Zone was at least temporarily overshadowed by the pressure in the Canal of escorted ships and barges which had to be removed immediately. All sides had promised to withdraw after some preliminary diplomatic skirmishing, which had involved the British, Ministers of Tunis, Cayman, Indonesia and India who formulated a strong condemnation on

¹World Council, London have presented the passage of an Egyptian merchant ship through the Gulf carrying arms for Jordan. An interesting question which was never resolved up.

the subject on November 14³ and which had been followed, the next week, by a similar communique issued from the Conference of Nine Arab States held at Beirut.⁴

As noted above, Ben Gurion seems to have looked upon the Sinai occupation and the resolutions calling for his withdrawal⁵ as not one but three separate problems. The Suez forces were of only insignificant importance to Israeli security and were to be the first to come back home, the withdrawal graciously made in a bid for favorable publicity. The Gaza problem was somewhat more vital to the defense of the country from the fedayeen and withdrawal from the Strip would have to depend on successful bargaining for as much international peace-keeping machinery as could be obtained. But Gaza was less than critical; in the changed military context even a return to the status quo would have been tolerable although it worried Israel considerably.

On the Strait of Tiran, the problem was acute. The Gulf was significant and as the diplomacy of the middle weeks of November unfolded, it seemed that Israel was content to

³Department of State, op. cit., pp. 217 ff.

⁴Ibid., pp. 220-222.

⁵Resolutions 997, Emergency Session of November 2, 1956, and 1002 of November 7th, 1956, verbatim in Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 184 ff. The first Resolution had been sponsored by the United States and carried 64 to 5. The second, submitted by the neutrals, was merely a repeat of the provisions of the first. The intervening Resolutions (998, 999, 1000 and 1001) all refer to the situation and the UNEF. See Department of State, op. cit., pp. 157, 160-162, 175, 205-207.

the subject of November 11th and which has been followed
the same way, by a similar communication between the
Conference of these two States and the United States.

As noted above, Ben Gurion seems to have looked upon
the Soviet occupation and the evacuation of the land
as a problem, as not one but two separate problems. The
Soviet forces were at first stationed in Israel
secretly and were to be the first to come back home, the
evacuation of the land was to be a bid for favorable publicity.
The Soviet problem was somewhat more vital to the interests of
the country than the evacuation and withdrawal from the Strip
would have to depend on successful negotiations for an armistice.
International public opinion, especially in regard to the
Soviet problem, was less than critical; in the changed military
situation with a return to the status quo would have been
relatively minor in comparison to the evacuation of the land.

On the basis of this, the problem was solved. The
Soviet evacuation was the diplomatic of the middle weeks
of November 1948, it seemed that Israel was content to

Department of State, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

ibid., pp. 220-221.

Resolution 181, Emergency Session of November 29,
1947, and 1948 at November 29, 1948, version in Resolution
op. cit., pp. 217-218. The Soviet evacuation was seen as a
step by the United States and Britain in the amount
admitted by the committee, and finally a report of the group
of the five. The International Resolution (1948, 1949,
1950 and 1951) was also a resolution and the UNCT. See
Department of State, op. cit., pp. 227, 228, 229, 230-231.

play a waiting game and adjust her withdrawal to the pressures brought to bear. One of these pressures came on the 24th, when the General Assembly, without reference to committee, passed a resolution reiterating its call for withdrawal. Over the weekend of the 24th, Ben Gurion met with his cabinet⁶ and when the General Assembly implemented its United Nations Emergency Force Resolution on Monday, November 26th, the withdrawals began in some earnest.⁷

The month of January was a month of virtual deadlock, during which three rather clearly defined positions could be identified. Israel continued to hold out for positive assurances that she would gain more than she would lose by withdrawing, the gain being related to relative security in Gaza and absolute security on the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary General, caught in the middle, was working furiously toward achieving compliance with the withdrawal resolutions on the one hand and effecting the withdrawal and substitution by the United States Emergency Force in such a manner as to build more security than was being destroyed on the other. Egypt, at the opposite pole, was content to play the role of innocent and patient creditor carefully making no specific

⁶London Times, November 27, 1956.

⁷Coincident with and intertwined among the negotiations was another Israeli diplomatic ploy, asking the UN to assist Israel in communicating with Egypt. It may well have been a lever to cover further delays. For the texts of the applicable documents, see Department of State, op. cit., pp. 158-160.

play a leading role and adjust our viewpoint to the
 situation as it is. One of these problems was on
 the day, when the General Assembly, without reference to
 committee, passed a resolution concerning the call for with-
 drawal. One has noticed in the call, that Union was with
 the assembly and was the General Assembly's representative
 Union National Assembly for the Assembly on Monday, November
 20th, the Assembly's action is now known.
 The words of Assembly was a shock of violent reaction,
 during which some further clearly stated positions could be
 established. I must continue to hold on to positive
 position that the Union gain more than the world loss by
 withdrawing. The gain being related to relative security in
 Asia and absolute security in the Gulf of Arabia. The Gatt-
 ley General, under the Union, and working together
 toward achieving compliance with the international resolutions
 on the one hand and affecting the withdrawal and withdrawal
 by the United States Emergency Force in such a manner as to
 bring more security than was being destroyed in the other.
 Egypt, as the opposite pole, was destined to play the role of
 innocent and passive witness, carefully making its position

London Times, November 27, 1956.

Continued with an interview under the caption
 was another incident. I asked the UN to assist
 in the investigation of the matter. It was said that a
 letter to the United States for the purpose of the applica-
 tion document, was forwarded to them, on 11. 1956.

commitments either way in an effort to take advantage of a situation which was proving to be considerably embarrassing to her enemy.

It was at this point that the United States entered the lists in earnest.

The United States and the Gulf of Aqaba

In an aide memoire handed to Ambassador Eban on the 11th of February, Secretary Dulles reviewed the situation as it had progressed since the cease fire.⁸ On the Gaza matter, he assured Israel that he understood its position and struck a bargain. In the first part of the document, Dulles went on record in favor of prompt and unconditional withdrawal from Gaza "leaving the future of the Gaza Strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations." Ben Gurion was undoubtedly willing to do this, for a price.

In the second part of the document, he repeated the stand taken publicly so many times in the past that the Gulf was an international waterway and quoted at length from the Egyptian aide memoire of January 28, 1950,⁹ on the subject

⁸Full text in Department of State, op. cit., p. 290. Naturally the text was not released immediately but was held until February 17 when it was released as Department of State Press Release 72 of that date. In his March 5th conference, Secretary Dulles was questioned at length on this note. See New York Times, March 6th.

⁹Supra, p. 48.

constructive effort was in effect to take advantage of a
 situation which was growing to be considerably more serious
 on her part.

If one of this point that the United States cannot
 the first in history.

The United States and the Gulf of Aden

In an article published in Ambassador's Room on the
 15th of February, Secretary Dulles reviewed the situation
 as it had developed since the cease fire. On the 15th
 matter, he stated that he understood the position
 and seems a complete. In the first part of the document,
 Dulles went on record in favor of peace and unconditional
 withdrawal from Gaza. Indeed, the focus of the Gaza Strip
 to be moved out through the efforts and good offices of the
 United Nations. The United States was unhesitatingly willing to do
 this, for a price.

In the second part of the document, he repeated the
 same action publicly in many places in the past that the Gulf
 was an international waterway and should be kept free from the
 Egyptian and Israeli forces of January 15, 1950, on the subject

¹Full text in Department of State, 91. 217, p. 280.
 Secretary Dulles was not released immediately but was held
 until January 17 when it was released as Department of State
 Press Release 77 of that day. In the March 28 conference,
 Secretary Dulles was questioned as to this matter. See
 New York Times, March 28.

of free passage "in conformity with international practice and the recognized principles of the law of nations."

The United States, he then declared,

is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

It is of course clear that the enjoyment of the right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with United Nations Resolutions. . . . The United States is prepared publicly to declare that it will use its influence, in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented. (Emphasis added.)

Israel was now in a position to claim solid American support in return for a withdrawal from Gaza and Sinai. Characteristically, Ben Gurion was not about to give the impression that American influence had anything to do with a change of his heart, although this attitude benefitted American prestige with the Arabs in the long run as much as it saved Israeli face. When President Eisenhower addressed the nation on the evening of February 20, 1957, he recounted some of the problems of the previous months and informed the American people on his stand over Aqaba. He was able to criticize Israel for its insistence on "firm guarantees," and in a question summarizing the public image of the United States, said:

This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal?¹⁰

¹⁰Department of State, op. cit., pp. 301-307.

of five persons, the Committee, with international character
and the recognition of the law of nations."

The United States, as has been declared,

is prepared to accept the right of free and open
trade between all nations and to accept the principle
of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
nations. It is of course true that the enjoyment of the
right of free and open trade by Israel would
depend upon the prior withdrawal of restrictions which
Israel has placed upon its trade with other nations.
The United States is prepared to accept the fact that it will
have no influence in Israel with other nations
unless, however, it can be shown that Israel is
willing to accept the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other nations.

Israel was not in a position to claim such American
support in return for a withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.
Consequently, the United States was not about to give the
impression that American influence had anything to do with
a change of its heart, although this attitude facilitated
American progress with the Arabs in the long run as much as
it saved Israeli case. When President Eisenhower addressed
the nation on the evening of February 20, 1957, he indicated
some of the problems of the Arab world and informed the
American people on his stand over Israel. He said this in
essence: Israel has no right to be a "privileged nation,"
and in a question concerning the public image of the United

States, that:

This raises a basic question of principle. Israel
is a nation that is not a member of the United Nations
and in the case of United Nations membership by
Israel to accept the principle of non-interference

This statement was made to maintain the impression that whatever settlement was to be achieved was to be a victory of right and justice over opportunism. In this regard, it also gave Ben Gurion the opportunity to express public displeasure at the American attitude based on the same "high regard" for principle when he addressed the Knesset the following day to comment at length on the President's speech. His attitude was one of virtue scorned, of patient righteousness; what he actually said was that Israel would indeed withdraw both from Gaza and from the Gulf if the United Nations would meet his price.¹¹ He already had the American guarantee of support in his pocket.

By the 25th, Abba Eban was ready to talk business with Hammerskjold on the Gulf of Aqaba. Three things were bothering Eban, in a private conversation with Hammerskjold, which would have to be resolved before his troops would leave. Would the United Nations Emergency Force be specifically instructed to keep the straits open? Hammerskjold replied that it would. Would the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force be subject to the concurrence of the entire General Assembly? Hammerskjold dodged this very vital question and replied that it would be up to the advisory Committee for the United Nations Emergency Force. Finally, Eban wanted to know if the United Nations would agree to

¹¹Ibid., pp. 308-316.

station a United Nations Naval Force in the Gulf at the Strait "to ensure free and innocent passage." This, Hammerskjold replied, would be beyond the competence of the Secretary General.¹²

The fact that Eban and Hammerskjold were talking in this vein is proof positive that Dulles had hit his mark with his February 11th note. The ritualistic pronouncements of the two heads of government were useful in setting the intended diplomatic scene to embellish the positive developments which were shaping up with a faint aura of antagonism as the Eisenhower Doctrine was being discussed in the Arab world. Israel was getting her backdoor to the east. All that was required of her now was to obey the resolutions calling for withdrawal and hand over the territories to the United Nations Commander.

The Arabs meanwhile were having similar experiences.

A meeting was held late in February between the Arab Heads of State at Koubbeh Palace in Cairo.¹³ King Saud had recently returned from a visit to the United States and Hussein, Kuwatly and Nasser were on hand to sound out the reactions he had made and received on his visit. The report sounded considerably more encouraging than it actually was

¹²Ibid., pp. 318-321, recorded as UN Document A/3563 of February 26, 1957.

¹³New York Times, February 27, 1957.

and a serious split seems to have developed at this meeting as to what the next Arab diplomatic move would be.

Nasser had been forced through a soul searching similar to the one which the past three months had forced on Ben Gurion. Just as there were three aspects to the Israeli problem, there were similarly three problems for Egypt and some kind of a priority of value had to be established to determine which plum could be lost first. The blockade of the Straits of Tiran looked like a losing proposition to Egypt in February, 1957. American opposition to the "tri-partite invasion" in October had certainly not made an Eisenhower Republican out of Nasser but American influence was at least to be respected for its consistent stand against the action. While this respect was all but neutralized within a month when the United States agreed, at Bermuda, to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, there was still enough of it around in February to have had some effect on the conference. A controversy developed, probably, as to how serious the Americans were and a decision seems to have been reached to settle for no decision at that time other than a reaffirmation of the old territorial waters position and a renewed affirmation of Arab sovereignty over the Gulf.

In the second matter, that of Gaza, the Arabs had a stronger political case dating back to the Rhodes agreement and intertwined as it was with the refugee settlements in

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effect on the conference. A controversy developed, probably,
as to how serious the Americans were and a decision seems
to have been reached to wait for no decision at that time
other than a reaffirmation of the old territorial status
position and a renewed affirmation of Arab sovereignty over
the Gulf.
In the second matter, that of Gaza, the Arabs had a
stronger political case than had the British and
and intervened as it was with the former willingness in

Gaza and the American position that the agreements should be implemented across the board, they were willing to accept the United Nations as what would amount to a return to the status quo.

The game they could not afford to lose was the Suez Canal. On this point they were ready to stand or fall and ultimately, they were successful. It is interesting to note how the three Arab problems were inversely proportional to the Israeli problems¹⁴ and how, although the meeting ended with absolutely no agreement on how to solve any of them, they all agreed that there were problems which required a certain priority of settlement. The communique they issued listed "decisions" reached, but the decisions were nothing more than a catalogue of these same problems.¹⁵

By March 1st, real progress had been made. Dulles met with the ambassadors from the Arab countries in Washington on that date and reported to them the intention of the Israeli government to withdraw from Sinai.¹⁶ Almost at the same moment, Mrs. Meir, in the United States for an exploratory visit, made a similar statement to the United Nations

¹⁴In a direct report from Cairo on March 21, Michael Adams viewed the same three problems but from a different aspect. "Suez," he wrote, "seems the most immediately solvable, Gaza the most dangerously urgent, and the Gulf of Aqaba the hardest to solve." Manchester Guardian, March 24, 1957.

¹⁵Department of State, op. cit., p. 321.

¹⁶Department of State, Press Release 103 of March 1, 1957.

data and the American position that the agreement should be implemented within the next year, they were willing to accept the United Nations as a neutral ground as a result of the

status quo.

The main thing they could not afford to lose was the 1948 Canal. On this point they were ready to stand or fall and ultimately, they were successful. It is interesting to note how the same kind of problems were inversely proportional to the Israeli position¹⁴ and how, although the meeting spent with absolutely no agreement on how to solve any of them, they all agreed that there were problems which required a certain priority of settlement. The committee they issued listed "obstacles" rather, but the obstacles were nothing more than a restatement of these same problems.¹⁵

By March 1st, real progress had been made. Following our visit the ambassadors from the Arab countries in Washington had on that date and reported to them the intention of the Israeli Government to withdraw from Sinai.¹⁶ Almost at the same moment, Mr. Hall, in the United States for an earlier first visit, made a similar statement to the United Nations

¹⁴In a similar report from Cairo on March 21, Michael Adams stated that the Arab position was not a different degree, "Israel" he stated, "is the most immediately obvious, the most dangerous, and the only of the obstacles to solve." International Quarterly, March 24, 1957.

¹⁵Department of State, op. cit., p. 124.

¹⁶Department of State, op. cit., p. 124.

General Assembly.¹⁷ There was an interesting disclaimer, however, in the State Department Press Release referring to the Dulles meeting with the ambassadors. It mentioned the fact that Communist propaganda was spreading a story in the Arab world to the effect that there "was a secret understanding between the United States and Israel" and deplored this story as a misrepresentation of "what was, in effect, a great achievement for the principles and efforts of the United Nations." (In her New York speech, however, Mrs. Meir made considerable capital of the American readiness to exercise the right of freedom of passage.)

In the New York speech, Mrs. Meir laid out the Israeli position on the "final" settlement of the Aqaba issue. The Gulf was an international waterway. Israel would do nothing to impede Arab maritime traffic, would protect its own ships in the Gulf and would interpret an attack on its vessels as entitling it to exercise its rights of self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Finally, she had "received with gratification the assurances of leading maritime powers that they foresee a normal and regular flow of traffic of all cargoes in the Gulf of Aqaba."

The last Israeli forces left the Sharm el-Sheikh on

¹⁷Department of State, Documents, p. 330.

the afternoon of March 8, 1957, to the plaudits of Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations,¹⁸ and a somewhat glum silence from the Arab states. The United Nations Emergency Force, once again under General Burns, took the positions vacated by the Israelis and the Gulf of Aqaba was open, finally. Israel had gained and the Arab possession of Suez was virtually irrevocable.

Only Great Britain and France seemed to have lost.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 345.

¹⁹"We were not successful. . . . [W]e did not bring about Arab-Israeli peace or restore international control of the canal. It is true that some successes were gained. The military weaknesses of the Egyptian forces was exposed and duly noted, in particular by her neighbors. This had important consequences. From the day of the Egyptian defeat in the Sinai desert, the chances of a Nasser Empire were scotched, not killed. Even so, the Sudan did not hesitate to resist the grasping demands which Nasser later made on her northern territory. It is unlikely that Nasser or any other Arab leader will undertake a war of extermination against Israel in the immediate future, without outside support. As against this, Nasser remains, ruler of Egypt, his ambition still dangerous. . . . Our intervention at least closed the chapter of complacency about the situation in the Middle East. It led to the Eisenhower Doctrine and from that to Anglo-American intervention in the following summer in Jordan and Lebanon. It helped show that the west was not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltration and subversion by others. But these were only partial gains. The uneasy equipoise still continues.

"Happily, by a combination of brilliant courage and firmness, Mr. Ben Gurion was able to secure for his country one capital advantage, free passage of the Gulf of Aqaba to the port of Elath [sic] which could transform the economy of Israel and make everything that small country endured worthwhile." Anthony Eden, op. cit., pp. 646 and 625.

In Gaza the situation remained critical as each side jockeyed for position astride an imaginary Armistice Line. In mid-March an important flare-up developed. General Burns had set up his headquarters there when the Israelis withdrew and on the 15th Egypt asserted a claim to exercise complete authority over the liberated area. Neither the United Nations Emergency Force nor the Egyptians seem to have displayed much tact in the matter and for a day or two it posed a serious threat between the United Nations and Egypt. This would have wide implications because it seemed almost possible at this juncture that the Egyptians might insist on United Nations withdrawal in which case the entire keg would have blown sky high again. The situation calmed down after a United Nations concession to Egypt, over the bitter protests of Israel.²⁰

In Suez, the original problem of usage and control became significant once again after General Wheeler had accomplished the initial clearing of the passage. On February 19th, an interim plan providing for toll collection by an international body but allowing full Egyptian operation was rejected by Egypt. The Egyptian answer, on March 19th, was an Egyptian Canal Authority which would respect the 1888 Convention but which would collect its own tolls and operate its own funds. Since there seemed to be no

²⁰New York Times, March 21-29, 1957; Michael Adams, Suez and After, p. 147.

feasible alternative to this plan, the Suez Canal Users Association, formed the previous summer, authorized its members to begin using the waterway on the Egyptian terms and on May 13, the British lifted their ban and allowed payment of tolls in sterling. The French followed a month later.²¹

The Voyage of the 'Kern Hills'

Diplomacy in the Middle East during the last week of March and the first week of April, 1957, resembled nothing as much as a tangled web, beautiful and symmetrical from a distance but difficult to unravel. The Canal was about to open fully and American Ambassador to Egypt Raymond Hare was conducting secret talks with the Egyptian foreign minister daily. These talks took on a new significance and part of the mystery about them cleared up after the release of Nasser's Suez policy, but at the same time the Egyptian government modified its stand in Gaza just barely enough to allow full United Nations patrols in return for their continued ascendancy there.²² Dag Hammerskjold held extensive talks with Mrs. Meir the previous week²³ and had assured her

²¹Europa Publications, The Middle East 1961 (London: Europa Ltd., 1961), p. 387.

²²The London Times made almost daily reference to these talks during the last week in March whereas the New York Times carried only two small notices of their progress, "buried" in the back pages. See the two newspapers for March 26 and 29, but particularly April 4 and 6.

²³New York Times, March 23rd.

leading authorities to see that the same kind of
 Association, formed and known as, and for
 members to begin with the subject of
 and on May 11, the British listed their own and
 payment of tolls in advance. The French followed a month
 later.

The Port of the Tarn Hills

According to the British last week of
 March and the first week of April, 1937, recorded nothing
 as much as a single day, British and American forces
 distance for British to control. The British was about to
 open fully and American movement to keep British from
 was conducting proper talks with the British forces
 minister talks. These talks took on a new significance and
 part of the general about the status of after the release
 of American's own policy, but at the same time the British
 government realized all that was left barely enough to
 allow full United Nations control to return for their own-
 closed adequately now. The British had already
 talks with the British last the previous week and had another set

¹¹Europe Publications, The British Press (London: Group Ltd., 1937), p. 337.

¹²The British Press last week of March and the first week of April, 1937, recorded nothing as much as a single day, British and American forces distance for British to control. The British was about to open fully and American movement to keep British from was conducting proper talks with the British forces minister talks. These talks took on a new significance and part of the general about the status of after the release of American's own policy, but at the same time the British government realized all that was left barely enough to allow full United Nations control to return for their own-closed adequately now. The British had already talks with the British last the previous week and had another set

¹³New York Times, March 1937.

that he "believed there would be no interference" with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. News was also leaking out of a secret pact concluded by Mrs. Meir with the French on her way home from Washington that weekend, and Hammerskjold was now complaining publicly of Israeli silence concerning his contacts with Nasser which were now in progress.²⁴

At the end of March, these talks were said to have culminated in a "gentleman's agreement" whereby Nasser allegedly modified his intransigence on Aqaba and Gaza enough to strike a bargain for concessions to Egyptian sovereignty in the Canal.²⁵ By the following weekend, April 6th, President Eisenhower was coolly refusing to come to Ben Gurion's diplomatic assistance in the matter of Israeli access to the Suez Canal.²⁶ The impression can be gathered that the United States was unwilling to press Israeli access to the Canal at a time when Nasser was himself negotiating in Cairo for a more basic arrangement dealing with everybody's access to the Canal. Certainly the State Department realized that Nasser was making what amounted to a concession in his own eyes by the mere presence of the United Nations Emergency Force, particularly in southern Sinai and

²⁴Ibid., March 26th.

²⁵Ibid., March 28th.

²⁶Ibid., April 7, 1956, apparently datelined before the arrival of the "Kern Hills" at Eilat.

that he believed there would be no more...
Israel's mission to the State of Israel...
ing out of a secret...
French on the...
Rommstein's...
concerning the...
process.

At the end of March, these...
collected in a...
affiliated...
enough to...
separately in the...
of, President...
Gordon's...
access to the...
that the...
to the...
in...
bed's...
realized...
also in his...
National...

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the outstanding promissory note to exercise the right of "free and innocent" passage through the Strait of Tiran was not exactly adding to Dulles' peace of mind. Once the right had been exercised, however, the slate would apparently be wiped clean.²⁷

It was an important slate to wipe clean, this American-Israeli "collaboration" (as the Arabs viewed it) as the Eisenhower Doctrine²⁸ was about to be put to the test in Jordan and as the United States was making a new bid for influence in the Middle East.²⁹ At a press conference on March 5th, Dulles had been asked about his intentions in the matter of exercising the American right of passage, and the following interchange was reported:

Q. You said . . . that the United States expected to exercise its right of free and innocent passage through this Strait [the Strait of Tiran] into the Gulf of Aqaba. Have you taken any steps or do you contemplate taking any steps to establish this exercise of right on the part of the United States --in other words, should a ship or ships normally begin to move through there now? Have they already moved?

A. Well, there is no-prearranged exercise in that respect. It would be normal that a ship of United

²⁷The New York Telegram of March 19th reported a decline in American prestige among the Arabs, the Jews and the western powers. "Most objectionable is the refrain that President Eisenhower has broken his pledge."

²⁸Which had been signed as Public Law 85-7 on March 9. See Department of State, op. cit., p. 44.

²⁹Ambassador James P. Richards was touring the Middle East "to present and discuss [President Eisenhower's] proposals." See his statement of March 12, as he departed, in Department of State, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

the corresponding provisions made to exclude the right of
 after any amendment passed through the House of Representatives
 and exactly adding to the bill, passed by the House. (Once the
 right has been exercised, however, the bill would apparently
 be wiped clean.¹⁷

It was an important point to have cleared, that
 American-Liberal legislation, (as the House viewed it) as
 the Lincoln-Washington doctrine¹⁸ was about to be put to the test
 in Jordan and as the United States was entering a new era for
 influence in the Middle East.¹⁹ At a press conference on
 March 21, 1951, Wilson had been asked about the intention in
 the matter of excluding the American right of passage, and
 the following statements were reported:

"I am sure... that the United States expects
 to exercise the right of free and innocent passage
 through the Canal (the Canal of Suez) into the
 Gulf of Arabia. Now you know the steps we are now
 completing toward any action to establish this
 exercise of right on the part of the United States
 in other words, should a ship or ships naturally
 begin to move through such a canal, how they all
 really move?"

"Well, there is no question as to that
 respect. It would be normal that a ship of United

¹⁷The New York Times of March 1951 reported a bill
 given in American territory among the first, and last and the
 western power. "From a strategic point of view the
 President's statement has broken the barrier."

¹⁸Wilson had been known as Public Law 82-7 on March

9. See Department of State, 22-1, 1-10.

¹⁹Secretary James T. Glavin was quoted as saying
 that no present and future legislation is necessary, but
 possible. The bill is a part of the bill, as the Department of
 Department of State, 22-1, 1-10.

States registry would be going through there. You see, it is only quite recently that the port of Elath [sic] has been developed so that it is a port which attracts shipping. Now there has been a development at the port of Elath to a point where there will probably be considerable shipping going there in the normal course of events that would include a vessel of United States registry.

Q. But you don't know of any particular ship?

A. No, I haven't looked into that. Of course that is a matter which is primarily under private direction. The shipping companies send their ships where they will. We assume that one will be going there, but that is not based on any checkup with the companies.

Q. I wondered sir, whether it would be normal procedure for the United States government to send notice to the shipping companies that the strait is considered open or whether everybody is supposed to know it?

A. Well, I think that everyone is supposed to have read the newspapers in that respect, particularly if they are in the shipping business.³⁰

At the Tuesday, March 26, press conference the Secretary of State faced the same line of questioning. The only significant modification he made at this conference was a declaration that "I think that a certain amount of shipping is or shortly will be passing through the straits."³¹

Although the United States had committed herself to Israel to exercise the right of free and innocent passage in return for a withdrawal in Sinai, the Secretary of State now was attempting to give the impression that it was up to

³⁰ New York Times, March 6, 1957.

³¹ Ibid., March 27, 1956.

American free enterprise which now would be compelled by some inner mysterious force to reap the benefits of the newly developed port which would be "attracting" shipping. This is a difficult statement to accept on face value.

On the one hand, Eilat in April, 1957, had little commercial interest for American shipping unless a profitable charter arrangement made calling at Eilat and blacklisting worthwhile. The difficulties of unloading petroleum into storage tanks made such a voyage expensive and the pipeline north to Beersheba, a tiny 8 inch jump pipe, was not scheduled to be tested until April 15. On the other hand, there was a kernel of truth to the statement. The United States would certainly not "send" a warship up the Gulf and the United States Merchant Marine was a congress of independent shipowners and operators.

If such a venture was planned, the first week in April was unquestionably the best time to do it in the political context. Tensions had cooled considerably, Richards was reporting civil reception in the Arab world³² and State, viewing the Jordanian situation with a weather eye, was probably anxious to extricate the United States government from its promise to Israel.

Accordingly, arrangements were completed sometime

³²Daily press reports of the trip are confusing. See text of Ambassador Richards' radio and television address on May 9, 1957, reporting on the trip to the American people. Department of State, op. cit., p. 69.

American from operations which are being completed by some other operation. There is some discussion of the very detailed work which would be interesting and quite. This is a difficult subject to handle on this value.

On the one hand, since in April, 1977, the 12th Communist Party for American ships and a previously charter arrangement made with the U.S. and Blacklist. The situation of shipping, particularly in the stores since such a system requires and the pipeline north to Germany, a ship is in the pipe, was not scheduled to be started until April 15. On the other hand, there was a report of such to the committee. The United States would certainly not want a shipping up the Gulf and the United States Maritime was a member of the. Recent shipments and operations.

If such a venture was planned, the first week in April was undoubtedly the best time to do it in the political context. Houston has called considerably. Richard was reporting civil reaction in the Arab world and state, given the domestic situation with a number eye, was probably needed to reflect the United States Government from the point of view.

Accordingly, withstanding the complex situation

¹² Gulf states report of the ship are conflicting. See list of Ambassador's names, which had relation address on May 7, 1977, reported on the ship as the American people. Department of State, 225, p. 17.

during the last week in March or the first week in April by the Israeli National Petroleum Company to purchase a shipload of crude oil at Abadan consigned to Capetown, Union of South Africa, on an American flag vessel. The Israeli National Petroleum Company, DELEK, had a charter arrangement of long standing with a certain North Atlantic Marine Company which operated a fleet of tankers owned by dummy corporations whose capital stock was completely owned by the same individual who owned North Atlantic Marine. In effect, therefore, the ship which was selected for the mission was owned by the Fairfield Steam Ship Corporation in name but in fact was owned by North Atlantic. The president and sole owner of both corporations was Samuel H. Wang.³³ Wang himself, a Polish Jew by birth, was active in American Zionist circles in the late forties and through the influence of a close friend, Stanley Unger, did most of his shipping business with the Israeli government. Unger, a vice president of North Atlantic Marine, had been employed by the American Israeli Steamship Company from August, 1948, when it was

³³City of New York, County of New York, County Clerks Office, public records of incorporation with amendments thereto for the American Bulk Carriers Incorporated, North Atlantic Marine Co., Inc., Fairfield Steamship Corporation. Fairfield was one of eleven dummy corporations which owned the eleven ships operated by North Atlantic and was probably named after Fairfield Road in Great Neck, N.Y., where Wang lives with his family. (From Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.) There is nothing unusual about this arrangement, although it adds to the research problem considerably.

during the last week in March or the first week in April by the Israeli National Petroleum Corporation as evidence of a ship loan of crude oil to Jordan conditional on payment, which of course it did, on an American flag vessel. The Israeli National Petroleum Corporation, which, had a charter agreement of long standing with a certain North Atlantic Marine Company which operated a fleet of tankers owned by Jewish corporations whose capital stock was completely owned by the same individuals who owned North Atlantic Marine. In effect, therefore, the ship which was released for the mission was owned by the Israeli Petroleum Ship Corporation in name but in fact was owned by North Atlantic. The president and sole owner of both corporations was Daniel H. Wapner. It was himself, a Polish Jew by birth, was active in American Jewish circles in the late forties and through the influence of a close friend, Gustave Hertz, the head of his shipping business with the Israeli government. Hertz, a vice president of North Atlantic Marine, had been employed by the American Israeli Petroleum Company from August, 1948, when it was

25 City of New York, County of New York, namely District Office, public records of incorporation with names of officers for the American Petroleum Corporation, North Atlantic Marine Co., Inc., Israeli Petroleum Corporation. Hertz was one of eleven Jewish corporations which owned and eleven ships operated by North Atlantic and was probably named after Hertz's son in New York, N.Y. where Hertz lived with his family. (From New York Times, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2682, 2683, 2684, 2685, 2686, 2687, 2688, 2689, 2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, 2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2718, 2719, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725, 2726, 2727, 2728, 2729, 2730, 2731, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2735, 2736, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2740, 2741, 2742, 2743, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2747, 2748, 2749, 2750, 2751, 2752, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2766, 2767, 2768, 2769, 2770, 2771, 2772, 2773, 2774, 2775, 2776, 2777, 2778, 2779, 2780, 2781, 2782, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 2788, 2789, 2790, 2791, 2792, 2793, 2794, 2795, 2796, 2797, 2798, 2799, 2800, 2801, 2802, 2803, 2804, 2805, 2806, 2807, 2808, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2812, 2813, 2814, 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819, 2820, 2821, 2822, 2823, 2824, 2825, 2826, 2827, 2828, 2829, 2830, 2831, 2832, 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 2837, 2838, 2839, 2840, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847, 2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874, 2875, 2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, 2885, 2886, 2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2900, 2901, 2902, 2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911, 2912, 2913, 2914, 2915, 2916, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924, 2925, 2926, 2927, 2928, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2933, 2934, 2935, 2936, 2937, 2938, 2939, 2940, 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3107, 3108, 3109, 3110, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3115, 3116, 3117, 3118, 3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3123, 3124, 3125, 3126, 3127, 3128, 3129, 3130, 3131, 3132, 3133, 3134, 3135, 3136, 3137, 3138, 3139, 3140, 3141, 3142, 3143, 3144, 3145, 3146, 3147, 3148, 3149, 3150, 3151, 3152, 3153, 3154, 3155, 3156, 3157, 3158, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164, 3165, 3166, 3167, 3168, 3169, 3170, 3171, 3172, 3173, 3174, 3175, 3176, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 3183, 3184, 3185, 3186, 3187, 3188, 3189, 3190, 3191, 3192, 3193, 3194, 3195, 3196, 3197, 3198, 3199, 3200, 3201, 3202, 3203, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3207, 3208, 3209, 3210, 3211, 3212, 3213, 3214, 3215, 3216, 3217, 3218, 3219, 3220, 3221, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3225, 3226, 3227, 3228, 3229, 3230, 3231, 3232, 3233, 3234, 3235, 3236, 3237, 3238, 3239, 3240, 3241, 3242, 3243, 3244, 3245, 3246, 3247, 3248, 3249, 3250, 3251, 3252, 3253, 3254, 3255, 3256, 3257, 3258, 3259, 3260, 3261, 3262, 3263, 3264, 3265, 3266, 3267, 3268, 3269, 3270, 3271, 3272, 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3605, 3606, 3607, 3608, 3609, 3610, 3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619, 3620, 3621, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3625, 3626, 3627, 3628, 3629, 3630, 3631, 3632, 3633, 3634, 3635, 3636, 3637, 3638, 3639, 3640, 3641, 3642, 3643, 3644, 3645, 3646, 3647, 3648, 3649, 3650, 3651, 3652, 3653, 3654, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3658, 3659, 3660, 3661, 3662, 3663, 3664, 3665, 3666, 3667, 3668, 3669, 3670, 3671, 3672, 3673, 3674, 3675, 3676, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3680, 3681, 3682, 3683, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3688, 3689, 3690, 3691, 3692, 3693, 3694, 3695, 3696, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3700, 3701, 3702, 3703, 3704, 3705, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3709, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3713, 3714, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3718, 3719, 3720, 3721, 3722, 3723, 3724, 3725, 3726, 3727, 3728, 3729, 3730, 3731, 3732, 3733, 3734, 3735, 3736, 3737, 3738, 3739, 3740, 3741, 3742, 3743, 3744, 3745, 3746, 3747, 3748, 3749, 3750, 3751, 3752, 3753, 3754, 3755, 3756, 3757, 3758, 3759, 3760, 3761, 3762, 3763, 3764, 3765, 3766, 3767, 3768, 3769, 3770, 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 3780, 3781, 3782, 3783, 3784, 3785, 3786, 3787, 3788, 3789, 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 3800, 3801, 3802, 3803, 3804, 3805, 3806, 3807, 3808, 3809, 3810, 3811, 3812, 3813, 3814, 3815, 3816, 3817, 3818, 3819, 3820, 3821, 3822, 3823, 3824, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3828, 3829, 3830, 3831, 3832, 3833, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3839, 3840, 3841, 3842, 3843, 3844, 3845, 3846, 3847, 3848, 3849, 3850, 3851, 3852, 3853, 3854, 3855, 3856, 3857, 3858, 3859, 3860, 3861, 3862, 3863, 3864, 3865, 3866, 3867, 3868, 3869, 3870, 3871, 3872, 3873, 3874, 3875, 3876, 3877, 3878, 3879, 3880, 3881, 3882, 3883, 3884, 3885, 3886, 3887, 3888, 3889, 3890, 3891, 3892, 3893, 3894, 3895, 3896, 3897, 3898, 3899, 3900, 3901, 3902, 3903, 3904, 3905, 3906, 3907, 3908, 3909, 3910, 3911, 3912, 3913, 3914, 3915, 3916, 3917, 3918, 3919, 3920, 3921, 3922, 3923, 3924, 3925, 3926, 3927, 3928, 3929, 3930, 3931, 3932, 3933, 3934, 3935, 3936, 3937, 3938, 3939, 3940, 3941, 3942, 3943, 3

originally incorporated, to February, 1953, when he resigned as Port Captain to work for Wang.³⁴

The vessel itself was the "S.S. Kern Hills," a war-time T-2 tanker built at Salusito, California, in 1945. It was one of five operated during 1957 by North Atlantic Marine although the operating arrangements between North Atlantic and the dummy corporations which "owned" its ships was so fluid that its fleet waxed and waned monthly keeping one step ahead of the Egyptian blockade where necessary.³⁵

The captain of the "Kern Hills" was Glenn E. Mosely, whose thirty-eighth birthday was celebrated on March 21, 1957, as the ship was inbound to Abadan. The ship was being operated as a tramp through the Caribbean during late 1956 and Mosely was living in New Orleans, although the home port of the ship, once North Atlantic took it over, was New York. The crew was American, a union crew, most of them signed on at Galveston on January 6, 1957, for "various ports of the Caribbean and Atlantic and any other voyage."³⁶

³⁴Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.

³⁵Wang declared a petition of bankruptcy on January 16, 1960. The involved ownership arrangements during 1956-1958 were too complicated for Lloyds Registry of Shipping (London: Lloyds Ltd., 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958), Vol. I, to keep up with but the ownership is traced in the annual editions of U.S. Army, Corps of Engineers, Transportation Lines on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Coasts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956 and 1957).

³⁶Shipping Articles for the "S.S. Kern Hills," Year 1957, a public record in Headquarters, United States Coast Guard.

After its tramp trip through the Caribbean in January (where, at Aruba, British West Indies, it signed on its last crew member on January 23), the ship sailed for Abadan via Capetown late in February and arrived on the Persian Gulf at the end of March.³⁷

After a short layover on the Gulf, it loaded 15,500 tons of crude and 1,000 tons of fuel oil and, according to arrangements with North Atlantic, set sail for Capetown on April 3. Meanwhile, the actual initiative in the political arrangements seems to have been seized by the Israelis. State knew the "Kern Hills" was in the Middle East and it was aware of the charter arrangements with DELEK. After a series of conferences in Washington during the last days of March, representatives of Israel pressed the Israeli request for implementation of the American promises and agreement was reached, "almost with relief," that the "Kern Hills" would get the job.³⁸ Accordingly, Mosely received instructions at sea from DELEK to deviate from his original destination and to deliver the cargo at Eilat.³⁹

³⁷Recollection of crew member who requests anonymity.

³⁸This is according to a source which is, at best, second hand. It has been included here because it ties in with other evidence setting the time context but the author does not and cannot vouch for its validity.

³⁹Despite a statement of Mr. Wang's to the contrary, blanket clearance for American vessels to visit Eilat had not been formally given at this point although he may well have been referring to the Dulles statement of March 5, supra, p. 121. While there was little chance of trouble with

The ship sailed up the Red Sea during the night of Friday, April 5th, and passed the United Nations position at Sharm el-Sheikh at daybreak Saturday morning. The weather was poor owing to a dust storm on the Sinai peninsula and as it passed Ras Nasrani, the old signalling station where the spiked Egyptian guns still pointed at the Enterprise passage, greetings were exchanged with the United Nations Force and a flare signal fired from the shore. Earlier, the ship had been challenged in the Red Sea during the night by the "USS Stormes," an American destroyer on patrol attached to the Middle East Defense Force. When she answered "Eilat," the "Stormes" had signalled "Good luck" and good luck seems to have been the rule of the day.⁴⁰

Shortly after three on Saturday afternoon, April 6, Mosely dropped anchor as close to the shore at Eilat as he could, having been boarded by the Eilat harbor master from a rowboat as he approached. Eilat was technically closed on Saturday, the Jewish holiday, but this rule was neglected on this particular Sabbath. As soon as the pleasantries were exchanged, a twin-necked sea-pipe was floated out to the ship and connected to the main discharge standpipe on the

Egypt in view of the progress being made with Nasser, some apprehension was felt over a Saudi statement the previous week that reaffirmed the Saudi intention to "maintain the blockade." See the New York Times, March 27, 1957. Saudi troops were at Aqaba after March 28th.

⁴⁰This account corresponds point for point with press reports in the New York Times, April, 6, 7, and 8, 1957.

The ship sailed up the bay the night of Friday, April 2nd, and passed the United States Station at Shant at about 10 o'clock Saturday morning. The weather was poor owing to a high wind on the final passage and at the United States Station where the ship's engine was still running at the time. Passengers were exhausted and the United States Force was a little worn. The ship had been delayed in the harbor during the night by the "USS Sturgeon," an American destroyer on patrol assigned to the United States Force. When she answered "Alas," the "Sturgeon" had stopped. When the ship had been told to leave the bay the night of April 3rd.

Shortly after noon on Saturday afternoon, April 3rd, the ship dropped anchor in close to the shore at about 10 o'clock. The ship was boarded by the United States Force from a rowboat at the ship's stern. The ship was technically closed on Saturday, the United States Force, but this was explained on this particular occasion. As soon as the passengers were exchanged, a two-masted schooner was floated out to the ship and connected to the main steamship through an cable.

Left in view of the United States Force with the ship's apprehension was left over a small amount of provisions and that remained the last incident to remain in the place. See the New York Times, March 25, 1911. The ship was at 10 o'clock on Saturday.

This incident was reported by the United States Force in the New York Times, April 3, 1911.

deck of the tanker. This was "a little out of the ordinary" for Mosely,, but it permitted much speedier unloading into the storage tanks on the quay, which were to hold the crude until the pipeline could take it the following week. Sea-pipe unloading is tricky, but all went well.

The unloading took thirty-six hours. After a rest and a swim in the Gulf, the crew had the ship outbound from Eilat Monday evening at midnight. This was arranged so that the straits could be transited at first light Tuesday morning, since Mosely was afraid of negotiating the long unused Enterprise channel in the darkness. The beacons were unlighted and he had noted the previous weekend that the buoys gave a very poor radar reflection.

On April 19, the first oil was piped from the storage tanks⁴¹ through the new pipeline and Israel marked the successful delivery of her first Persian Gulf crude through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. It was a pitiful drop in the bucket to be sure, but the Middle East would never be the same.

There were now two countries with frontage and facilities on the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

The evaluation of the significance of the passage of the "Kern Hills" depends almost wholly on the viewpoint of

⁴¹This date is difficult to substantiate and the impression given here may be in error. The pipeline was tested for the first time on the 19th and it is assumed it was tested with "Kern Hills" oil.

back of the valley. This was the little out of the valley
for some 15, but it was not much greater than the
the valley was on the way, which was on the left
until the valley was in the valley. The
like extending in the valley, and all were well.

The valley was very deep, and the valley was
and a town in the valley, and over the valley from
Elia's valley was in the valley. The valley was in the
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
and, other valley, and the valley was in the valley
the valley was in the valley. The valley was in the
lighted and he had seen the valley was in the valley
have a very poor valley.

On April 15, the valley was in the valley
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was

There were now two valleys with the valley
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
The valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was

This was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was
the valley was in the valley, and the valley was

the evaluator. The overall significance of the opening of the Gulf and the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force at Sharm el-Sheikh is obviously great but did the passage by an American flag vessel under the circumstances just described materially affect the situation in either way?

In context, the Gulf had been travelled by north-bound shipping and had been patrolled by the Israeli frigate "Miznak" almost as soon as the military campaign had ended. Less than a week after the final shots had been fired, the Israeli merchant ship "Queen of Sheba" had anchored off Tiran⁴² and on December 26 the "Miznak" arrived from Haifa and Eilat was opened as a "naval base." The first Israeli ship to transit the straits waited until June 4, 1957, when the cargo ship "Atlit" sailed from Djibouti, French Somaliland, to make a test trip north, arriving at Eilat on June 6.⁴³

What value was there in testing the blockade? While there was a certain "moral" or sentimental significance in delivering crude oil for the first time, several more trenchant political questions remain to be answered.⁴⁴

⁴²Although the "Queen of Sheba" did not transit the straits. The voyage probably had two objectives--to replenish the Israeli garrison and to act as a "feeler" to gauge the Arab reaction to her presence.

⁴³Cagle, op. cit., p. 80.

⁴⁴It is frequently claimed that the voyage established a precedent of innocent passage. This is not true. It established a precedent of free passage by an American tanker

One of the more significant aspects of the voyage probably had to do with the context in which it was accomplished, the "way things were" during that first week in April, 1957. In a sense, the voyage indicated both a beginning and an end--a beginning for Israel, in a certain emotional sense, and an end for the United States in the harder sense of international politics. It was the end of the series of definite, public international commitments to Israel; was it also an end to a phase of American policy?

The positioning of an international force in Egyptian territory demanded Egyptian consent. What concessions were made to insure that this consent would be given and, once given, not rescinded? Did the fact of UNEF presence at the signalling station at Ras Nasrani indicate a willingness, albeit unpublicized, to "put up" with passage through the strait despite the formal continuation of the blockade?

The question of Israeli access to the Gulf is directly dependent on Israeli access to the Negeb; her access to the Negeb is directly dependent on the so-called "final" settlement of the Arab-Israeli War. Can it be argued that with Eilat open for international trade, the question of Israeli tenure in the Negeb, one of the perennial major issues of the conflict, is at least politically

carrying contraband Persian Gulf crude, and in the abstract, served American interests as well as it served Israeli interests.

finalized? Is it valid to argue further that in return for Egyptian control of the Canal, Nasser surrendered any future claims he might have made that Israel further modify her territorial status along the Israeli-Egyptian frontier?

Is there any sense in the statement that an even trade occurred in late 1956 and early 1957--Suez for the Gulf of Aqaba?

The theoretical question of victory and defeat in the exercise of arms is another thorny problem. Who really won and who really lost?

Finally, did the opening of the Gulf mark a turning point in Arab-Israeli affairs and is an eventual solution of the conflict more likely or more politically feasible because of it?

These are some of the questions which must be examined.

The questions are quite simple. The answers may give some difficulty.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this study the point has been frequently made that the events of the Middle East Crisis of 1956 ended in a "victory" for Israel in the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. Two basic questions determined the major substantive problem of research--the "how" and the "why."

In exploring the how, an examination has been made of the geopolitics of the Gulf and the implication of the Egyptian Blockade on certain relationships that pertained to Israel. The course of the military and diplomatic maneuvers to guarantee Israeli access through the Strait of Tiran form an essential part of this exploration as does the effort of the international community, whose stake in the game was far more procedural than substantive, to restore if not stability at least a brake to the spiralling instability. The efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to provide the framework for settlement and the efforts of the Secretary of State of the United States to provide the focus--these have been important parts of the how. So also have been the fleeting glimpses of Avraham Yoffe and Glenn Mosely who as instruments more than as agents have merited a place of

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this study the view has been presented
that the events of the Israeli Arab crisis of 1950 ended
in a "victory" for Israel in the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba.
Two basic questions remained the major substantive problem
of interest--the "how" and the "why".

In regarding the how, the conclusion has been made
of the geographic of the Gulf and the implication of the
Egyptian blockade on certain relationships that pertained
to Israel. The course of the military and diplomatic
maneuvers to overcome Israeli access through the Gulf
of Aqaba was an essential part of this explanation as was
the ally of the international community, which stands in
the face was the new potential than substantive, to restore
it our credibility as least a bridge to the spiraling instability.
The efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to provide
the framework for settlement and the efforts of the Secretary
of State of the United States to provide the forum--these
have been important parts of the how. So also have been the
frequent glimpses of American Jolls and Nixon possibly who as
Chairman's more than as agent have carried a piece of

prominence in the history of an obscure waterway in an obscure corner of the globe.

The second problem, the question of "why," remains to be answered.

Why was there a victory for Israel?

The Theoretics of Victory

Victory is relative to defeat.

As nations act to maximize their values, however, the complexities of life in the modern political context tend to blurr this relationship as national action in the modern world becomes open-ended, a non-zero-sum game in which a gain for one country does not automatically become an equivalent loss for another. In analyzing the notion of victory however, bearing this factor in mind, a conceptual spectrum may be erected which spans a framework whose parameters are absolute victory on one end and complete and total defeat on the other. The simplified way of looking at this spectrum attempts to force it to do what it cannot do. If a nation is "better off" after a particular maneuver has been completed than it was before it began, the simplified concept of "victory" is applied; if the nation is worse off than when it started, the condition is called "defeat." Unfortunately for the simplicity of this method, "starts" and "ends" are attributed to historical occurrences only in history books. Such a simple dichotomy is relatively useless

There is no doubt that the above is an accurate statement of the facts.

parameter "y" is always set, always being set

It was about a year or so ago

[illegible]

in the complicated setting of the modern political world where simultaneous motivations and occasionally mutually exclusive aspects of a single national interest are used as criteria for actions planned, moves made and decisions formed in relation to a bewildering series of inter-acting forces and conflicts.

In examining the inputs to the spectrum of success, there are three variables which determine position on the spectrum with a far greater degree of accuracy than that which can be determined by the simplistic "seaman's eye."

The first of these inputs is the process concept--the objectives established in the order of priority or the values that are intended to be maximized in any given maneuver. For a nation with a high degree of what might be called political solvency, these values are likely to be more procedural than substantive. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, despite some substantive differences, are engaged in the current Cold War for what are largely procedural issues. Each disagrees with the other on the procedural base on which world politics are to be conducted. For a nation almost politically bankrupt, as was, for example, the Republic of the Congo during much of 1961, the issue is entirely the substantive one of sheer survival. In the Arab-Israeli difficulties in the decade following the year 1947, there was an admixture of the substantive and the procedural until

is the completed course of the subject political world
where economic institutions and institutions mutually
exclusive aspects of a single social system for that
as criteria for economic classes, many may not be
formed in relation to a dominating set of institutions
forces and relations.

By regarding the system as the sphere of action,
about its growth and development which relations prevail in the
system with a few greater degree of activity, that the
system can be determined by the objective "economic" system.
The first of these is the economic concept of the
objective system as the sphere of activity of the value
that are related to the system in the given system. For
a system with a high degree of activity in relation to political
activity, these values are likely to be more numerous than
otherwise. The United States and the Soviet Union, for
example, despite their fundamental differences, are engaged in
the economic Cold War for their own selfish purposes.
The United States with the power of the industrial base on which
world politics are so conducted. For a system with
political activity, as was, for example, the Republic of
the Congo during 1960-1963, the system is entirely the
economic one of world activity. In the present
discussion is the United Nations for 1963, there
was an extension of the economic and the political world

by the summer of 1956, the Israeli objectives, as best determined from operation analysis, were punitive action against the fedayeen bases in Gaza, political leverage to embarrass or unseat Nasser and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is important to remember that in the day to day tyranny of the IN basket in a Foreign Ministry, priority of objectives constantly shift and change. Whatever the priority, however, the first and most obvious input to the determination of success or failure must deal with the objectives intended by the maneuver under analysis.

The second input to the process of determining success or failure is the cost concept, the calculated bearable loss which a nation is willing to accept in order to fulfill its process concept. If, for example, nation A has a dispute with nation B but feels that any cost expended to settle the dispute in its favor would be unbearable, there will be no maneuver and consequently no question of success or failure. The dispute will smoulder. When the threshold of bearable loss is expanded to provide the flexibility for some kind of risk, the world witnesses what is known as an international crisis and so are the history books filled. Usually, when this threshold of bearable loss applies to ends (or, in other words, when both sides feel they can afford to lose the entire dispute) the question is able to be settled by judicial means. When the threshold applies

by the summer of 1950, the Internal Security, as well as
 external, for operations analysis, were possible action
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 which a nation is willing to accept in order to fulfill its
 process concept. If, for example, a nation has a dispute
 with another nation it may feel that any loss sustained in battle
 the damage to the latter would be unacceptable, there will
 be no surrender and consequently no question of success or
 failure. The damage will be minimal. When the threshold
 of desirable loss is expanded to provide the flexibility for
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and for, it is not until, when both sides feel they can
 afford to lose the entire dispute, the question is then
 to be carried by political means. When the threshold applies

only to means (how many casualties, how many planes) the crisis becomes acute.

The third input is the conflict concept, the underlying psychological context in which the objectives are entertained and the costs calculated. The United States and the United Kingdom, for example, have between them a certain psychological relationship which determines that a conflict between them will be "waged" in accordance with an extremely delicate and low threshold of cost and bitterness, largely dependent on the overall world situation in which such a conflict might occur. The United States and the Soviet Union have a different conflict concept, to be sure, which determines the level of action which will be taken by either side probably based on a somewhat higher threshold of bitterness. The Cold War with its undulating current of tension is an excellent example of the way in which this conflict concept changes from time to time in accordance with the overall world political situation. The Arabs and the Jews, the extreme case perhaps, have an elaborately worked out conflict concept between them which determines almost automatically the choices each side feels it must make at any moment in their relationship and which gives permanence to the listing of difficulties which keep them from rapprochement.

only to mean (and many understand it that way) the

whole human race.

The main point is the conflict concept, the under-

lying psychological concept in which the differences are
 interpreted and the wars explained. The United States
 and the United Kingdom, for example, have between them a
 certain psychological relationship which determines that a
 conflict between them will be "cold" in character with
 no seriously hostile and no thousands of dead and dis-
 tress, as the Japanese on the other side would expect in
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 is more than at any moment in their relationship and which
 gives substance to the feeling of antagonism which keeps
 them from rapprochement.

Based on these three variables, therefore, it might be said that absolute victory in any act intended to maximize substantive or procedural values is defined as a situation in which objectives are achieved in the order of established priority at or below the calculated bearable cost with a major change in the psychological relationship between the antagonists which renders the conflict irrelevant.

Corresponding to the absolute victory of one protagonist is the idea of absolute defeat on the part of the other. Absolute defeat then would be defined in terms of capitulation (or the absence of objective achievement)¹ following unbearable cost with a major change in the psychological relationship rendering the antagonist irrelevant. In defeat the loser loses more than he feels he can bear and his influence on the enemy is reduced to zero.

In nuclear war, a preoccupation of the world since August, 1945, much has been written on the thesis that absolute victory is impossible and in the rhetoric of the frameword erected above, it is simple to see the logic of this position. Nuclear war, regardless of objectives achieved, imposes unbearable cost on both sides removing any outcome from the "absolute" end of the spectrum. The determination of relative victory and defeat is quite another matter.

¹The case of substantive loss is the absence of the static objective achievement of preventing the loss from occurring.

based on these three conditions. However, it might be said that however distant the way and intended to maintain relationships in psychological science is defined as a situation in which objectives are achieved in the power of established priority of or before the established scientific work with a major change in the psychological relationship between the organizations which render the subject irrelevant.

Corresponding to the scientific theory of the past is the idea of scientific method on the part of the other. Scientific theory would be defined in terms of scientific method for the purpose of objective comparison.¹

Following scientific work with a major change in the psychological relationship rendering the scientific method valid. In fact the lower levels were then the basis for the best and the following on the way is intended to show.

In scientific work, a presentation of the work is made in such a way that each article in the series that absolute reality is impossible and in the presence of the scientific method above, it is simple to see the basis of this position. But it is, regardless of objective evidence, imposed upon the work on each side resulting in a process from the "absolute" but in the scientific. The description of relative theory and the work is shown below.

¹The case of scientific work is the absence of the scientific method of presentation, the work from the scientific.

In the old fashioned kind of war, though, there can be an absolute winner. Whether it is called "limited" war or "conventional" war in honor of its less sophisticated weaponry or its long history, one of the major objectives of the institution we know of as the United Nations has been to prevent such a situation from occurring. The rationale of collective security is designed to prevent wins and losses in war, if not to prevent the wars which give wins and losses.

But if there are statutory provisions and political precedents in the modern world to prevent absolute victory, there are still opportunities for relative or qualified victories. If, for example, objectives are realized at or below programmed cost although the conflict worsens, a certain kind of qualified victory can be claimed. If some but not all objectives are realized at, below or above programmed costs, then a different kind of victory has ensued. As can be seen, the permutations are almost endless.²

²An additional complication arises in conflict analysis in which the number of antagonists is greater than the classic two. Where three, four or more nations act at cross purposes with differing, variable objectives shifting in priority on an ad hoc basis in a context sensitive to extraneous political considerations (Hungary; the American election) victory and defeat became so difficult to identify that the exercise loses most of its relevance for all but the main parties.

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2
An additional simplification arises in conflict analysis
in which the number of objectives is smaller than the elements
two. Where there, four or more elements and at least two
with different, various objectives which in priority on
an and two basis in a somewhat complex to various political
considerations (energy; and various elements victory and
defeat become as difficult as itself. That the various levels
cost of its relevance for all the same period.

In the preceeding chapters it has been indicated that during the summer of 1956 the government of Israel appraised the chronic Arab problem and examined its own objectives in the deteriorating political situation in the Middle East. At the risk of over-simplification, these objectives fell into three basic categories: Egypt, Gaza and Aqaba. Sometime during the summer a modification in the cost concept occurred in that the threshold of bearable cost was expanded to include large scale military action with the anticipated loss level shifted correspondingly higher. Finally, the Israeli analysis of what has been called the conflict concept above indicated that the psychological relationship between herself and her neighbors had reached the point where nothing was relevant except the conflict. The Arab military arrangements with Egypt crystallized this position and plans were made for what became the Sinai War.

Following the nationalization of the Canal on July 26, a similar appraisal had been made by England and France. Still another similar appraisal was made in Cairo but in the case of the Egyptians, the actual maneuver made them the objects rather than the subjects of action and they had only static objectives to consider after July.

The Sinai War began at 5:00 P.M. on the evening of October 29, 1956. It ended at 9:00 A.M. on the morning of

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The Sinai War began at 5:00 P.M. on the evening of October 29, 1950. It ended at 9:00 A.M. on the morning of

the 5th of November.³ Analyzing the Israeli political position three months later, the following judgments must be made:

1. Egypt. Israel was, if anything, worse off than before with regard to political leverage over Egypt. There were several factors behind this turn of events, not the least of which was the American attitude toward the Arab cause in general and the growth in Arab prestige as a result of the political ramifications of the Suez invasion, the Soviet notes and the split in the western alliance.

2. Gaza. She was somewhat better off in Gaza than she was before although her objective of destroying Egyptian capability to field fedayeen attacks from the Strip was not able to be determined. While Egyptian supremacy in administrative matters was restored, the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force guaranteed at least a modicum of improvement over what was there before.

3. Aqaba. Unquestionably better off than before.

Such was the recapitulation of the process concept.

The cost factor was almost negligible. The total casualty count was a delightful surprise. The added military prestige and the captured equipment left her with a profit.

³ Authors sympathetic to Israel delight in referring to the Sinai campaign as the "100 Hour War," which, even if untrue, sounds better than the "160 Hour War."

the 2nd of November. Analyzing the Israeli political posi-
tion three weeks later, the following judgments were made:

1. Setting. Israel was, in effect, worse off than before with regard to political leverage over Egypt. There were several factors behind this state of affairs, not the least of which was the Egyptian military victory in the Sinai campaign in general and the growth in Arab prestige as a result of the political mobilization of the Arab invasion, the Soviet Union and the split in the Western alliance.

2. Goals. There was somewhat better off in Gaza than she was before although her objective of destroying Egyptian capabilities to strike Israeli interests from the Strip was not able to be determined. While Egyptian military in administrative matters was reduced, the presence of the United Nations Truce Supervision Force in Gaza was a serious obstacle to improvement over what was there before.

3. Impact. Unsurprisingly better off than before. There was no recognition of the progress made. The goal leader was almost negligible. The total casualty count was a negligible surprise. The added military presence and the Egyptian presence left her with a smaller

¹ Another reference to Israel's position in referring to the Sinai campaign as the "1956 Sinai War", which, even in current events books, is the "1956 Sinai War".

The conflict concept is less simple to generalize. Anything less than unbearability is a relative improvement. After the defeat of the Egyptian armies in Sinai, the conflict remained no less bearable politically probably but the "iron grip" with which she had been grasped was broken and remains so to this day.

In achieving one of her major objectives, partially achieving another despite frustration in her third, considerably below programmed cost with a slight lowering of the general tenor of the conflict, Israel must be placed on the victor side of the spectrum.

A relative victor, to be sure, but more the victor than vanquished.

Similarly, Egypt in retaining sovereignty over the Canal (and indeed strengthening it), in increasing her political influence at the loss of her blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba and her high military casualties in a slightly diminished atmosphere of tension with Israel--probably a negative value for her--also emerged on the victorious side. It would be incorrect to say that Egypt "won" a victory in the same sense that Israel did. Both won, nevertheless; but if both won, who lost?

Earlier it was noted that the problems of the world have become increasingly open-ended, that more and more often both sides can win without a corresponding loss by either side. The loss, however, must be absorbed someplace. And so it was in the Middle East Crisis.

The conflict emerges as a basic conflict in general.
 Nothing less than total victory is a realistic requirement.
 After the defeat of the Egyptian armies in Sinai, the conflict
 remained to lose the Sinai politically precisely but the "loss"
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 have become increasingly open-ended, that more and more often
 both sides are without a corresponding loss of either side.
 The loss, however, must be accepted nonetheless. And so it was
 in the Middle East Crisis.

Actually, the world lost.

The Defeat

The institution of war was invented as a normal necessary adjunct of the nation-state system. In the absence of an international legislature or executive, relations between states resembled relations between individuals under primitive American and English tort law, where redress for wrong was an individual affair. While the solutions produced by war often bore no relationship to the rightness or wrongness of the victor's case, since the strongest or luckiest always won, the institution itself survived virtually unscathed until it threatened to destroy the very parameters of the society it was intended to serve.

In 1945, the United Nations was established by the states who, realizing the inability of war to finalize political solutions, intended to abolish it by mutual consent. In abolishing the legal right to individual redress, it was hoped that political conciliation would become a substitute for war, an institution which could perform the same task that war had performed with a greater degree of "accuracy" and with far less expense. Unhappily, what emerged was rather than a substitute for war, merely an alternative to it.

When Israel jumped off on Monday, October 29th, she put the traditional institution of war to the test. She had tried diplomacy and diplomacy did not work. She resorted to force in an attempt to do in the desert what she could not

...the ...

The Defeat

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do around the green table. In eschewing diplomacy from the very beginning as a way to settle the conflict, the Arabs were every bit as much to blame as Israel for this turn of events. Had action in the United Nations ever been a substitute for war, the whole thing would have been impossible. In the absence of a substitute, the alternative could only work if both sides wanted it to work.

Force was called in to do the job.

Force seems to have prevailed until the states on the sidelines realized what was happening and remembered that it was 1956 and not 1856. The United Nations Emergency Force was established to remind the principals of the date. To the extent that the status quo was changed by the use of force, regardless of the substantive issues involved, the world could be said to have suffered a defeat.

Fortunately, it was a relative defeat.

Dag Hammarskjöld personified the objectives of the world community, or to remain in the framework erected above, the process concepts. They were entirely procedural; the important thing was the way things got done. But insofar as the procedural objectives of peace, order and stability were only insured with the expense of an at least unplanned-for cost in a psychological context attributing new utility to the exercise of arms, the immediate result had to be written

to around the given points. In answering questions from the very beginning in a way to create the conflict, the state were every one as much as himself for this form of answer. Had anyone in the United States ever been a witness to war, the whole thing would have been impossible. In the absence of a witness, the witnesses could only have been those who were present at the war.

Force was called in as the law. Force was to have prevailed until the peace of the situation reached what was happened and returned that it was 1915 and not 1911. The United States Emergency Force was established to remind the witnesses of the date. To the extent that the state was changed by the act of force, regardless of the objective reason involved, the world could be said to have entered a period. Historically, it was a relative action.

But however might be considered the objectives of the world community, or to remain in the historical context above, the process was not. They were entirely personal; the important thing was the way things got done. The result as the procedural of justice of peace, order and stability were only limited with the expense of an at least unimpaired-for as in a psychological system affecting the ability to the exercise of law, the individual's results had to be written

in red ink.⁴

The Pragmatics of Victory

As a final section of any study such as this, it is useful to evaluate the impact of the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba on subsequent developments in the Middle East. Two extremes--exaggeration and belittlement--must be avoided.

The first and most obvious effect of the opening of the Gulf was on the Israeli economy. With her backdoor to the east, a new self-confidence marked her economic policies during the years that followed the battle of Sharm el-Sheikh. While the 100,000 tons of cargo moved through there annually through 1960 represented only fifty port-days operations, it was a huge assurance to her. The 18 inch pipeline was recently completed and parallels the new Beersheba-Eilat railway but petroleum discoveries in the Heletz area have taken at least some of the edge off her dependence on the Eilat deliveries. Tourism, on the other hand, has become a big industry in Eilat and the fact that the Israelis up north now can go south for their annual vacations seems important in a country in which too few things like that are ever considered.

⁴On the other hand, the overall effectiveness of the United Nations operations probably did enough psychological good for the U.N. to balance it out in the long run. This is somewhat beside the point.

in red ink.

The Problem of Israel

As a final section of my study such as this, it is
 useful to evaluate the impact of the opening of the Gulf of
 Aqaba on subsequent developments in the Middle East. For
 extremely complicated and difficult--must be avoided.
 The first and most obvious effect of the opening
 of the Gulf has been the Israeli economy. With the discovery
 of the sea, a new self-confidence marked the economic
 policies during the years that followed the establishment of Israel.
 el-Shabab. With the 100,000 tons of cargo moved through
 there annually through 1960 represented only fifty four
 days operations, it was a huge assurance of war. The 14
 inch pipeline was recently completed and parallels the new
 East-West line railway but petroleum discoveries in the
 Nafta area have taken at least some of the wind out of
 dependence on the Gulf deliveries. Further, on the other
 hand, has been a big industry in Iraq and the fact that
 the Israelis in 1960 now can go south for their annual re-
 ceptions of oil is a country in which the low oil prices
 have been very beneficial.

On the other hand, the overall effectiveness of the
 United Nations operations probably has been psychological
 good for the U.N. as a whole. This is
 somewhat outside the scope.

The political implications were certainly positive. As a result of the continued and effective United Nations presence at Sharm el-Sheikh stability in the area has gone up and down since 1957 but the presence of the United Nations has accounted for more stability than it has discouraged. Saudi claims of sovereignty over Tiran and their annual threats to re-institute the blockade seem to be taken seriously by no one; the blue flag flies over the minaret at Sharm el-Sheikh and virtually all nations have dipped their flag to it at one time or another since the 'Kern Hills.' The blockade in the Suez Canal has had a curious history but in balance Israel seems to have learned to live with it and only makes propaganda mileage out of it when the climate is ripe.

The military implications have been somewhat more indirect, but no less substantial. The experience has impressed the Arab world with the fact that Israel will be displaced from Palestine only by brute force, and that brute force (even obsolete brute force manufactured in Czechoslovakia in 1946) remains a symbol of anti-Zionism. Arms and the buildup of arms in the Middle East therefore have important domestic political implications and it was by this route that the Soviet Union was able to gain a toehold in the area. Military advisors and hardware were an important part of the Communist economic offensive through 1961 and although follow-up in this area posed the greatest single threat to the west from 1958 to 1961, follow-up was what the Soviet bloc did least well and

the West has managed to weather the storm--by default perhaps. The bottom fringes of the emerging middle class, now finding its political voice in the new revolution in the Middle East, like to see arms in the market-place on holidays, and arms is what they get.

The opening of the Gulf in the way it was accomplished impressed many in the West with the seriousness of the dogma of positive neutralism which as a result, is becoming better understood in the places where it should have been understood in 1951.

But the most overwhelming effect of the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba has not been on Israel, but on Egypt.

Arab-Israeli antagonism and the Arab thesis that Israel does not exist is petulant, somewhat ridiculous but above all, unreal. While Nasser has a reputation for petulence and is on occasion somewhat ridiculous, the Suez Canal has made a realist out of him and the Gulf of Aqaba has helped him understand himself. It is submitted that the mystique of anti-Israelism is as important to Nasser as a shibboleth as is the traditional regard for motherhood of Pennsylvania Avenue. Most Arabs need Israel and would feel vaguely uncomfortable if it were not there to disparage; Nasser seems to recognize this. He also seems to understand, more than any other Arab figure, that Israel is not going out of business next week without a self-defeating clash which would signify the end of the world order which we now know and his attitude

the West has managed to weather the storm--by deftly perceiving
the bottom line of the situation, and by making
the political voice in the new revolution in the Middle East,
the one to be heard in the new order of things, and also in
what they are.

The opening of the Gulf is the way it was accomplished
expressed many in the West with the significance of the change
of position in the Gulf which as a result, is becoming better
understood in the West where it should have been understood
in 1911.

But the most overwhelming effect of the opening of
the Gulf of Arabia has not been in Israel, but in Egypt.
The Gulf of Arabia has not been in Israel, but in Egypt.
Israel does not exist in isolation, somewhat isolated but
above all, Israel. While Israel has a reputation for isolation
and is on occasion somewhat isolated, the Gulf Canal has
been a central one of his and the Gulf of Arabia has helped
him understand himself. It is understood that the opening
of the Gulf of Arabia is as important to Israel as a highway
as to the international system for movement of goods and
services. The Gulf Canal has been Israel and would have been
Israel if it were not there to disperse; Israel seems to
recognize this. He also seems to understand, but from any
other Arab figure, that Israel is not just one of the
new world without a self-defeating which would actually
the end of the world even which we now know and the attitude

on the Gulf of Aqaba matter seems to bear this out.

Whether or not he may have looked at it in quite this way, Nasser traded the Gulf of Aqaba for the Suez Canal in 1957 and the Suez Canal is by far more important to Egypt than Aqaba ever might have been. To say that he took a substantive gain for a procedural loss is possibly a contrived way of describing a situation which was done for two very definite and quite realistic reasons, both political.

In the first place, Nasser was enough of a realist to understand that the acquiescence of the United States was the deciding factor in March, 1957, which tipped the scales in the direction of the Sphinx. The price was small on the scale of values who had a huge job to do in his own way. Aqaba was that price. By consolidating his political position he was in a far better position to face the world and to gain customers for the Suez Canal Authority.

The second reason is more subtle. It was politically impossible for Nasser or any other Arab leader to retain or regain ascendancy in the Arab political world after 1957 by a soft line on Israel. On the other hand, it would have been equally impossible for Nasser to cultivate the impression that he was the responsible Canal operator in the face of Israeli claims that her port of Eilat was blockaded by force, that she was kept from her contacts with the East and that

on the Gulf of Aqaba seems to have this out.
Whether it can be put into effect at it is quite

this way, however, it seems the Gulf of Aqaba for the time
being in 1957 and the Gulf of Aqaba is by far more important
to Egypt than the Gulf of Aqaba. To say that he
took a substantial gain for a permanent loss is possibly
a convenient way of describing a situation which was done
for two very different and quite opposite reasons, both
political.

In the first place, Nasser was enough of a realist
to understand that the appearance of the United States
was the deciding factor in 1957, 1958, which tipped the
scales in the direction of the United States. The price was well
on the scale of values who had a huge job to do in his own
way. It was then that, by consolidating his political
position he was in a far better position to face the world
and to gain acceptance for the Suez Canal authority.

The second reason is more subtle. It was politically
impossible for Nasser or any other Arab leader to remain or
remain necessarily in the Arab political world after 1957
by a vote like on Israel. On the other hand, it would have
been equally impossible for Nasser to withdraw the Egyptian
that he was the responsible Canal operator in the case of
Israel claim that the Gulf of Aqaba was blocked by force,
that this was Nasser's own responsibility with the fact that

her economic life was being strangled by Nasser's maritime policy. World opinion was particularly important at a time when the World Bank was considering what became of its \$56.5 million loan in 1959. When the Egyptian government somewhat "graciously" allowed the United Nations into the Sharm el-Sheikh and abandoned its Blockade on the Gulf, it certainly did not weaken its position on Suez.

The Egyptian policy on the Israeli access to Suez would seem to make sense only if this interpretation--world opinion--were part of the interpretation of that policy also. The Canal policy is curious. Explicitly, the policy prohibits Israeli ships but not Israeli cargoes from the Canal. In practice, the Canal has been occasionally closed to certain Israeli cargoes on certain ships for no clearly discernable reasons. The most famous case, the "Inge Toft," was a Danish ship chartered to an American firm hauling stone from Haifa to the Far East. At Port Said, the Egyptian government barred the Canal to her passage and attempted to seize the cargo. This was on May 21, 1959.

Coincident with this, Nasser and Kassim were engaged in a bitter propaganda battle during a time when the United Arab Republic had expressed overt support for the Mosul revolt and there seemed to be a serious bid by the USAR to overthrow the Iraqi government. Was there a connection between the propaganda war and the seizure of the "Inge Toft," an act symbolic of absolutely nothing except anti-Israelism?

her economic life was being dominated by Western's economic policy. World opinion was particularly important as a time when the World Bank was negotiating with Britain in 1952. The Egyptian government seemed "generously" allowed the United Nations and the Arab League. Shakh and Khayyat in 1952 on the Gulf, to establish did not within the position of Egypt.

The Egyptian subject on the Israeli subject to 1952 would seem to have been only at this time. The opinion--were part of the interpretation of that policy also. The Canal policy in 1952. Explicitly, the policy prohibited Israeli ships but not Israeli cargoes from the Canal. In practice, the Canal has been occasionally closed to certain Israeli cargoes in certain ships for no clearly stated reasons. The most famous case, the "Tallit", was a Danish ship chartered to an American firm sailing from New York to the Far East. At that time, the Egyptian government denied the Canal to her passage and arranged to return the cargo. This was on May 21, 1952.

Collected with 1952, Kassar and Kassar were engaged in a bitter propaganda battle during a time when the United Arab Republic had requested every support for the Arab cause and these seemed to be a serious aid to the Arab cause. Overthrow the Iraqi government. Was there a connection between the propaganda war and the seizure of the "Tallit"? an act of aggression against Israel's economic life.

In the light of this, and remembering the development projects carried out at Eilat while the Gulf was still firmly shut, it is probable that following nationalization of the Canal in July, Nasser understood the political impossibilities of the Aqaba Blockade as well as Ben Gurion understood the inevitability of its termination.

The overall implication or effect of the opening of the Gulf on the ultimate solution of the Palestine is negligible. If the removal of the Blockade had occurred in an exclusively legal context and if the controversy had been waged in strictly legal terms, the effect would have been greater of course. The removal of the blockade by Egypt would be argued by Israel to be the legal underwriting for her sovereignty in the Negeb and consequently her right to "exist" within the 1949 Armistice Lines. But on an effective level, the purely legal has little bearing.

The simple fact seems to be that the Arab-Israeli dispute is not a legal dispute; that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was no more legal than was its subsequent removal and that the exclusive application of international law to solve the conflict was useless after 1947.

The conflict is soluble, but it is not soluble in a court of law unless a sweeping change occurs in the political climate which would make a settlement on legal grounds relevant. With the Gulf open, the most significant problem between the two sides is probably the refugee question. The

In the light of this, and remembering the developments projected during the 1950s, it is probable that following nationalization of the Canal in 1956, Kanner understood the political implications of the Suez blockade as well as Ben Gurion understood the feasibility of its termination.

The general implication of effect of the opening of the Gulf on the ultimate solution of the Palestine is negligible. It was merely of the blockade had occurred in

an exclusively legal context and if the controversy had been waged in exclusively legal terms, the attack would have been

frustrated at once. The removal of the blockade by Egypt would be argued by Israel to be the legal underwriting for her sovereignty in the region and consequently her right to "exist" within the 1947 partition lines. But on an effective level, the purely legal fact little counting.

The simple fact seems to be that the Arab-Israeli dispute is not a legal dispute; that the blockade of the Gulf of Aden was not legal then was the subsequent removal and that the exclusive application of international law to solve the conflict was realized after 1957.

The conflict is political, but it is not soluble in a court of law unless a sweeping change occurs in the political climate which would make a settlement on legal grounds reasonable. With the Gulf open, the legal situation becomes neutral and the two sides are probably the refugee question. The

two situations are somewhat analogous. Israel will be required to make a diplomatic concession (repatriation or compensation) in the same vein as she made the diplomatic "concession" to withdraw in favor of the United Nations in Sinai. The Arabs will have to make a practical concession by integrating the refugees who refuse repatriation into their own societies, just as Egypt made the practical concession of refraining from reoccupying Sharm el-Sheikh.

Such a settlement is quite a long way off.

Finally, with regard to the United States, what did the State Department gain in its course of action with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba from February to April, 1957?

Increased flexibility.

And flexibility characterizes, as nothing else, the policy which the United States has managed to maintain with the developing world ever since. There have been false starts and blind alleys, to be sure, but in extricating herself from the bitter inter-domestic problem of the Arab-Jewish world in 1957, the United States was able to meet the Soviet economic offensive on much more realistic grounds. Indications seem to point to the fact that by 1962, flexibility has been the single most important asset in American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is the kind of flexibility that has been able to accept positive neutralism on its own terms and Zionism on American terms.

the situation was somewhat ambiguous. There will be
 referred to some of the important developments (especially on
 cooperation) in the field of the United Nations in
 "conclusion" in the report of the United Nations in
 1961. The report will have to make a practical conclusion
 by integrating the refugees and returnees separation into
 their own countries, but on the other side the practical con-
 sideration of the United Nations is quite a long way off.
 Finally, with regard to the United Nations, what the
 the United Nations said in its report of action which was
 sent to the Council of the United Nations in 1957.
 Increased flexibility.
 And finally, the United Nations, in making plans, the
 policy which the United Nations has wanted to maintain at the
 the developing world ever since. There have been false
 errors and blind alleys, so to speak, but in conducting the
 self from the United Nations' position at the time.
 Indeed, when in 1957, the United Nations was able to meet the
 world economic difficulties in such a successful manner.
 Furthermore, it is true that in 1957, flexibility
 has been the single most important factor in making foreign
 policy in the United Nations. It is the kind of flexibility
 that has been able to keep positive relations in the com-
 munity and the United Nations. It is the kind of flexibility
 that has been able to keep the United Nations in the

With the help of the experience in the Aqaba matter, an important lesson seems to have been learned in Washington. The crises which have vexed State since 1957 have been crises--in Berlin, in Cuba, in Laos--which have been born out of situations in which the flexibility which should have been maintained has been gobbled up. Where the American policy was able to maintain this flexibility, important crises have been averted. This flexibility is the ability to remain free of the moral obligation to make a choice in a pre-determined direction. It is the ability to have choices to make based not on a previous policy "set" but on realistic considerations of national interest.

The United States, in developing a policy based on the ability to choose, has added to its political solvency.

The Arab-Israeli dispute will be solved one day when both sides acquire enough of this solvency to realize that the ability to choose is far more important than the necessity for choice.

With the help of the experience in the Arab matter, the Government has been asked to have been learned in Washington.

The crisis which have been since 1957 have been serious--in fact, in Cuba, in fact--which have been born out of situations in which the flexibility which should have been maintained has been cobbled up. When the American

policy was able to maintain this flexibility, important crises have been averted. This flexibility is the ability to remain true of the moral obligation to make a choice in a pre-determined direction. It is the ability to have

choices to make based not on a previous policy "but" but on realistic considerations of national interest.

The United States, in developing a policy based on the ability to choose, has added to the political policy. The Arab-Israeli dispute will be solved one day when

both sides accept enough of their policy to realize that the ability to choose is far more important than the

possibility for choice.

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